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This dissertation is an ethnographic, socio-historical study of public 
participation in post-disaster recovery planning in Japan from the 1995 Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe through ongoing recovery activities in the 
tsunami-devastated areas of Tōhoku. It investigates how a "new breed of specialists" in
participatory recovery planning (PRP), primarily from Kobe, co-constructed the field 
of PRP along with their own expertise, and scrutinizes what happens specifically when 
these experts work together with the local residents of the Sanriku coast, who 
apprehend the world from very diﬀerent cultural, historical and epistemological 
perspectives. This work reveals PRP in Tōhoku as a process through which the 
"community" of experts and the "community" of locals strive to re-construct 
themselves and each other. 
Based on ethnographic data, this dissertation questions both the old "deficit 
model" of an ignorant and irrational public and the (recently in vogue) deficit model of
"unreflexive" experts constitutionally blind to local context and the situated character 
of knowledge — at least with respect to a certain category of expert, epitomized by the 
PRP experts from Kobe. Drawing upon recent scholarship, the thesis argues that it is 
fruitful to dub this category engagement agents: technical experts who "orchestrate" 
participatory engagement exercises, integrate and contextualize diverse knowledges, 
and liaise with diverse stakeholders and key constituencies. Among the core practices 
of engagement agents is the praxis of trust-work, through which they construct and 
maintain their credibility as experts and their trustworthiness as moral agents, 
integrating their several roles. Putatively "non-expert" individuals without formal 
training may also pick up the know-how of a technical specialty and become 
recognized as authoritative "experts" while practicing the peculiar roles of engagement
agents, while also retaining the social and epistemological advantages of "locals." 
"Expertise" is not solely about the production, use, or communication of 
"knowledge." Rather, there are as many ways of "being an expert" or "constructing 
expertise" as there are of situating practice, locating social identity, negotiating 
credibility, eliciting trust, engaging constituencies, or enacting reflexivity. 
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GLOSSARY: KEY JAPANESE TERMS
This short list explains a few key words that appear repeatedly in the text. Additional, 
less important or less frequent terms will be translated in the body of the dissertation.
 
* Bōsai (): disaster risk reduction/mitigation/prevention.
* Bundan (): division, separation.
* Fukkō (): recovery, reconstruction, renovation.
* Gappei (
): merging, amalgamation, annexation.
* Hama (): beach, seashore, seaside district.
* Hisaichi (): disaster zone, literally "disaster-struck land" or "land that has 
endured calamity."
* Hisaisha (): sometimes translated as "victim" or "survivor;" literally "disaster-
struck person" or "person who has endured calamity."
* Juku (): semi-formal study group or seminar; informal school.
* Kizuna (): social ties or bonds.
* Machi-aruki ($" ): "town-walking," a guided group walking tour through a 
townscape, usually to learn about local history and culture.
* Machi-zukuri kyōgikai ($"#!%), or machi-zukuri for short: "community-
making;" neighborhood-based local planning or community development 
associations.2 
* Shūdan-iten (): Group relocation.
* Takadai-iten (	): Relocation to high ground.
* Toshi-keikaku (): City planning (conventional, top-down, technocratic).
2. There are many ways to translate these terms from the Japanese. Machi can mean "town," 
"community," "neighborhood," or even "block," depending on context and the way it is 
written. As with its English equivalents, it can connote "community" in the sense of a 
physical arrangement of architectonic structures or "community," in the sense of a 
cohesive social group, or both. It can be written with at least two diﬀerent kanji characters 
( or ), or with the kana phonetic syllabary ($"). Zukuri, a gerund of the verb tsukuru, 
"to make," "build," "develop," also may be written in kanji (%) or kana (#!%). Machi-
zukuri is generally written using kana alone, which emphasizes interpretive ambiguity. 
Meanwhile, the most literal translation of kyōgikai () might read "cooperative 
deliberation meeting," though it is often rendered "council" or "conference" or 
"association" in the English literature.
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DRAMATIS PERSONAE
In order to help the reader keep track of the cast of characters portrayed in this 
dissertation, here is a list of key, selected actors and their institutional aﬃliations. Note 
that in this English-language dissertation, names are provided in the order familiar to 
English speakers (i.e., surname last), contrary to the standard Japanese order, which is 
surname first. Some names are pseudonyms, for the protection of certain individuals.
 
* Tadamori Arakawa: independent tea seller from Minami-Sanriku.
* Kuniaki Baba: resident and owner of waste disposal company in Karakuwa; sponsor 
and supporter of network for recovery support volunteers.
* Masaaki Chibata: Engineer and planner from Pacific Consultants, Inc., a major 
contracting corporation, hired by Minami-Sanriku and Miyagi Prefecture to work on
recovery plan for Shizugawa District.
* Eiichi Katō: hotel owner from Shishiori District, Kesennuma.
* Norio Katō: Karakuwa resident; president, Kesennuma Tourist Convention Agency;
owner of a minshuku (a kind of Japanese-style inn) in Karakuwa
* Ikuo Kobayashi: professor of planning, Yamate University, Kobe; PRP expert 
(trained as urban planner); founder and principal of several organizations and 
networks for institutionalizing and coordinating Kobe's community of PRP experts, 
including CO-PLAN, Supporters' Network for Recovery from Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake Through Machi-zukuri, and Kobe Machi-zukuri Research Institute
* Seiji Komori: retired professor of geography, Himeji University; PRP expert; oﬃcer 
of Kobe Machi-zukuri Research Institute; chief of Fukkō Juku.
* Mayumi Kudō: priestess of Shintō shrine in Shizugawa District, Minami-Sanriku; 
photographer and artist; organizer of local PRP initiatives; recognized by PRP 
experts and public as machi-zukuri expert.
* Teruyuki Morisaki: PRP expert (trained as architect); worked with Noda Hokubu 
and Takatori East machi-zukuri organizations for recovery planning after Kobe 
earthquake.
* Mr. Neguchi: shop owner, resident of Tadakoshi District, Karakuwa; head of takadai-
iten association, former head of neighborhood association.
* Ryuichi Nozaki: PRP expert (trained as architect); oﬃcer of Kobe Machi-zukuri 
Research Institute; working with several groups of residents in Kesennuma, 
including the Tadakoshi District of Karakuwa.
* Harumi Takasago: PRP expert; member of Kobe Machi-zukuri Research Institute; 
relocated to Kesennuma and worked out of local Volunteer Station on variety of 
recovery-related projects, including PRP with Nozaki and others
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* Mr. Onodera: head of Community Hall of Shishiori District, Kesennuma. 
* Osamu Tsukihashi: professor of architecture, Kobe University; PRP expert; working 
with several groups of residents in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures, including the 
Osawa District of Karakuwa.
* Nobukazu Tsuji: independent urban planner; PRP expert; resident of Matsumoto 
District in Kobe; worked with Matsumoto machi-zukuri kyōgikai as consultant after 
Kobe earthquake; oﬃcer of Kobe Machi-zukuri Research Institute; emcee of Fukkō 
Juku; working with several communities in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures.
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PREFACE
	






chigiri ki na
katami ni sode o
shibori tsutsu
sue no Matsuyama
nami kosaji to wa
We were exchanging our love vows
Wringing each other's sleeves
When the wave overtopped the peak of Pine Mountain....3
— Kiyohara no Motosuke ()4
Disasters are a "normal" part of the human condition.5 Their periodic 
occurrence is inevitable. Yet, the variability of that periodicity and the unpredictability
of the precise moments at which they strike exacerbate their capacity to disrupt — and
to shape — human lives. Like the poet Kiyohara no Motosuke's lovers, we may be 
attending to the passions and obligations of our mundane lives, when suddenly an 
overwhelming violence strikes from beyond our imaginations. This dissertation, too, 
was disrupted, and shaped, by the unexpected occurrence of disaster. 
It was originally conceived, in 2010, as a comparison of the participatory 
recovering planning processes in post-earthquake Kobe and post-Katrina New 
Orleans. Despite obvious social, historical and material diﬀerences between the two 
3. Translation by author. 
4. Waka poet, CE 908-990.
5. Perrow (1984, 1999).
- xix -
cases, they share a number of important features. For example, in both cities, 
historically marginalized populations proved to be the most vulnerable. In both cities, 
early recovery plans presented by experts and oﬃcials were vehemently rejected by 
citizens, in part due to lack of public input. In both cities, none of the subsequent 
recovery planning endeavors was able to garner significant political legitimacy without 
prominently featuring widespread public participation as central to its process. In both 
cities, neighborhood- and district-based planning groups were provided with teams of 
architects, engineers and planning consultants, and lay residents worked with these 
experts and oﬃcials to plan for the social and material recovery of their communities. 
And in both cities, the final recovery plans resulting from these processes closely 
resembled the initially rejected plans, yet enjoyed broad support.
In short, Kobe and New Orleans were the two pre-eminent examples of major 
urban (actually peri-urban) disasters in wealthy, industrialized, democratic societies in 
recent decades, and community-based participatory planning featured prominently as 
a key component of both cities' recovery processes. Thus, a study of the two cases in a 
roughly comparative project promised to yield clues to a suite of questions about 
publics and experts, power and participation, and expertise and sociotechnical change.
Then the tsunami of March 11, 2011 devastated the Pacific coast of Tōhoku, 
and Japan's relentless seismicity reconfigured not only the lives and material reality of 
its eastern seaboard, but also this dissertation (admittedly, an eﬀect of somewhat less 
significance). In fact, my initial reaction (aside from shock and horror and awe) was to 
forge ahead with the dissertation as planned, with the "3.11" disasters featuring merely
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as an epilogue or perhaps a narrative framing device. I proceeded with a research visit 
to New Orleans in the summer of 2011. As much as I wanted to go to Japan to join 
volunteer eﬀorts, as well as to research the ongoing events, I was yet unsure of how 
much of my work to date would be irrelevant, how much ground would need to be re-
tread, or how much would need to be explored anew. Furthermore, I knew that the 
situation in Japan was chaotic and in flux, and I was unsure of what approach — 
empirically, methodologically, theoretically — would be most appropriate or fruitful. 
On the other hand, the March 11 disasters almost immediately began to alter 
my work, intensifying my focus upon both Japan and catastrophe in general. Shortly 
after the disasters, there was an encouraging surge in interest among academic 
colleagues to "do something," including simply to study, teach, learn and understand 
the situation. Yet Japan specialists are few, and my colleagues and I recognized that 
many educators who might want to incorporate study of various aspects of the disasters
in their courses may have lacked a basic familiarity with the relevant literature and 
thus faced a daunting task. With Lisa Onaga and Honghong Tinn, then two graduate 
student colleagues with expertise in Asia and Japan studies in Cornell's Department of 
Science & Technology Studies, I started Teach 3.11, a blog of film and academic 
literature annotations aimed at helping students and teachers understand the socio-
historical context of recent and ongoing events. Further, the disasters helped to inform 
a course I developed and taught in the fall semester of 2011 on "technology versus 
nature in Japanese history," in which my students and I explored Japan's long, 
ambivalent relationships with "nature" and with "technology." 
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After I arrived in Japan at the end of 2011, my project transformed. The actors
who had been involved with Kobe's recovery were heavily engaged with similar eﬀorts 
in Tōhoku, and although many municipalities on the northeastern coast had released 
initial recovery plans, the local recovery planning process, and the overall progress of 
the region's recovery, had barely begun. I felt compelled, both from the standpoint of 
research opportunity as well as, somehow, moral obligation as a concerned human 
being, to shift my focus to Tōhoku. As the ongoing recovery planning on the Sanriku 
coast became central to the project, the relevance of New Orleans faded, while Kobe's 
recent history took on a new significance.
It is my sincere hope that the resulting dissertation is one that does justice to 
the dignity of the extraordinary people of Kobe and Tōhoku, and their respective 
struggles to recover from horrific catastrophes. "Recover" can be used either as an 
intransitive or a transitive verb, and the multiple processes of "recovery" are ones in 
which hisaisha ("disaster-struck people") work to recover their homes, their 
communities, their ways of life, the meanings of their pasts, and the imaginaries of 
their futures. As Kobe's residents can attest, identifying a definitive end to these 
processes is diﬃcult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, by helping to understand the 
ongoing processes of recovery, I hope that this dissertation may in its own small way 
contribute to a better recovery for the residents of Tōhoku, and for all recovering 
hisaisha, and their supporters, everywhere.
- xxii -
1. INTRODUCTION: PARTICIPATORY RECOVERY PLANNING
AS PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE
... rather than saying that we give back to Tōhoku what we received from Tōhoku, I 
would rather say that the things we received from people in the past, we return to the 
people of the future…. Therefore, there is absolutely no need for anyone to thank us. 
We are investing for the future. This means that Tōhoku is in no way the place where 
we teach the lessons of Hanshin-Awaji; it is the place for us to learn. We don't go there
as sensei; we go there as students.
—Seiji Komori1
1.1: From Kobe to Tōkohu
Even on the fastest of Japan's shinkansen "bullet trains," the Nozomi ("Hope"), it 
takes the better part of a day for you to reach the town of Kesennuma from the city of 
Kobe. From Shin-Kobe station, it's just a few minutes to the first stop in Osaka, about 
30 minutes to Kyoto and an hour to Nagoya. This is an early morning train, so the 
salarymen sitting next to you are noisily unwrapping and consuming their excessively 
aromatic breakfast eki-ben (“station-bento,” shorthand for train station-bought meals in 
disposable bento boxes). Gliding eﬀortlessly on smooth, jointless tracks, you zoom 
eastward under mountains, over rivers, past rice fields, tea farms, rural villages, and 
industrial facilities. When another train passes in the other direction, the windows and 
wall of your car bend inward from the air pressure, as the full 1300-foot length of the 
other train comes and goes within less than a second. Your shinkansen skirts the base of 
Mount Fuji, its divine peak vibrating with an almost sentient majesty, as the salarymen
next to you snore in their seats. About two and a half hours after leaving Kobe, you 
reach the terminal at Tokyo station. There, you rush to make your transfer, a 
1. Komori interview (May 2012).
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northbound Yamabiko ("Mountain Echo") shinkansen leaving 10 minutes later. Once out 
of the Tokyo metropolitan area, you pass broad, flat agricultural lands, stopping briefly
in Fukushima city before whooshing through an area that was a radioactive no-go 
zone in the days after March 11, 2011. An hour and a half after leaving Tokyo, in 
Sendai, the largest city in the Tōhoku region,2 you are transferring again, to a 
northbound Hayate ("Swift Wind") shinkansen. After thirty minutes you disembark at 
Ichinoseki, a smallish industrial town in Iwate Prefecture, a number of miles inland 
from the coastal area hardest hit by the tsunami. After the gleaming urban centers of 
Kobe, Tokyo and Sendai, Ichinoseki seems like a shabby, semi-rural outpost. There, 
you board yet another train, the eastbound Sūpah Doragon ("Super Dragon"). Despite its
formidable name, it is not another shinkansen. Rather, it is a wan man ("one man") — 
that is, a small train driven and conducted by a single crewman, just one or two cars 
long. The Super Dragon travels at a languid pace, kerchunk-kerchunking its way 
downstream for nearly an hour and a half until it finally reaches its terminus at 
Kesennuma on the coast. 
Kesennuma is situated on a rugged coastline of forest-clad, rocky mountains 
girding narrow valleys — scenery so spectacular that you may wonder why it took a 
catastrophe to bring it to your attention. Even more than two years after the disaster, 
you see heart-breaking and frankly awesome devastation in the valleys, juxtaposed 
with untouched buildings and infrastructure at higher elevations. You still see hills of 
rubble, trashed cars and boats, gutted buildings, and broad fields of rectangular 
building foundations where once there were whole neighborhoods. You see 
construction workers and heavy equipment and the uniform, cross-braced, 
2. Tōhoku (, literally "northeast") is the northeastern area of Honshu (Japan's largest 
island), comprising six prefectures, including the three most aﬀected by the Great East 
Japan Earthquake and tsunami (	, Higashi-Nihon Dai-Shinsai): Fukushima, 
Miyagi and Iwate.
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prefabricated blocks of temporary houses, temporary shops, and temporary oﬃces. 
You meet kind and hard-working locals who laugh and joke with you, and then tell 
you their personal stories of tragedy. With a shrug, the heroic determination to 
overcome and to rebuild transforms into the acknowledgment that the quotidian tasks 
of carrying on are just the way things are now.
This is the environment in which the relentless, uncertain work of cleanup, 
reconstruction, and “recovery” is proceeding. This is "the geography of crisis and 
opportunity."3 Here, local communities are engaged in a range of recovery eﬀorts, 
including public participation in recovery planning through neighborhood-based 
machi-zukuri (“community building”)4 organizations. In this context, local residents — 
many still displaced and living in temporary homes — are working with non-local 
technical experts to re-imagine the future sociotechnical configurations of their 
communities.5 A core group of these experts performed similar duties in Kobe after the
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995.6 Many of them have been making the 
3. Edgington (2010) is the source of this phrasing. A frequent discourse in the aftermath of 
catastrophe is the discourse of “unprecedented opportunity” (Quarantelli, 1999; 
Olshansky, 2002; Olshansky et al, 2005; Tierney et al, 2006;  Edgington, 2010; Orihara & 
Clancey, 2012).  
4. The meaning and significance of "machi-zukuri" is discussed in detail in the next section of 
this introduction.
5. The sociotechnical concept has been developed by numerous STS scholars — for example, 
Winner (1980), Pinch & Bijker (1984), Bijker, Hughes & Pinch (1987), MacKenzie & 
Wajcman (1987), Bijker & Law (1992), Kline & Pinch (1996), Jasanoﬀ (2003), Jasanoﬀ 
(2004), Jasanoﬀ & Kim (2009). Although these and other scholars describe distinct 
variations on the concept, the general idea is that “technological” artifacts and systems are 
socially constructed, or that technology and the social world are co-constructed. That is, 
sociotechnical systems comprise not only physical components but also the debates, 
negotiations, assumptions, values and contested knowledge claims that come to be 
inscribed in the structure and workings of the material artifacts, as well as the “ensembles” 
of relevant social groups, institutions, practices, norms, market conditions and regulatory 
frameworks in which technologies are embedded and without which they could not 
function. Society is embedded in technology even as technology is embedded in society.
6. This event (
	, Hanshin-Awaji Dai-Shinsai) is often referred to simply as "the 
Kobe earthquake" or as "Hanshin-Awaji" or even, given suﬃcient context, just "Hanshin."
The temblor's epicenter was located at the northern tip of Awaji Island. "Hanshin" (
) 
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arduous trip from Kobe to Kesennuma and other towns in Tōhoku at least once per 
month, since late 2011. Some receive compensation for their expenses from Hyogo 
Prefecture, while others are funded by their universities or by other organizations. 
Since a large portion of hotel stock was destroyed by the tsunami and what remains is 
largely booked by armies of construction workers, these recovery planning experts 
often must find creative solutions to the problem of accommodation.7  Thus, despite 
the fact that Japan is among the wealthiest and most eﬃciently connected societies on 
Earth, Tōhoku, with its relative inaccessibility and its lack of available 
accommodation, is a surprisingly diﬃcult location to visit. 
This distance is not only geographic. Languishing on Japan’s periphery, the 
region never fully shared in the heights of the nation’s economic success, including the 
“bubble” era of the 1980’s. A vast area comprising a large city, several small towns, 
and a number of fishing and farming villages, the region is considered inaka or “rural” 
by Japanese standards. The density, distribution, and patterns of development are 
quite diﬀerent from American rural environments, but it does share features of 
contemporary American rurality: a culture of rugged self-reliance, an aging and 
declining population, an economy based largely upon exploitation of natural resources 
through agriculture, mining, fishing and forestry. For centuries, the agricultural, 
touristic and extractive industries of Tōhoku have served Japan's capital to the 
south — Tokyo (née Edo) — in a relationship that might best be described as 
is a portmanteau of alternate readings of two characters from the names of Osaka (
) 
and Kobe (), the two largest cities aﬀected. It is also the name of a company that runs 
a train line between the two cities and owns the region's most popular professional baseball
team, the Hanshin Tigers (who are to Tokyo's Yomiuri Giants roughly what the Boston 
Red Sox are to the New York Yankees). However, while Osaka endured shaking and 
limited damage from the earthquake, Kobe was substantially devastated.
7. One team of such experts working in Kesennuma, for example, stays at the house of the 
team leader's friend. This structure, the first floor of which was damaged by the tsunami, 
has numerous small bedrooms, as it had been used as a bordello until the 1930's.
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"colonialistic."8 Tōhoku’s post-war history is one of gradual social disintegration and 
environmental degradation, in tandem with progressive entanglement in international 
markets and globalized flows of information, capital, and technology — processes that 
have sharply accelerated in the post-disaster period of nascent “recovery,” even while 
the growth of urban centers such as Tokyo and Sendai has surged.9 
In this dissertation, I examine a specific part of that recovery process: 
community-based participatory recovery planning, or “PRP” for short,10 enacted by a 
core group of experienced PRP experts from Kobe11 and local, non-expert residents of 
Kesennuma and Minami-Sanriku, two towns in Miyagi Prefecture on the tsunami-
devastated Sanriku coast. Based upon 18 months of in situ ethnographic and historical 
fieldwork, including participant-observation, interviews and documentary analysis, I 
show how PRP — specifically the "Kobe Style" of PRP — became a coherent field of 
practice and expertise after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, how a specific 
group of academics and professionals became “experts” in that field at that time, and 
8. A popular, recent Japanese book, Tōhoku Saisei (, "Tōhoku Rebirth"), argues that 
Tōhoku residents should seize upon the recovery as a chance to break away from this past 
of exploitation and dependence upon Tokyo, and to establish a more sustainable, 
independent society and economy.
9. I discuss this recent history in some detail in Chapter 3.
10. "PRP" is my own acronym for "participatory recovery planning," which itself is shorthand 
for "public participation in post-disaster recovery planning." It is neither an actors' term 
nor a unified and organized institution, although as I will show (especially in Chapter 2), 
the "Kobe Style" of PRP has been institutionalized, formally and informally. Furthermore,
Kobe's experts have influenced an ethos of PRP, enacted through machi-zukrui kyōgikai and 
similar community-based organizations, widely shared by many planners, architects and 
other practitioners throughout Japan, particularly in academia. (Less so among private 
contractors and government agencies — another topic explored in the following pages.)  
11. This dissertation is, in a sense, an extended elaboration of exactly what I mean by "PRP 
experts". For now, it is important to note that my usage of "PRP experts" refers to 
individuals who are experts in the process of PRP itself. Like other "technical experts," 
conventionally construed, they "contribute expertise" to the process in the form of 
specialized advice based on their disciplinary know-how (e.g., architecture, engineering or 
urban planning); in addition, they study and facilitate the very processes of public 
participation in recovery planning.
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how this same group is now playing an important role in the ongoing recovery 
planning in the aftermath of the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami. They are 
exploiting Tōhoku as a training ground for their successors and as a milieu for 
reconsolidating their expertise and insuring their legacy. Thus, PRP in Tōhoku is a 
process through which both the “community” of experts and the “community” of local
residents strive to re-construct themselves and each other.12 
Drawing from literature in science and technology studies (STS) and public 
engagement with science (PES)13 as well as urban planning, sociology and other fields, 
I interrogate the nature of expertise in a PRP context, including how it is constructed 
and maintained. I examine what kinds of knowledge are salient, and what are their 
respective roles. I investigate the strategies that are employed by geographically, 
culturally and epistemically disparate communities as they endeavor to work together 
toward mutual understanding, agreement, and concrete plans for re-imagining and re-
shaping the sociotechnical order of their communities. Ultimately, this analysis 
interrogates, challenges and contributes its own conclusions to the rich tradition of 
scholarship in STS concerned with “lay/expert” interactions, “local” vs. "expert" 
knowledge, and public engagement with technology and technical expertise.
12. Note that actors themselves generally use the terms senmonka (, "expert" or 
"specialist") and the English-derived konsarutanto ($ #!$", "consultant") to 
describe those who are helping to facilitate machi-zukuri and related PRP endeavors. Senmon
() means "specialty" or "subject of specialization/expertise," while senmonteki () 
is usually translated as "technical" or sometimes "professional."
13. Here, “PES” is used to distinguish work of roughly the last two decades from prior work in
public understanding of science (PUS). For reviews of these literatures and their history to 
the early and mid-1990s, see Lewenstein (1992) and Wynne (1995). As I discuss in greater 
detail elsewhere in this dissertation (especially in Ch. 4), PES emerged, in part, as a 
reaction against PUS’s problematic assumptions about the character of technical 
knowledge, experts, and publics. I am not the first to make this distinction — cf., for 
example, Durant (2008), p. 18. 
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1.2: The research opportunity
Underpinning this dissertation is the fundamental supposition that there is 
merit in bringing the insights of STS (science and technology studies) and PES (public 
engagement with science and technology) to bear on the study of post-disaster 
participatory recovery planning (PRP), and, conversely, that the empirical study of 
PRP may serve to challenge, highlight, or supplement the insights of STS and PES. 
After all, PRP is a process by which human beings intentionally design, shape, and co-
construct the "hard" technological infrastructure of the "built environment" — roads, 
buildings, seawalls, public transportation systems, water and waste management 
systems, parks, monuments, arrangements of public and private spaces — along with 
the "soft" social infrastructure of a community — cadastral boundaries, local 
associations, administrative institutions, business investments, market structures, 
consumption habits, resource usage and supply chains, the mundane rhythms of daily 
life, cultural norms, values and practices — and the interdependent relationships 
between them. It is this complex, intricately woven tapestry to which I refer when I 
invoke the "sociotechnical order (or configuration)" of a community. Moreover, PRP is
a site of interaction and collaboration between technical experts (who are often non-
local), and local residents, who are rarely experts in the relevant "technical" fields of 
recovery planning.
These fields — architecture, urban planning, geography, civil engineering and 
design, construction, law — have received relatively scant attention from STS scholars 
thus far (and almost none from scholars of PUS or PES). This is somewhat surprising, 
given that the purview of these fields is the shaping of the built environment, including 
its relation to the “natural” environment, for human use and habitation. Few 
enterprises purport to wield such a powerful influence over the sociotechnical 
configurations of communities, cities and societies. Indeed, when Langdon Winner 
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sought to illustrate the profound and lasting socio-political impacts of specific choices 
in the designs of technological systems, he primarily cited cases of urban planning and 
architecture.14 Robert Moses and his Long Island bridges may be the most famous 
example, but Winner’s essay invokes a number of other cases in an extended 
discussion of the “built environment” professions and the technological infrastructure 
that is their bailiwick. Winner's essay is a landmark of the small and modest district 
within the STS polity that has been constructed on studies of the built environment.15 
This project aims to instigate further development of that subdivision. Thus, implicit in
the current project is a "meta" argument, which is that it is indeed appropriate — and 
important — for STS scholars to investigate the processes by which that constellation 
of sociotechnical infrastructures and artifacts known as "the built environment" is 
changed. 
Meanwhile, disaster studies in general and STS-inflected studies of disasters 
and their aftermaths, in particular, have been gathering considerable momentum in 
recent years, moving toward the culmination of a long de facto tradition of “Disaster 
STS” (DSTS).16 Akin to the long heritage of fruitful scholarship in scientific 
14. Winner (1980).
15. Other notable edifices of this district include Hughes (1983, 2004), Latour (1992, 1996), 
Kranakis (1996), Aibar & Bijker (1998), Latour & Hermant (1998), Sims (1999), Star 
(1999), Bowker & Star (1999), Bijker & Bijsterveld (2000), Knowles & Saarinen (2001), 
Gieryn (2002), Hommels (2005a, 2005b), Clancey (2006a, 2006b), Bijker (2007a, 2007b), 
Hård & Misa (2008), Pinch (2010), Barrios (2010, 2011), Allen & Maret (2011), Knowles 
(2011).
16. E.g., Perrow (1984), Wynne (1989, 1992, 1996), Vaughan (1996), Fortun (2001), Petryna 
(2002), Klinenberg (2002), Clancey (2006a, 2006b), Allen (2007), Frickel & Vincent (2007),
Hilgartner (2007), Shrum (2007a, 2007b), Knowles (2011). In addition to a wave of special
journal issues in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (e.g., Social Studies of Science 37:1, 2007; 
Technology in Society 29, 2007), as well as several edited volumes (e.g., Lakoﬀ, 2010; Dowty &
Allen, 2011), recent years have seen a proliferation of conferences devoted to disaster 
studies and DSTS. Not coincidentally, recent years have also witnessed a surfeit of 
“natural” disasters, such as Japan's quake and tsunami (2011), the Indian Ocean tsunami 
(2004); devastating tropical cyclones in the U.S. (2005), Myanmar (2008) and Phillippines 
(2013); violent tornado outbreaks in the U.S. (2011); earthquakes in Indonesia (2004), 
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controversies and technological failures, DSTS has recently been the subject of a call 
for an institutionally coherent program of research as a major sub-field within STS.17 
Across the social sciences, it has become a virtual truism that catastrophes provide 
unique opportunities for both scholars and actors to apprehend, and potentially 
reform, otherwise inaccessible structures and “black-boxed” dynamics of societies.18 
Built environments, sociotechnical systems, political institutions, and cultural norms, 
practices and imaginaries all become potentially open to scrutiny and intervention in 
the aftermath of a catastrophe. This idea is similar to the principle which underpins 
the tradition of “controversy studies” within science studies,19 as well as several strains 
of technology studies, including the social construction of technology (SCOT)20 and 
studies of technological testing, failure, and accidents.21 To wit, whether an object of 
inquiry is a material artifact, a scientific theory, or a society, it is most amenable to 
study and intervention prior to the “closure” and stabilization of its form,22 or after it 
has suﬀered some catastrophic rupture to its context23 or its constitution — especially 
when the latter is followed by strenuous eﬀorts toward (social) reconstruction.24
“Public participation” in decision-making processes and other endeavors that 
Pakistan (2005), China (2008), Chile (2010), Haiti (2010) and New Zealand (2010, 2011); 
floods in Pakistan (2010), Australia (2010-11) and Thailand (2011); as well as mudslides in 
Brazil (2011), massively lethal heat waves in Western Europe (2003) and Russia (2010), 
and proliferating areas of severe drought across the globe. 
17. Fortun & Frickel (2012).
18. This is a point made by many; e.g., Wynne (1988), Pinch (1991), Bijker & Law (1992), 
Jasanoﬀ (1994), Downer (2011), Dowty & Allen (2011), Fortun & Frickel (2012).
19. E.g., Collins 1985, Latour & Woolgar 1986, Collins & Pinch 1998.
20. E.g., Pinch & Bijker 1984, Bijker & Pinch 1989, Kline & Pinch 1996.
21. E.g., Perrow (1984), Vaughan (1986), Wynne (1988), Pinch (1991), Pinch (1993), Sims 
(1999), Downer (2007), Downer (2011).
22. On the other hand, studies have also shown that users can "re-open," reconfigure and 
reinterpret technologies. E.g., Akrich (1992), Kline & Pinch (1996), Oudshoorn & Pinch 
(2005). 
23. Akrich (1992).
24. Hilgartner (2007).
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produce or depend upon specialized knowledge has been an important site of practice 
and research across a number of professional and academic fields for some time now. 
Scholars in fields such as STS, PES, urban planning, international development and 
political science all share a strong commitment to the study and practice of 
participatory methods and public engagement. Yet dialogue between the fields 
remains remarkably rare.25 Although this project is situated primarily within STS and 
PES, it also aims to instigate and provoke that broader dialogue.
Participatory processes are generally considered to be a more just means 
toward higher quality, more equitable and more sustainable ends than non-
participatory or “top-down” methods. In the abstract, and viewed against the foil of 
“top-down” processes in which experts or authorities dictate from on high, the promise
of public participation may be distilled to two, complementary points. Through the 
relatively open and transparent sharing of information and the involvement of multiple
stakeholders, including traditionally under-represented groups, it is seen as a more just 
and democratic means to achieving an end (such as a policy or a planning outcome or 
some other collective action or decision).26 And by subjecting proposals to deliberation 
and taking into account multiple perspectives and a richer, finer-grained knowledge of 
local conditions, its ends are seen as being of higher quality and more sustainable 
25. The STS studies of the built environment mentioned above do engage to some degree 
with planning and architecture literature. Hommels (2005a, 2005b), in particular, has 
argued that STS needs to pay more attention to cities as technologies, and has tried to 
establish "a common interdisciplinary playground" for STS and the urban planning and 
urban studies literatures. In addition, some literature in the planning field has invoked 
STS scholars and concepts. For example, Brain (2006) cites actor-network theory, while a 
recent volume examines Urban Planning as a Trading Zone (Balducci & Mäntysalo, 2013), 
exploiting both Galison's "trading zones" concept as well as Star & Griesemer's "boundary 
objects" to help theorize inter-group and inter-disciplinary conflict, negotiation and 
collaboration in planning processes. A chapter of that volume (Calvaresi & Cossa, 2013) 
also invokes "interactional expertise" (Collins & Evans, 2002; 2007).
26. Friedmann (1992), Jasanoﬀ (2003), Latour (2004), Leighninger (2006), Ganapati & 
Ganapati (2009).
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politically, socially, and often environmentally.27
The vast literature on "public participation" describes a dizzying array of 
approaches.28 In STS and PES, there is citizen science or "public participation in 
scientific research" (PPSR);29 there are consensus conferences, science shops, science 
cafes, science cabarets, and participatory mapping exercises. In the field of planning, 
there are charrettes, neighborhood plans, district plans, and there is debate over which
approach is most "eﬀective:" direct participation, advocacy planning or collaborative 
planning.30 Anglophone planning scholars fret that "the incorporation of citizen 
participation into conventional planning... has produced frustration, disillusionment, 
and cynicism on all sides...."31 My research project is motivated, in part, by the hope 
27. Variations on these ideas may be found in, e.g., Funtowicz & Ravetz (1990), Harding 
(1991), Irwin (1995), Scott (1998), Taylor (2001), Burby (2003), Jasanoﬀ (2003), Lee & 
Roth (2003), Innes & Booher (2004), Latour (2004), Leighninger (2006), Skogan (2006), 
Ebrahim & Weisband (2007), and Ganapati & Ganapati (2009).
28. At least since Arnstein's seminal "Ladder of Participation" essay (1969), participatory 
exercises have often been characterized as "having high levels" or "having low levels" of 
participation. Yet ranking "levels" of participation along a single axis fails to capture the 
diversity of forms of participation, and there are as many ways of evaluating this "level" as 
there are of defining the goals of "participation." Given these issues, it is unsurprising that 
a literature has developed around the evaluation of participatory exercises. E.g., Renn et al
(1993, 1995), Rowe & Frewer (2000, 2004, 2005), Ryfe (2007).
29. Bonney et al (2009).
30. E.g., Yoshimura & Yazaki (1999), Innes & Booher (2004), Lane (2005), Brain (2006), 
Olshansky (2006), Reardon (2009), Ganapati & Ganapati (2009), Tanaka et al. (2009), 
Grant-Smith & Edwards (2011), etc. Part of the debate is over what should count as 
"eﬀectiveness" in this context. Should it be based upon evaluations of the extent to which 
the exercise is "participatory," or upon some other measurable outcome? Forester et al 
(2008) argue that their approach to local planning in post-Katrina New Orleans, in which 
they interviewed residents in the field and then went back to drafting room to translate the 
residents' desires into plans, produced more representative results — judged by residents' 
own pleased reactions — than the "participatory," expert-facilitated neighborhood 
planning that characterized the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) and which resembled, 
to some degree, machi-zukuri-based recovery planning in Kobe. One New Orleans-based 
architect who helped facilitate UNOP complained to me that the built-environment 
professionals should have led the process, rather than "facilitate" it. (Waggonner interview, 
2010.) On the other hand, post-UNOP surveys showed broad, overall satisfaction with the 
planning process among participants (Lukensmeyer, 2007). 
31. Brain (2006), p. 18. Brain, in a piece directed toward a readership of designers, architects 
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that the study of a few empirical examples of PRP would produce practical knowledge 
about some subset of the broader galaxy of public engagement and participatory 
processes, to help make sense of them and to help guide future eﬀorts. I wanted to 
know which strategies and which practices worked best, given the specific conditions of
PRP in these particular Japanese communities. I'll return to these issues in the 
concluding chapter.
Participatory planning in Japan is generally conducted through the institution 
of neighborhood-based machi-zukuri kyōgikai  (, "community-making
associations") or similar organizations. Historically, these grass-roots groups positioned
themselves in opposition to toshi-keikaku: conventional urban planning (, "city 
planning"). Speaking of toshi-keikaku and machi-zukuri as "ideal types," as portrayed both 
in scholarly literature and commonly by actors, toshi-keikaku is usually seen as a largely 
“top-down,” technocratic process, which aims to remake the built environment 
according to the goals of authorities with relatively little regard for local contexts or 
qualitative social consequences, which, in turn, often include the disruption of local 
social networks and ways of life. In contrast, machi-zukuri is generally seen as 
characterized by local, public participation in the planning process, including the 
framing of problems and questions to be addressed, as well as the goals to be achieved. 
and planners, argues that participatory processes have largely failed to adequately reflect 
the will of participants and have also failed to meet "our aspirations for democracy and 
social justice." Campanella (2011) has argued that the American planning field's 
overwhelming concern with participatory input and its post-Jacobs constitutional allergy to
classically modernist master plans have contributed to a disciplinary identity crisis and left 
the big, bold ideas of built-environment design to — horror of horrors — architects. 
Likewise, Krieger (2000) asserts that "greater public involvement in the planning process 
has had the unanticipated consequence of diminishing regard for professional expertise," 
since planners have become "mere absorbers of public opinion, waiting for consensus to 
build" (p. 208-209). In the same volume, Rybcynski (2000) asks, "Where have all the 
planners gone?" (p. 210). For these authors, the planner's role as participatory facilitator is 
ineluctably incompatible with the planner's putatively more fundamental role as designer. 
As I will show in this dissertation, PRP experts from Kobe take the opposite view, that 
these two roles are continuous.
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Typically, those goals include qualitative measures of success — such as improvements
in quality of life — and the steps to achieving them tend to be incremental, whereas 
toshi-keikaku’s objectives are often quantitative benchmarks of narrowly defined notions 
of eﬃciency and productivity — e.g., calculations of costs, tax base expansion, or 
traﬃc throughput — that are often achieved through short-term, larger scale 
engineering projects. Thus, whereas toshi-keikaku approaches generally view planning 
and sociotechnical change in terms of a context-free “technical” rationality, manifested
in physical plant and material artifacts, machi-zukuri approaches claim to be more 
socially and technically robust because, stated crudely, they ideally take seriously both 
the "social" and the "technical" "halves" of socio-technical co-construction. In short, 
machi-zukuri may be summarized as “creating physical space as well as human network 
in local community [through] soft-oriented bottom-up community planning activities 
and/or hand-on community design towards the betterment of the environment 
[sic].”32
Thus, PRP, as it has been practiced through machi-zukuri in Kobe and now in 
Tōhoku, fundamentally represents an opportunity to study an empirical example of 
public participation in an exercise directed toward sociotechnical change, in which 
non-expert publics interact with "experts,” and in which “local knowledge” and local 
concerns, as well as “expert knowledge,” play important roles. Originally I saw this 
project as an opportunity specifically to study processes of upstream public engagement 
in sociotechnical change — that is, prior to the inscribing of values, norms and 
32. Nishimura (2005), p. 2. The English-language literature on machi-zukuri is small but 
burgeoning.  See, for example, Hein (2001), Evans (2002), Shaw & Goda (2004), Sorenson 
(2004), Nishimura (2005), Olshansky et al (2005), Kobayashi (2007), Sorenson & Funck 
(2007), and Edgington (2010).  A selection of the more extensive Japanese literature 
includes Makisato (1981), Endo & Miyanishi (1981), Mori (1984), Tamura (1987), 
Hirohara (1989), Konno (1991), Honma (1994), Ito (1996, 2000), Matsuno (1997), 
Nakamura (1997), Kobayashi (1998), Miyoshi (1998), and Watanabe (1999).  
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assumptions into sociotechnical systems.33 I intended to extend the metaphor of 
upstream engagement from its more typical context of emerging and risky technologies
to the less glamorous but equally important context of post-disaster PRP. However, as 
I discuss in greater detail in the closing section of this chapter, I have come to question 
the usefulness of the "upstream" metaphor in this case.
Prior studies of interactions between technical experts and lay publics have 
rarely treated these two groups symmetrically. Unfortunately, many accounts of “lay-
expert” interactions either subscribe to the so-called “deficit model” of an irrational 
and technically ignorant public, or vehemently oppose that tradition by portraying the 
“lay” public with greater sympathy and in richer, subtler detail than the “experts.”34 
Yet such a reversal of sympathies actually contravenes the most compelling argument 
against the “deficit model”: the idea that “lay knowledge is not an impoverished or 
quantitatively inferior version of expert knowledge; [rather,] it is qualitatively diﬀerent 
[and] no less sophisticated than specialist expertise.”35 Because they are "qualitatively 
diﬀerent," neither "expert" nor "local" (or "lay") ways of knowing can make blanket 
claims to epistemological primacy. This suggests that points of friction or slippage 
between, for example, fishermen and planning consultants cannot merely be chalked 
up to the ignorance or “wrongness” of one group and the knowledge or “correctness” 
of the other (whether the arena is planning or fishing). Rather, they must be evaluated 
based on a rich and symmetrical understanding of the disciplinary, historical and 
cultural contexts that condition the ways that each group engages, understands and 
represents the world. Hence this project aims to build a detailed ethnographic and 
historical understanding of both the Kobe-based experts and the non-expert residents 
33. Jasanoﬀ (2003), Wilsdon & Willis (2004), Wilsdon et al (2005). Cf. also Irwin (1995), Sclove
(1995), Irwin & Wynne (1996) for similar ideas without using the term itself. 
34. E.g., Wynne (1989).
35. Bucchi (2008), p. 451.
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involved in Tōhoku’s recovery planning.
Initial research indicated that this group of PRP experts had emerged from the 
ruins and the recovery of Kobe, and that these experts were now applying their know-
how in Tōhoku. By studying them, I wanted to learn how technical expertise in the 
built environment fields is constructed and maintained through the study and practice 
of PRP. I expected that my research would confirm the notion, common in STS and 
PES literature, that technical experts are, as a rule, unreflexively and institutionally 
blind to the situated character of knowledge, the nuances of local context, and the 
varieties of ways of knowing. At the same time, I wanted to learn more about the 
specific ways that experts and non-experts interact, communicate and collaborate. Do 
they deploy boundary objects?36 Employ trading zones?37 Enact various forms of para-
linguistic translation? Achieve "interactional expertise"?38 Is the so-called "lay/expert 
divide" incommensurable?39 To what degree do the answers to these questions vary 
among subgroups within "experts" or "non-experts"? Which PES frameworks, if any, 
best describe the empirical practices of PRP? How are the questions, choices and 
salient forms of knowledge determined? Whose expertise matters, and why — or, put 
another way, how is expertise established in this context? How is it sustained and 
reproduced? In what ways does it matter that experts and locals come from diﬀerent 
communities, distinct "social worlds,"40 or that they represent alternative "forms of 
life"?41
Although there are several groups of built environment experts involved in 
36. Gieryn (1983), Star & Griesemer (1989).
37. Galison (1997), Gorman (2010).
38. Collins & Evans (2002, 2003, 2007), Collins et al (2010).
39. Kuhn (1962).
40. Clarke & Star (2008).
41. Wittgenstein (1953).
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Tōhoku's recovery — including those working in government planning agencies at all 
levels (national, prefectural, and municipal), as well as those working for private 
contracting firms on behalf of these agencies — this dissertation focuses primarily upon
those PRP experts who are working most closely with the communities of Tōhoku 
through machi-zukuri and similar participatory processes. Specifically, it focuses upon a 
few Kobe-based PRP experts who make the long trek once or twice a month to a few 
districts in Kesennuma and Minami-Sanriku within Miyagi Prefecture, and the local 
residents with whom they are engaged in recovery planning.
One final note on research opportunities in the wake of the so-called "triple-
disasters" of "3.11." Obviously the tsunami wreaked more tragedy than the acute 
devastation of wrecked communities; the nuclear disaster at Fukushima which began 
to unfold on March 11, 2011, continues to this day, and will persist, in the form of 
widespread radioactive contamination, for decades or centuries. It has understandably 
attracted a great deal of attention from STS scholars internationally. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to address the range of complex issues presented 
by what has become known simply as "Fukushima." It is worth noting, however, that 
when one considers the crucial role of tsunami defenses, infrastructure, and other 
sociotechnical features of the built environment — including their failures — the 
tsunami destruction on the Sanriku coast is just as much a "natech disaster" or an 
"envirotechnical disaster" as the Fukushima nuclear accident.42
42. Shorter and perhaps more convenient — albeit less evocative — than Kai Erikson’s “new 
species of trouble,” environmental sociologists now frequently use the portmanteau natech 
to refer to these "natural-technological" catastrophes. (E.g., Picou, 2009; Andreadakis et al,
2012.) Brett Walker, an environmental historian of Japan, speaks of hybrid causation in 
catastrophes that have conventionally been regarded as "technological" in etiology, such as
the case of widespread mercury poisoning at Minamata. Other environmental historians 
have adopted the term envirotechnical to capture the notion of the co-construction of 
ecological and (socio-)technological systems more generally (e.g., Finlay, 2010; Pritchard, 
2011, 2012).  Finally, a more conventional concept of causation is worthy of mention 
because of its association with the influential Normal Accident Theory. In the aftermath of
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Fig. 1-1: These buildings, erected after Kobe's earthquake, house the Kobe Earthquake 
Memorial Museum and a number of institutions devoted to the study of disaster risk reduction 
and recovery, including the Asia Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC), the Disaster Reduction 
and Human Renovation Institution (DRI), and the International Recovery Platform (IRP), 
with which I was aﬃliated as a visiting researcher and Fulbright-Hays Fellow. A third building 
to the left is a major branch oﬃce of the Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), 
analogous to USAID. These buildings, plus an art museum, hospital, shopping center, and a 
large cluster of condominium high-rises (with hundreds of both public and private units), make
up the HAT Kobe district (HAT="Happy Active Town"), an area that was conceived before 
the earthquake but not planned or constructed until afterwards. Ikuo Kobayashi, the figure 
who is arguably most responsible for the institutionalization of participatory (recovery) 
planning in Kobe, if not Japan, was the lead planner on the project. HAT Kobe is built upon 
formerly industrial waterfront land and landfill. By purchasing the land from Kobe Steel and 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries and developing the HAT Kobe district, the city's planning 
department hoped to help revitalize Kobe's economy, resettle thousands of residents who had 
lost their homes in the earthquake, and reinvigorate community through strategic use of 
expanded public spaces. As a public center of disaster-related expertise, the institutions 
pictured here further served to symbolize Kobe's recovery as well as its commitment to 
furthering disaster management and humanitarian action globally.43  Photo by author 
(February 2013).
the Bhopal disaster, Charles Perrow expanded his theory to more explicitly recognize the 
importance of ecosystem accidents, in which certain etiologically “technical” accidents 
ultimately result in social and ecological catastrophe.
43. Kobayashi interview (March 2012).
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1.3: Research methods and challenges
From the beginning, this has been an exploratory, qualitative research project. 
As such, the research themes and questions described above, based largely upon issues 
and debates within STS and PES literature as well as upon basic knowledge of the 
empirical sites, have operated as sensitizing concepts throughout the processes of research 
and analysis.44 The strength of an exploratory, ethnographic approach guided by 
sensitizing concepts and open inquiry, as opposed to, say, a targeted approach directed
by hypotheses and specific questions, is that the researcher remains open — and 
"sensitized" — to a broader range of sources, sites, and types of meaningful data. To 
use a signal-noise metaphor, the targeted approach directs the researcher to disregard, 
not only larger chunks of apparent noise, but also any possible coherent patterns that 
do not fit the previously specified forms of acceptable signals. In contrast, the 
exploratory approach encourages the researcher to recognize, and consider further 
investigating, unanticipated patterns that could be read as meaningful signals. At the 
same time, the sensitizing concepts provide enough guidance and structure that the 
researcher is able to sift through the data, identifying potentially meaningful patterns 
and disregarding irrelevant noise, relatively eﬃciently. A disadvantage, vis-à-vis a more
targeted approach, is that the exploratory approach may require more time to be spent
collecting and analyzing broader and more diverse sets of data.
In this instance, I spent about 18 months in the field, conducting roughly three 
consecutive phases of fieldwork and analysis, plus a final phase of analysis after 
returning from the field. At the risk of some oversimplification, I would describe these 
phases roughly as (1) broadening, (2) deepening, (3) sense-making, and (4) articulating. 
In the first phase (about 3-5 months), the primary objective of my research activities 
44. Blumer (1954), Van de Hoonaard (1997), Bowen (2006).
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was to broaden my understanding of the project's sites, actors and objects of inquiry. 
This included identifying key individuals, institutions and social groups, mapping the 
relationships between them, and establishing access. The second phase (about 7-9 
months) was about deepening my knowledge of these sites, objects and actors, with a 
particular focus on those that seemed to be the most promising sources of fruitful data. 
In the third phase (about 6 months), I began trying to make sense of what I was 
learning by pulling the information together into several coherent narratives. Although
I had taken notes throughout the first two phases (and, of course, had produced 
proposals proﬀering prospective analyses), it was not until the third phase that I began 
attempting to write significant analytical material based on substantial fieldwork. 
Lastly, the fourth phase (about 4 months), focused on formulating and articulating a 
final, analytical narrative, commenced at the end of my fieldwork. As noted, these 
descriptions of distinct project phases are somewhat simplified; although the emphases 
and immediate objectives evolved, data collection and analysis worked as a dyad 
throughout the duration of the project, informing each other dialogically.
The primary methods of data collection included participant-observation, 
interviews, documentary analysis, and audio and photographic documentation. From 
December 2011 through August 2013 — minus two months in the summer of 2012 —
I was based in Kobe, Japan, and made frequent, regular visits to Kesennuma, Minami-
Sanriku, and other parts of Tōhoku. In all locations, I attended formal and informal 
events, formed relationships and interacted extensively with residents and experts, 
gathered documentary materials (printed as well as audio-visual), took photographs, 
and conducted unstructured and semi-structured ethnographic interviews. In addition 
to taking live notes, I recorded the audio of interviews, meetings and events as much as
possible — as well as some casual (but valuable) conversations — and took 
photographs for the sake of compiling visual records that could be cross-referenced 
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with the audio and textual material. A number of those photos are reproduced within 
this dissertation, for illustrative purposes. Since a number of key informants were 
active Facebook users, their posts — updates and photos — were monitored for 
important developments in their activities.45 A great deal of recorded and collected 
material was transcribed into Japanese text; a subset of that was subsequently 
translated into English. Likewise, key portions of publications and printed documents 
were also translated. As mentioned briefly in this dissertation's Acknowledgments 
section, my wife, Michiyo, who is a native of Kobe, Japan, supplemented my own 
work with occasional interpretation at meetings and interviews and with help 
translating documents and transcripts. Finally, all of the information and notes 
generated from these research activities were collated and analyzed, both concurrently 
with their capture as well as post facto.
"Collation and analysis" means that the data was tagged with notes and 
organized into an evolving filing system, the structure of which reflected research 
themes and empirical categories based on a continuously developing understanding of 
the data and its relevance to the sensitizing concepts. This process was often 
undertaken in conjunction with the selection of material to be transcribed and the 
further selection of material to be translated (signal selection and amplification, to 
continue the earlier metaphor). In addition, some data collection itself performed 
crucial interpretive and analytical work. In particular, in interviews and other 
interactions with actors, many of whom may also be said to be colleagues in the broad 
field of disaster studies, discussions often became sessions of mutual dialogical analysis 
and interpretation. Particularly as my fundamental orientation toward the project was 
not to work toward a narrowly conceived conclusion nor to impose a heavy-handed 
45. I have not used any direct quotations from these posts, but rather used them to inform 
lines of questioning during interviews and personal communication.
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theoretical structure on the data, but, rather, to "follow the actors"46 and, as much as 
possible, to allow meanings to seem to "emerge" from the data, guided by sensitizing 
concepts,47 these discussions were especially productive. Since none of my interlocutors
was familiar with STS or PES literature, it was solely my task to situate these meanings
with respect to the literature and my developing understanding of the research. As the 
research progressed into the "sense-making" phase, notes were expanded into brief 
passages of descriptive and analytical text, and eventually organized and further 
expanded into narrative proto-chapters for this dissertation.
Although the Institutional Review Board of Cornell University chose to exempt
my project from the strict oversight of IRB review, some of the information I collected 
in the course of my fieldwork was of a suﬃciently sensitive nature that I have elected to
anonymize (or rather, pseudonymize) certain names of people and places. A few names
are too well-known or too easily identifiable to eﬀectively obfuscate, while most are not
particularly vulnerable to harm.
I encountered several interrelated challenges in the field, which I was only 
partially able to overcome, and which therefore have aﬀected the content of this 
dissertation. First, despite my aim to produce an account symmetrical in its treatment 
of each of the main groups of actors, in practice this turned out to be diﬃcult to 
achieve. While my institutional aﬃliations aﬀorded me a number of advantages, being 
based primarily in Kobe (where those institutions were located) meant that I had more 
frequent, easier access to the PRP experts in Kobe than I did to the residents and 
communities of Tōhoku. To some degree I was able to compensate for this by simply 
46. Latour (2007).
47. "Emergence," of course, is a phenomenological description of a process that involves both 
intuitive perception and systematic analysis by the researcher. Ultimately, all 
interpretation is theory-laden and all analysis is guided, not only by conscious awareness of
specific questions and sensitizing concepts, but also by disciplinarily structured ways of 
thinking.
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prioritizing social and formal interactions with residents of Kesennuma and Minami-
Sanriku when I visited those sites; however, a more sustained presence in Tōhoku may 
have allowed for even deeper ethnographic engagement.
At the same time, my access to the Kobe-based experts was also limited in 
certain respects. In spite of my aﬃliations, I did not necessarily have daily contact with 
them, and I was never able to find myself fully included in their internal communiqués.
Although they responded generously to any individual request for specific information,
they did not generally include me in their planning or in the circulation of information 
unless I asked. Not only was I a new acquaintance, but I was a foreigner of a younger 
generation, untrained in architecture or urban planning, with somewhat limited 
Japanese language abilities. In short, I was an outsider — welcomed and treated 
generously, to be sure, but never quite fully included, and thus not privy to as much 
information as I would have liked.48
Other unintentional asymmetries of access and analysis have further influenced
the account within the following pages. For example, I had limited access to meetings 
between PRP experts and government oﬃcials; thus, I have been unable to portray 
those interactions and relationships, especially vis-à-vis relationships with local 
residents, in as much detail as they deserve. For a time, my focus in the field was 
largely upon the "point of contact" between Tōhoku's residents and Kobe's PRP 
experts, at machi-zukuri meetings and elsewhere, and it was relatively late in my 
fieldwork that I came to fully appreciate the fact that such PRP activities are 
substantially circumscribed by the planning eﬀorts of government agencies and their 
48. As one who owes many of his achievements to sheer linguistic competence in a single 
language, it is diﬃcult to know whether such challenges could have been overcome with 
native speaker-like abilities. As mentioned in the Foreword, Michiyo, my Japanese spouse-
cum-research assistant, was able to help me overcome many language barriers, but there is
no question that, even with the best training, one will never be as comfortable conducting 
research in a second language as in one's native tongue.
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contractors, huge design-and-engineering corporations. The results of recovery 
planning conducted by local communities, while given oﬃcial recognition and limited 
funding by government agencies (explained in further detail below, especially in 
Chapter 3's "Dramatis institutionae" section), are subject to final approval by government 
planners and must ultimately fit within the municipal and regional-scale plans 
produced by contracted firms with relatively scant public input. This side of the 
recovery planning process is clearly important to the story; however, because of my 
primary perspective from within the local planning process, it may sometimes appear 
in my account as a somewhat opaque, exogenous force impinging upon the local scale 
from without.
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1.4: A few words on words
A comprehensive survey of literature on "participation" and its conceptual kin 
"engagement," "dialogue," and "deliberation," even just in the last two decades, would 
span multiple fields and yield innumerable empirical examples and theoretical 
variations on the concepts. A similar claim could be made for definitions and theories 
of "the public" or "publics,"  "community," and — perhaps especially — "experts" and
"expertise." In many cases, what these terms signify may remain unclear or implicit; 
categories may overlap and slide into one another. They tend to drift lazily and 
congregate into conceptual clusters, collocations and binary oppositions, wherein 
meanings between strongly associated terms may bleed across porous categorical 
boundaries. For example, "the public" may be associated with "citizens," "residents," 
and "laypeople." All of these categories may then be situated in opposition to 
"technical experts," even though only the last term, "laypeople," properly pertains to 
the issue of expertise.49 Equally problematic, individual members of each category may
be assumed to be, not merely similar enough in a few specific ways to cohere under a 
common rubric, but almost entirely homogeneous. In this dissertation, I have tried to 
recognize the heterogeneity within broad categories such as "the public," and I have 
tried to remain as consistent as possible in my usage. Rather than invoking esoteric or 
theoretically specific definitions of these categories, my usage is, on the whole, 
intentionally consistent with common-sense, vernacular understandings of these words.
 I view "the public" as the collective population of a society (or a large 
subsection thereof) who may partake in "public" spaces and "the commons." This 
includes both "experts" as well as non-experts or laypeople, though for any given field 
49. For example, Felt & Fochler (2010) describe (and critique) "public engagement" exercises 
in which relatively knowledgable would-be participants were barred from participating, as 
they did not suﬃciently represent "the public" qua "non-experts."
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of expertise a relatively small percentage of people would be considered "experts." I 
generally prefer to use the term "non-expert" over "layperson" because the latter, to 
my ear, seems to imply a general lack of knowledge and skill, almost to the point of 
character judgment, whereas the former is a more clinical term denoting a person who
lacks a specific "expertise" in a particular field. The point is to recognize that each 
individual may be an "expert" in one or more fields, and that context is critical: in an 
urban planning context, fisherman may be non-experts, but in a fishing boat pitching 
on the ocean waves, the planners become the "non-experts."
    The term "publics" explicitly recognizes social diversity within "the public," 
and emphasizes the subjectivity of these social groups — i.e., their roles as audiences, 
clients, or markets. "Citizens" are those members of a society or a community whose 
"citizenship" bestows certain civil rights while imposing a specific set of responsibilities 
on the members. "Residents" are people who reside in a specific geographical area. 
"Locals" are those who are intimately familiar with a specific location, through 
residence or through work or for other reasons.
    "Community" is a complex term. Scholars have theorized diﬀerent kinds of 
communities, such as "imaginary communities" (based on shared ideology, social 
identity and "imaginaries"),50 "enunciatory communities" (based on shared 
interpretations of common experiences),51 and the kinds of communities that arise 
around shared "civic epistemologies" and "sociotechnical imaginaries."52 Theories of 
concepts like "civic virtue" or "social capital" often imply or intersect with the notion of
"a sense of community:" the social bonds — aﬀective, material, institutional — that tie 
a "community" together. Vernacularly, "community" carries connotations both of a 
50. Anderson (1991, 1996).
51. Fortun (2001).
52. Jasanoﬀ (2005), Jasanoﬀ & Kim (2009).
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geographically delimited neighborhood and of a socially cohesive group of people who 
share some common trait, interest or aﬃliation. Methodologically, leaving that 
ambiguity unresolved can be productive. That is, rather than declaring, prior to 
analysis, a definitive concept of "community," it may be more fruitful to "follow the 
actors" who invoke the term, and to observe their own usage and interpretation.
An important concept, oft-invoked in PES comparisons of lay people and 
experts — and indeed in post-Strong Programme STS generally — is "reflexivity." An 
actor's reflexivity is generally characterized as lying on a continuum between 
"unreflexive" and radically "reflexive."53 In usage, it is not always entirely clear what 
this means. Contra this tradition, Lynch argues cogently against the notion that some 
actors practice reflexivity while others do not.54 Drawing upon Garfinkel, he argues 
that all human communication is inherently reflexive in a mundane yet fundamentally 
important sense; thus, all actors exhibit reflexivity of one form or another. He provides
an extensive glossary of multiple, context-dependent meanings of the concept,55 and 
argues that a more useful task for the scholar (as opposed to noting who is "reflexive" 
and who isn't) is to analyze actors' specific forms and uses of reflexivity within specific 
social contexts. As I discuss in more detail in the final two chapters of this dissertation, 
Lynch's argument poses significant repercussions for conceptualizations of expertise. 
Where I use the term without qualification, I intend it to convey something like 
"critical self-awareness," a crucial component of which is the constant assessment of 
whether or not the actor in question has taken into consideration alternative 
perspectives, particularly of those who are likely to be aﬀected by the actor's decisions 
and actions.
53. Cf. Woolgar (1988), Ashmore (1989).
54. Lynch (2000).
55. As does Ashmore (1989).
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"Expertise" is another ambiguous — and often contentious — term. On the 
one hand, it is perhaps most often understood as specialized "know-how" that one 
possesses or enacts — a set of skills, techniques, knowledge, and ways of knowing that 
characterize a particular (technical or disciplinary) specialty. On the other hand, this 
word is also not infrequently used to describe the status ascribed to an "expert" — it is the 
status of "having expertise" (in the first sense) or of "being (considered) an expert."56 
STS scholars have argued cogently that both knowledge and the epistemic authority 
associated with the status of "expertise" are socially constructed phenomena.57 In this 
view, such a status is the result of social judgments about whether or not would-be 
experts "look, walk and talk like experts:" do they "have" specialized knowledge? Can 
they make credible knowledge-claims? Can they credibly make use of relevant skills? 
Can they make credible judgments pursuant to their specialty? In other words, one 
does not become an "expert" solely through the acquisition and possession of 
specialized know-how, but also through authorization or accreditation by key 
constituencies, including previously established experts as well as some non-expert 
members of the public. In short, one earns the "right" to be called an "expert." This is 
accomplished, fundamentally, by convincing these constituencies of one's credibility. 
The construction of expertise is a core concern of STS as a field, and while 
there are broad agreements about the outlines, fierce debates remain about the specific
nature and uses of "expertise." For example, the approaches of Shapin or Latour, each
constructivist in its own way, contrast with the so-called "Third Wave" approach of 
Collins & Evans. Shapin's work portrays the construction of expertise as comprising a 
56. Note that both usages are widely employed in vernacular and scholarly discourse (often 
ambiguously, even in the latter). I do not claim that any definition is the "correct meaning"
to be applied universally across contexts. Rather, my purpose here is to identify general 
usages and to specify my own.
57. E.g., Shapin & Schaﬀer (1985), Shapin (1995a, 1995b).
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diverse set of practices and "technologies" with the fundamental objective of 
establishing a would-be expert's credibility as a knowledge claim-maker.58 In 
"Cordelia's Love: Credibility and the Social Studies of Science," Shapin stops just short
of arguing that the "social studies of science" ought to be known as "socially 
constructed credibility studies".59 Latour, Callon, and their actor-network theory 
(ANT) colleagues similarly describe tactics and strategies for amassing credibility as 
central to the construction of expertise, although these tactics (which are often martial; 
e.g., mustering allies), their metaphorical analogies (invoking military and political 
conflict), and the ANT framework certainly diﬀer from the accounts of Shapin and 
others.60 In a more recent approach that departs from these constructivist treatments, 
Collins & Evans portray "expertise" in instrumental terms, as knowledge that can be 
acquired, possessed, and put to use to solve problems or make decisions.61 Noting that a 
common normative position of STS scholars is to enrich technoscientific debates and 
improve policy decisions through broader participation and engagement, they argue 
that the key questions for such scholars are to identify which kinds of knowledge are 
relevant to which problems and to further identify who "has" the requisite "expertise" 
to apply most eﬀectively in a given situation. They argue that STS scholars are 
uniquely positioned to make such judgments,62 and they propose a typology of 
"expertise" in order to systematize such a process. 
I continue discussions of "expertise," including the possible relevance of such 
frameworks, throughout this dissertation, especially in Chapters 5 and 6. As mentioned
58. E.g., Shapin & Schaﬀer (1985), Shapin (1995b).
59. Shapin (1995a).
60. E.g., Latour & Woolgar (1986), Callon (1986), Latour (1987, 1993).
61. Collins & Evans (2002, 2003, 2007). Cf. also Collins, Evans & Gorman (2010).
62. This is interestingly parallel to the position of some who see a special role for STS scholars 
in facilitating and mediating processes of public engagement with technoscience, especially
"upstream." Q.v., Chapter 5.
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above, one of my objectives is to explore how a particular group of scholars and 
professionals constructed a new field of expertise (PRP) while establishing themselves 
as experts in this field. Both conceptions of expertise are important in this regard: what
kinds of know-how did they learn? How did they achieve recognition as experts from 
their key constituencies? (And who were these constituencies?) And how are they 
sustaining and reproducing their expertise into the future?
No doubt part of the answer to these questions involves "engagement" or 
"participation." To the extent that they do overlap, and to avoid repetitive linguistic 
monotony, I have used these terms somewhat interchangeably in this dissertation. 
Both can indicate the idea of mutual, active involvement. Strictly speaking, however, 
they are not identical, and I have made every attempt to use the more precisely correct
term wherever the diﬀerence might matter. "Engagement," in particular, is a highly 
complex term that can convey interest, consideration, or interaction. "Public 
engagement" may indicate any of these; moreover, it is ambiguous as to whether "the 
public" is the subject or the object of the "engagement" in question. Thus, calls for 
"public engagement with science" may be interpreted as exhorting scientific experts to 
"engage" the public more (that is, to interact with them, attract their attention and 
elicit their interest), or as exhorting the public to "engage" with "science" more (that is, 
to pay attention to scientific knowledge or become involved in scientific endeavors).
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1.5: Post-disaster "opportunity" and public engagement (or: Why this is not
a study of upstream engagement)
In the aftermath of a major disaster, the rhetoric of crisis and opportunity 
pervades public dialogue. Actors as well as scholars proclaim opportunities to enhance 
a community’s resilience and sustainability, to reduce and more justly distribute 
environmental risk, and even to remake its very moral constitution.63 "Build back 
better" is a rallying cry among inter-governmental organizations (IGO's) such as the 
UNISDR,64 the World Bank, and the International Recovery Platform (IRP). After 
over 140,000 Tokyo and Yokohama residents perished in the 1923 Great Kanto 
Earthquake, Japan was swept by forces seeking to build a "stronger" and "purer" state 
by exploiting the sense of emergency, laying the ideological groundwork for militarism 
and imperial aggression in subsequent decades.65 After the infamous industrial disaster 
entailing widespread mercury contamination in Minamata, Japan, that municipality 
endeavored to reinvent itself as an "Eco Town," for which it has since won several 
awards, including "Eco Capital of Japan" in 2010.66 The Unified New Orleans Plan 
(UNOP), a community-based PRP process by which New Orleans residents, in 
conjunction with teams of planning consultants, produced a recovery plan after 
Hurricane Katrina, was cited by participants as the beginning of a newly democratic 
way of "doing business" in a city with a long history of exploitative planning and 
corrupt policies decided in backroom deals by a few elites.67 After both Kobe's 
63. Olshansky (2002), Olshansky et al (2005), Clancey (2006a, 2006b), Hilgartner (2007), 
Edgington (2010), Orihara & Clancey (2012).
64. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.
65. Orihara & Clancey (2012).
66. http://eco-capital.net/modules/project/ecocap/report10/ecocapital.html; http:/
/www.japanfs.org/en/mailmagazine/newsletter/pages/031174.html. Communities 
struck by disaster, whether "natural" or "industrial," often respond by turning toward 
"nature" and environmental sustainability.
67. Newport interview (UNOP archive, 2006), Lukensmeyer (2007), Johnson & Olshansky 
(2010). One outcome of the UNOP process was the proliferation of dozens of 
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earthquake in 1995 and the disasters of March 11, 2011, commentators remarked on 
the opportunity for stimulating Japan's moribund economy through reconstruction.68 
Thus, even as some participants may use them to litigate grievances of the past, 
recovery planning endeavors fundamentally become contests over diﬀerently imagined
sociotechnical futures.
Practicing city planners sometimes use terms such as “tabula rasa” or “clean 
slate” to describe the post-disaster townscape,69 while scholars from the same field 
readily acknowledge that such characterizations neglect to acknowledge 
“sociotechnical obduracy”70 — surviving residents and structures, rubble and detritus, 
social institutions and networks, and the recovery plan that already lives in the minds 
of survivors: the city as it existed before.71 A tension in large-scale recovery planning 
exercises is commonly expressed between, on the one hand, a desire to restore the 
community to its prior state as quickly as possible, and, on the other hand, a desire to 
rejuvenate the community by making it safer, more economically vibrant, or more 
sustainable.72 
neighborhood associations across New Orleans, involved in local planning and other 
community development activities. It also gave rise to an Internet startup, 
Neighborland.com, a kind of hybrid of Twitter and crowdsourcing applied to grass-roots 
planning. (Users post desired changes in their local townscapes by completing the sentence
"I want ______ in my neighborhood.") On the other hand, shortly after the end of UNOP,
a mid-city neighborhood with numerous historic buildings was bulldozed to make way for 
a massive hospital project which had been pushed through with little public input, against 
intense popular opposition — an apparent return to planning and development practices 
of the past.
68. Kristof (1995a), Gardels (2011).
69. Vale & Campanella, (2005).
70. Hommels (2005a, 2005b).
71. Haas et al, (1977), Olshansky (2002).
72. Olshansky (2002), Vale & Campanella (2005), Johnson & Olshansky (2010). 
Etymologically "rejuvenate" derives from Latin, meaning "to make young again," and in 
the case of demographically aging Tōhoku, desires to "rejuvenate" local communities are 
often couched in literal terms of attracting and retaining younger residents.
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Because of the pervasive rhetoric of opportunity, the devastated landscape, and
the unprecedented scale of a planning enterprise involving oﬃcials, experts and 
residents across an entire city or a region, I initially framed PRP, not merely as public 
engagement, but as an example of upstream engagement. Scholars and proponents of 
"upstream engagement" have typically envisaged it as a kind of public intervention 
into the study and development of risky science and powerful emerging technologies 
before society is exposed to those risks. Citizens would engage in deliberation with 
experts about the risks and benefits of such technologies (including the potential for 
their inequitable distribution), influence the path of their development, and help 
identify alternative technologies that might be safer or more equitable in their impacts.
Thus, there seemed to be a natural consonance between the rhetoric of post-disaster 
opportunity and the STS/PES notion of "upstream engagement." In order to explain 
why I have emended the "upstream" frame vis-à-vis Tōhoku's recovery, I present the 
following, brief intellectual history of "upstream engagement."
STS scholars have advocated “sustained interactions between decision-makers, 
experts, and citizens, starting at the upstream end” of sociotechnical endeavors.73 They
have argued that only at the “upstream end” can citizens exercise their right to 
participate in crucial meaning-making or to influence the framing of questions and the 
articulation of “what are the issues, and what kind of knowledge is in principle 
salient.”74 Sites of inquiry for this kind of “public STS” have most frequently featured 
controversies over public health and disease or contamination of the environment. The
science and technology at the center of these disputes has ranged from industrial 
practices and environmental pollution (e.g., industrial accidents, waste disposal, 
73. Jasanoﬀ (2003).
74. Wynne (2003).
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pesticides, industrial chemicals)75 to emerging technologies (GMO’s, nanotechnologies,
medical practices and innovations)76 to disease outbreaks (epidemics, food-borne 
illnesses).77 Arguably, work on how users employ and reciprocally shape technologies 
may also be considered studies of a kind of public engagement with technoscience.78 
This concept of "upstream engagement" supports the argument that the ethically 
responsible development and use of risky emerging technologies in democratic 
societies must be subject to reflexive processes of deliberation by multiple publics and 
stakeholders, regardless of participants' putative expertise or lack thereof.
In the 1980s, STS scholars such as Brian Wynne began calling for "science" 
(i.e., scientists, technical experts and techno-scientific institutions) to take a cue from 
lay members of the public and to practice more humility and reflexivity when 
interacting with the public, particularly in the field, away from the laboratory.79 The 
rationale, in part, was to improve trust and the working relationship between 
"scientists and bureaucrats," on the one hand, and non-expert members of the public 
on the other. It was also to improve the eﬀectiveness of technical advice by making it 
more appropriate to local cultural and environmental conditions, and by cultivating 
self-correcting practices of reflexivity.80 This began a stream of PES scholarship 
normatively oriented toward the goal of improving the "quality" of scientific 
knowledge and technological implementation, whether it be through changing the 
75. E.g., Wynne (1982, 1989, 1992, 1996), Brown (1992), Fischer (2000), Allen (2003).
76. E.g., Irwin (1991), Irwin (1995), Sclove (1995).
77. E.g., Irwin (1995), Jasanoﬀ (1997).
78. E.g., Akrich (1992), Kline & Pinch (1994), Pinch (2004), Oudshoorn & Pinch (2005).
79. Wynne (1982, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2002, 2006, 2008). Wynne (1993), p. 337 (cf. 
Wynne, 2008, p. 24) half-jokingly proposes a "simple law of reflexivity — reflexivity is 
inversely proportional to power." Wynne's work generally associates "science" with formal 
authority, and Wynne (1991) argues explicitly and forcefully that his critique of "science" 
has "universal significance and validity" (italics in original) — that is, his critique applies not 
just to specific, "local" cases of inquiry, but indeed generally to "science" as an enterprise.
80. But see the discussion of "reflexivity," above.
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ways that scientists and experts engage with, and learn from, non-experts and 
particular field sites, or through expanding and enhancing the ways that non-expert 
publics engage with "science."
Joining these two strategies together, for example, Funtowicz and Ravetz have 
argued for the need for “extended peer review,” a term that denotes expanded public 
participation in assessments of scientific advice and truth-claims.81 Yearley broadened 
this concept to further include the notion that these “extended peers” also “extended 
the range of issues on which they commented” beyond simply the pre-framed technical
problems, questions of facticity, or knowledge propositions placed before them, in 
order to situate the technical issues within meaningful social contexts.82 Contrary to 
traditionally idealized notions of “good science” as “objectively” devoid of social 
context or politics, such scholars have argued that embracing this context makes for 
knowledge that is “not just more [socially] equitable than that produced by scientific 
expertise alone but more specific and accurate as well!”83 
In the tradition of work on public engagement with science (as opposed to 
scientific engagement with the public), Brown describes "popular epidemiology" as an 
ad hoc yet systematic program of action by which small communities of non-experts are
able to construct epidemiological knowledge as well as credibility with established 
scientists and authorities, which they leverage into policies and action.84 In a similar 
vein, Lee & Roth describe the capacity of groups of lay people to learn ecological and 
other scientific knowledge as a collective enterprise in which knowledge production is 
shared and distributed through the group.85 Murphy describes how sick building 
81. Funtowicz & Ravetz (1990).
82. Yearley (2006), 705.
83. Forrester et al (2002). Cf. Harding (1991).
84. Brown (1992).
85. Lee & Roth (2003).
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syndrome and multiple chemical sensitivity came to be “discovered” and 
“constructed” as disorders, and recognized by the medical establishment, through the 
collective eﬀorts of a movement of largely female oﬃce workers who, like Brown's 
actors, had noticed unusual relationships between their ailing bodily symptoms and 
their oﬃce environments.86 
Although scholars like Wynne, Brown and Funtowicz & Ravetz had already 
begun describing what would become known as "public engagement with science," 
that phrase would not be used until 1995, with Epstein's landmark study of how AIDS 
activists strongly influenced the production of knowledge about the disease — 
particularly its etiology — as well as the way in which patients were treated. In their 
push to favor rapid response over “scientific certainty,” these activists ultimately 
altered the institutional regulations and scientific rubrics and methodologies of federal 
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration. Formerly lay activists immersed 
themselves in the language and idioms of relevant sciences in order to assert their own 
expertise and to challenge establishment experts and policy makers “on their own 
turf.”87 In his study, Epstein noted that "the distinctive social epidemiology of AIDS 
has shaped the character of the public engagement with science."88
Also in 1995, Rip et al published a volume on Constructive Technology 
Assessment (CTA), a framework for facilitating public deliberation of technology 
policy in dialogue with experts and policymakers that shares much with the vision of 
"upstream engagement" and its later cousin, "midstream modulation" (q.v. below).89 
That same year saw the publication of Irwin's Citizen Science, which, without using the 
86. Murphy (2006).
87. Epstein (1995, 1996).
88. Epstein (1995), p. 414.
89. Note that by 1995, CTA was already a relatively mature framework, more than a decade 
old.
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phrase, was a manifesto for the widespread and strategic implementation of mutual 
engagement between "science" and its lay publics. Irwin and Wynne followed this up 
in 1996 with a further articulation of the public engagement thesis in their edited 
volume, Misunderstanding Science? In the same year, Wynne produced a widely cited 
book chapter, "Will the sheep safely graze?", in which he articulated a kind of social 
theory of public engagement vis-à-vis risk, science and modernity, noting diﬀerences 
between his theory and those of Beck, Giddens and other social theorists on these 
topics.90 Studies and discussions of "public engagement with science" have proliferated 
since then.
The specifically "upstream" variant of public engagement first saw the light of 
publication in Jasanoﬀ's 2003 manifesto, "Technologies of Humility:"
Sustained interactions between decision-makers, experts, and citizens, starting at the 
upstream end of research and development, could yield significant dividends in 
exposing the distributive implications of innovation.91
Visible in this sentence are familiar concerns with lay-expert engagement 
("interactions"), democratic decision making, distributive justice, and emerging 
technologies ("innovation"). To these, Jasanoﬀ adds the specific call for these 
interactions to take place "at the upstream end of research and development."
Although Jasanoﬀ's essay has become one of Minerva's most read and cited 
papers,92 it was not until after the UK think-tank Demos published its own manifesto 
See-through Science,93 promulgating similar ideas but written in simpler, more 
90. Wynne (1996b).
91. Jasanoﬀ (2003), p. 242.
92. Subsequent versions have also been published in the journal Nature (2007) and as chapters 
in at least two edited volumes (Mitcham, 2005; Nerlich et al, 2009).
93. Wilsdon & Willis (2004).
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straightforward language for a broader audience of scientists, policy makers and the 
wider public, that the language and metaphor of "upstream engagement with science 
(and technology)" became widely adopted and discussed.  In part as a response to the 
extensive and varied reaction, including criticism, to See-through Science, Demos quickly 
published several follow-up pieces, including The Public Value of Science.94 Its authors 
accuse "critics of upstream engagement" of "resort[ing] to arguments based on a linear
model of innovation," a model which they proceed to tear apart, noting that "of 
course, innovation doesn't happen in a line."95 A few pages later, they admit that "we 
also need to acknowledge the linearity of our metaphorical stream."96 In defense, they 
note that they conceive of engagement as a cycle — a linear stream circling back upon 
itself, like the mythical symbol of the Ouroboros (a serpent eating its own tail). They 
reproduce the following diagram of this cycle from Jackson et al (2005):
94. Wilsdon, Wynne & Stilgoe (2005).
95. ibid., p. 35-36.
96. ibid., p. 38
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Fig. 1-2: A letter runner: the Ouroboros of cyclical "upstream engagement." Source: Wilsdon, 
Wynne & Stilgoe (2005). 
The stream is now recursive: its discharge has become its own headwaters. 
Recently, some STS and PES scholars have begun to complicate the notion of 
"upstream engagement" somewhat, by advocating for "midstream modulation,"97 in 
which scientists and technical experts incorporate reflexive deliberation into their 
research and development, such as with the aid of "engagement agents" — trained 
STS and PES scholar-practitioners.98 The point is to emphasize the malleability of a 
given program of research or development, to ensure its receptivity to public influence 
and intervention even well past its earliest stages. It has been described as a way of 
"bridging internal and external governance" of science, "through which scientists and 
97. Fisher et al (2006), Schuurbiers (2011), Wynne (2011).
98. te Kulve & Rip (2011), Conley (2011).
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engineers, ideally in concert with others, bring societal considerations to bear on their 
work."99 Such applications of "midstream modulation" seem to reinforce both the 
implication that technological development is linear, as well as the implication that 
such development proceeds "internal" to science and engineering, divorced from 
"external" society and "downstream" users. 
Despite some shortcomings with the "upstream-midstream-downstream" 
metaphor of public engagement, I had considered PRP in Tōhoku as a site for the 
study of "upstream engagement," until my fieldwork convinced me otherwise. As I 
describe in greater detail in Chapter 3, I found the results of decades of gradual social 
disintegration in the fishing villages of Karakuwa and the Sanriku coast — processes 
that have hastened in the aftermath of the tsunami, posing the possibility that, 
especially given the accelerating decline and aging of the population, newly rebuilt 
settlements surrounded by massive tsunami defenses may end up sitting largely empty 
and unused within 20-30 years. Given this, it would seem inaccurate, perhaps even 
ethically inappropriate, to describe current processes of PRP as cases of upstream 
engagement in sociotechnical change, particularly when such a framing evokes the 
common post-disaster rhetoric of opportunity. While the recovery may well hold a 
legitimate promise of opportunity and a hope for renewal, the "upstream" metaphor 
seems to elide the important narrative of these people's history and their current 
conditions and daunting challenges. 
Furthermore, due consideration of context does not end here; the standpoint of
the one who invokes the metaphor also matters. If a resident of a Karakuwa fishing 
village speaks of "upstream" opportunities, it carries a diﬀerent weight and meaning 
than if a government oﬃcial speaks of the same — or an academic analyst.100 In some 
99. Fisher et al (2006), p. 486-487.
100. Some local residents do talk of the recovery as an opportunity to improve their 
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early meetings between local residents and recovery experts that took place in the 
summer of 2011, the experts began by talking excitedly about a range of opportunities,
but the residents were simply emotionally incapable of seeing the long road of recovery
as a set of opportunities to be excited about.101 They were too immersed in the gloom 
of the metaphorical tunnel to perceive the light at the end. At such a moment, 
government oﬃcials and some PRP experts — with the best of intentions — were 
employing the rhetoric of opportunity to support initial recovery plans. The recovery, 
they said, could become a vehicle for the modernization and revitalization of the area's
long-moribund economy. To some residents, such rhetoric seemed insensitive to their 
suﬀering, possibly even self-serving — oriented toward political or eventual monetary 
gain. Invoking the upstream metaphor resembles this rhetoric of opportunity, which 
may appear ethically questionable, depending upon context and the standpoint of the 
speaker.
Thus, despite its heuristic power, ultimately I have chosen to set aside the 
"upstream" metaphor, while retaining the broader and more flexible frame of public 
engagement with technoscience.
community in various ways, and some are worried that this "good chance" is being wasted 
due to poor policy decision-making and other problems.
101. Kumagai interview (March, 2013).
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1.6: The structure of this dissertation
Chapter 1 introduces the research sites and opportunities, including key 
questions, concepts and actors, and describes the methods and challenges of the 
research undertaken. While arguing that PRP is a site of public engagement in 
sociotechnical change, it questions the appropriateness of employing the metaphor of 
"upstream" engagement to frame recovery in Tōhoku. 
Chapter 2 describes the history of participatory recovery planning (PRP) in 
Japan, focusing upon its birth and maturation in Kobe after the 1995 Great Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake. The protagonists of this story are the community-based planning 
associations called machi-zukuri kyōgikai and the uniquely cohesive group of "built 
environment" scholars and practitioners who became the core group of PRP experts. 
This chapter describes the specific activities of several of these experts and the machi-
zukuri groups with which they worked, demonstrating examples of PRP learning and 
practice. It further illustrates the deliberate eﬀorts of these experts to share the fruits of 
collective learning and to institutionalize their expertise. Finally, the chapter discusses 
their eﬀorts to consolidate and apply their expertise in Tōhoku, and to insure their 
legacy by using the situation in Tōhoku to train their successors and demonstrate the 
value of their expertise.
Chapter 3 provides the background necessary to help the reader understand 
the context of ongoing PRP activities in Tōhoku, including a brief history of the 
region, a description of the disasters known as "3.11," and an overview of the array of 
social institutions involved in the recovery. The rest of the chapter charts the socio-
historical context of post-disaster recovery in fishing villages of the Sanriku coast, 
particularly Karakuwa Peninsula within the municipality of Kesennuma. In light of 
this context, the prospect that the process of "recovery" may deliver a "final blow" to 
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the old social order, just as devastating as the tsunami itself, seems as likely as any 
prospects for renewal. 
Chapter 4 interrogates the "deficit model" of context-blind experts that has 
replaced the old "deficit model" of an irrational and ignorant public yet nevertheless 
retains the assumption of a persistent, nigh-incommensurable "lay/expert divide." 
Through the concrete description of PRP activities in several districts of Kesennuma, 
Chapter 4 casts doubt upon both models' portrayals of this divide, instead showing 
non-local experts and non-expert locals mutually and collectively working to learn 
from each other, accomplish common goals, and close the gaps between them. 
Furthermore, this chapter follows PRP experts as they negotiate the apparent tension 
between "technical guidance" (dispensing pre-packaged specialized knowledge) and the
necessity to take into account local conditions and needs as they facilitate PRP 
processes. It suggests that, for these experts, there is no meaningful distinction between
their nominal, "technical" expertise and their expertise as facilitators of participatory 
processes per se.
In this dissertation, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide the richest empirical 
descriptions of PRP activities in Tōhoku, specifically in the towns of Kesennuma and 
Minami-Sanriku. Theoretically, however, whereas Chapter 4 critiques established 
notions of deficit models and the "lay/expert divide," Chapter 5 focuses on adopting, 
expanding, and building upon promising recent ideas in STS and PES, specifically the 
notion of engagement agents. It argues that this concept, conscientiously adapted and 
extended, may be a fruitful and appropriate description for a special class of context-
aware experts sensitive to local knowledge, epitomized by the PRP experts from Kobe 
who feature so prominently in the narrative of this dissertation. It examines the 
questions of who can fulfill the role of an engagement agent and what kinds of 
practices such agents employ. Drawing upon empirical examples, it argues that 
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engagement agents need not start out as technical experts or STS scholars, and that a 
set of practices grouped under the rubric of trust-work constitute a core praxis of their 
expertise. Eﬀective engagement agents employ multiple strategies to assemble 
technical, local and contextual knowledge, to "orchestrate" engagement, and to 
establish and fortify their own status as "experts."
Finally, Chapter 6, the conclusion, recaps the narratives and arguments of the
preceding chapters, attempts to synthesize their findings, and instigates a discussion of 
their significance for the actors and communities involved, for Japan as a whole, and 
for STS and PES as well as for studies of planning, disasters, governance, and other 
fields. It revisits the practices of PRP experts described in this dissertation in order to 
make sense of them as characteristic, not only of a particular group of experts from 
Kobe, but of engagement agents more broadly. 
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2. "A NEW BREED OF SPECIALISTS" :
THE KOBE EARTHQUAKE AND THE RISE OF PRP IN JAPAN
... who, then, will inherit the legacy of Hanshin-Awaji? 
— Seiji Komori1
2.1: Calamity's heritage
With its long history of disasters and war, Japan has extensive experience with 
post-disaster recovery.  In the 20th century Japan twice recovered from cataclysms of 
almost unimaginable scale: the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, which destroyed 
much of Tokyo and Yokohama and left over 140,000 dead or missing,2 and World 
War II, by the end of which American bombs had left only five or six towns (of 30,000 
people or greater) with more than 50% of their built environment intact.3 Each of 
these catastrophes spurred a frenzy of recovery-focused urban planning activity and 
legislation as well as massive reconstruction eﬀorts. It was not until the 1960s that 
participatory community-based planning began to take hold as a reaction and a 
complement to conventional "top-down" city planning by technocratic administrators 
and oﬃcial planners. The Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake that devastated Kobe in 
1995 was Japan's first large-scale disaster since the Fukui Earthquake in 1948,4 and 
while much of the city's recovery planning was still characterized by technocratic "top-
down" approaches, it also incorporated participatory community-based planning 
1. Komori interview (May 2012).
2. This number is widely reported, although the original source is unclear. The USGS lists 
the total number of souls lost as 142,800 (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/
events/1923_09_01.php).
3. Selden (2007), Wilson (2013).
4. There were other disasters in this period, of course, such as the Okushiri tsunami 
described in the Introduction. Here, I am counting any event that kills thousands of people
and destroys tens of thousands of structures as a "large-scale disaster."
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processes on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, it was in Kobe that participatory recovery 
planning (PRP) through local organizations such as machi-zukuri councils, in (often 
contentious) partnership with government planners and facilitated by expert 
consultants, became established as a major — and, I will argue, essential — approach 
to post-disaster recovery planning in Japan.5 This chapter draws upon existing 
scholarship as well as interviews and documentation to describe the range of PRP 
endeavors in Kobe and the work performed by those technical experts, primarily in 
the "built environment" design and planning fields, who further developed expertise in 
the facilitation of PRP processes involving non-expert local residents. 
These experts thereby established their approach as a viable and important 
alternative to traditional top-down recovery planning methods. The bulk of the 
chapter focuses upon Kobe. It concludes with a discussion of these experts' subsequent 
activities (post-Kobe recovery), including their current involvement in Tōhoku and 
their explicit acknowledgment that this involvement is critical to cementing their 
legacy.
5. As several veteran expert consultants have told me, this "Triangle of administration-
consultants-residents is a salient feature of the Kobe Style" or the "Kobe Way" of PRP. 
(Tsuji interview, April 2012)
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Fig. 2-1: Satellite photo of Osaka Bay, showing Kobe, Osaka, and Awaji Island. The 
earthquake's epicenter was at the northern tip of Awaji Island. Tremors traveled along faults to
the southwest, through rural Awaji, and to the northeast, through the heart of Kobe's urban 
areas. (Original color photo, sans text, from Wikicommons. Modified by author, September 
2013.)
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2.2: Mano and the rise of community-based planning within "Kobe Inc."
Japan's sixth-largest city by population at the time of the earthquake (and still 
today, with about 1.5 million residents), Kobe's distinctive social and institutional 
landscape made it something of an enigma with regard to urban planning and 
development. On the one hand, it had already become a hotbed of participatory local 
planning through the mechanism of neighborhood-based machi-zukuri organizations, 
one of which had been periodically covered by national news media and thoroughly 
studied by Japanese planning scholars. In 1981, it had become the first city in Japan to 
pass a machi-zukuri ordinance, formally recognizing a role for local community-based 
planning associations and opening an oﬃcial channel for collaboration between machi-
zukuri groups and the city planning department. On the other hand, the city had 
earned the somewhat derisive nickname of "Kobe Inc." (	, kabushiki kaisha
Kōbe) from its residents, due to the municipal administration's single-mindedly 
aggressive pursuit of business development, its heavy-handed planning policies, and its 
expensive, high-profile construction projects, such as the expansion of industrial and 
residential real estate by leveling nearby mountains and using the removed earth to 
construct two large artificial islands.6 In addition, Kobe's community of built 
environment scholars and professionals was uniquely organized, coherent, and indeed,
6. Chalmers Johnson (1982) coined the term "the developmental state" to describe postwar 
Japan and its pursuit of rapid economic growth at all costs through state-driven industrial 
development, "top-down" planning, and public-private partnerships (or collusion). He 
contrasted this approach to economic and technological policy with the regulatory 
approach of the United States, in which the state functions to maintain a relatively free 
market and to protect both private consumers and the public commons from commercial 
excesses. Although it incurred substantial collateral damage to public health and the 
natural environment, Japan's aggressive approach to economic policy and industrial 
development helped to facilitate its postwar "economic miracle," especially in the 1950s, 
'60s and early '70s. Long before Johnson's analysis, the Japanese themselves recognized 
these qualities of their state's system, which they captured concisely in the term: "Japan 
Inc." (	&,, kabushiki kaisha Nihon). Kobe's nickname was a play on this term.
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communal, for a large Japanese city. These experts not only shared a pedagogical and 
philosophical background that favored participatory approaches to planning and 
design, but they also shared productive, friendly and collaborative relations, both 
socially and professionally. These characteristics would help them to move rapidly in 
the aftermath of the earthquake to support the numerous machi-zukuri-based PRP 
endeavors in the months and years that followed.
Since the Meiji Era and the "opening" of much of Japan to international trade 
in the second half of the 19th century, Kobe had been a major port city. A 
mountainside neighborhood of European-style houses (a popular tourist attraction 
today), a large Christian cemetery, and a number of substantial masonry buildings 
near the shore of Osaka Bay remain as a testament to its early days as a center of 
international trade. By the end of World War II much of the shoreline remained 
undeveloped beach, while most of the city lay in ashes from American firebombs.7 In 
subsequent decades, "Kobe Inc." developed the waterfront into a zone of industrial 
production. Joining the old sake breweries near the shore were large industrial 
concerns such as Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Kobe Steel. The latter built its own 
coal-fired power plant near its factories. The port itself became Japan's busiest, and 
was ranked among the top five globally at the time of the earthquake. The city also 
attracted international corporations, as companies like Nestlé and Procter & Gamble 
established their regional headquarters for East Asia in the city's central business 
district. Out on the city's periphery, it extended its municipal subway line to newly 
built stations that served as transportation and shopping hubs for suburban "New 
Towns" — planned bedroom communities with rows of identical apartment and 
condominium buildings. 
7. Readers may have seen this depicted in the popular Studio Ghibli animated film Grave of 
the Fireflies.
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Meanwhile, homegrown machine-parts factories and small-scale "chemical 
shoe" manufacturers thrived in older, diverse, "inner city" working-class 
neighborhoods to the west of the city center.8 Some of these neighborhoods had 
managed to avoid destruction in the war. Their major streets were no more than eight 
meters wide, with smaller back streets of less than three meters. The traditional nagaya 
(", "long house") style of wood-constructed row house was typical for these areas. It
was in the garages of these old houses that the owners operated their machine shops 
and factories. Japanese have a word to describe these kinds of old working-class 
neighborhoods of single-family row houses and narrow streets: shitamachi (!, "down-
town" or "low town"). The word typically connotes not only densely packed, older 
houses and shops with low-income, working-class residents and shop owners, but also a
tightly knit social fabric and a strong, warmly supportive sense of community.
Many of the small business owners and other residents of these shitamachi areas 
in Kobe were members of minority groups: ethnic Koreans, Vietnamese, Chinese, and
descendants of the historical burakumin outcaste group. Indeed, Kobe's ethnic makeup 
was more diverse than much of Japan. Its "Nankin Machi" is possibly Japan's best 
known "Chinatown" outside of Yokohama's.
In the late 1960s, residents of the Mano district, one of those neighborhoods 
known for its small factories and high percentage of ethnic Korean residents, formed 
an organization to fight pollution from larger factories in the area. The late '60s and 
early '70s were a period of intense environmental activism throughout Japan, in part as
a reaction to a series of industrial pollution crises such as Minamata Disease, Yokkaichi
8. "Inner city" is not my term to describe these areas, as in the American context it tends to 
be freighted with an imagined set of racial, cultural and socioeconomic characteristics, not 
necessarily representative of the shitamachi areas of Kobe or other Japanese cities. It is 
widely used by scholars, however; e.g., Hirayama (2000), Hein (2001), Olshansky et al. 
(2005), Edgington (2010).
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Asthma, and Itai-Itai Disease.9 Mano's protest group was not Kobe's first. Unlike other
groups, however, it expanded and remade itself into an organization devoted more 
broadly to community development and the resolution of a range of local issues. Evans
succinctly describes the group's evolution into a machi-zukuri organization, along with 
its crucial links to expert consultants and municipal planning oﬃcials:
In 1970, the "Machi-zukuri School" (machi-zukuri gakkō) — an occasional series of 
lectures and workshops held by interested academics and specialist professionals on a 
variety of topics related to the residents' campaigns — first took place. These helped to
provide residents' leaders and other interested residents in the area with some 
specialist knowledge of the issues, and also served to develop the local campaigns from 
the essentially defensive nature of the anti-pollution campaign to a more proactive 
agenda. … [B]y the end of the 1970s, work had started on drawing up a machi-zukuri 
plan — a comprehensive plan for the whole Mano district, comprising a vision 
statement and detailed guidelines on how this was going to be achieved. This involved 
inputs from three sides — the residents, Kobe City's planning department, and some 
interested academics and planners who acted as technical advisors to the residents. 
(Evans, 2001: p. 450-451)
After Kobe's planning department gained experience working with Mano and 
several other similar organizations elsewhere in the city, it passed Japan's first Machi-
Zukuri Ordinance in 1981. (Kobe's ordinance itself followed on a 1980 addendum to 
the 1968 national City Planning Law, giving local administrations more responsibility 
for local planning decisions. Each successive passing of urban planning legislation by 
the national Diet in the postwar era attempted to further decentralize city planning.10) 
Kobe's ordinance oﬃcially recognized a role for machi-zukuri organizations in local 
planning and attempted to codify the city's experience in coordinating eﬀorts with such
9. See, for example, Broadbent (1999), George (2001), Walker (2010).
10. Bauman (1996), Evans (2002), Edgington (2010).
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groups and expert consultants, to serve as a kind of "manual" for future endeavors.11
Ikuo Kobayashi, a professor of planning at Yamate University in Kobe, who is 
in many respects the "godfather" of Kobe's PRP expert community (as will become 
evident in subsequent pages), briefly describes the relationship of Kobe's newly 
institutionalized machi-zukuri organizations and its community of built-environment 
experts:
By the 1980s, everyone had started thinking about what we could do for our town at 
the district level — for example, the Mano area, or Rokkō Island. Because of that, 
Kobe city made an ordinance for machi-zukuri and also systems for supporting those 
areas. According to the ordinance, Kobe city provided subsidies and a system for 
providing expert consultants to the districts. Because each machi-zukuri organization 
did not have an expert, we helped those organizations, and we got financial support 
from Kobe city.12 
Although the city clearly saw machi-zukuri councils as potential partners in 
working out local details of planning work, some machi-zukuri organizations formed 
specifically to oppose Planning Department proposals, such as the establishment or 
augmentation of major trunk roads through neighborhoods. (Kobayashi: "The 
organizations dealt with many problems like noise pollution and air pollution along 
highways, or they opposed the construction of buildings."13) Thus, in practice, machi-
zukuri groups (including Mano's) both contended and collaborated with the city's 
planning department, with the aid of expert consultant-liaisons, to provide feedback as 
well as pushback, and to implement their own local plans. Of course, the relationship 
between city oﬃcials and local planning groups was more contentious in some areas 
11. Evans (2002), Edgington (2010).
12. Kobayashi interview (February 2012).
13. ibid.
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than others. In certain neighborhoods, the city had been stonewalled in its eﬀorts to 
push through certain plans (e.g., expanded trunk roads) for years or even decades. 
Although the "top-down," aggressively pro-development, technocratic tendencies of 
"Kobe Inc." seemed to co-exist paradoxically with the local machi-zukuri organizations 
for which Kobe was also becoming well known, it may be that there was no paradox; 
rather, the former spurred the development of the latter, as a reaction of citizens 
against perceived incursions by the municipal administration into their private 
property and their neighborhoods.14
Just days before the earthquake in 1995, the city planning department had 
compiled a draft revision of its 1993 Master Plan. Included in these plans were a 
variety of large-scale, wish-list kinds of projects, such as an airport on a new artificial 
island, as well as a number of "district improvement" projects that would require 
cooperation with local machi-zukuri or jichikai (neighborhood associations). By the time 
of the quake, 28 machi-zukuri groups were operating in various neighborhoods around 
the city, 12 of them under the auspices of the Machi-Zukuri Ordinance.15 Despite 
Kobe's reputation as a vanguard for community-based local planning through machi-
zukuri councils, the majority of the city's neighborhoods still lacked these groups.
14. Hein (2001), Evans (2002). This could also be seen as an example of co-production, in which 
technology and environment (e.g., urban infrastructure, machine factories, industrial 
pollution) and social orders (e.g., technocratic governing institutions, community-based 
organizations) mutually generate and shape each other. Cf. Jasanoﬀ (2004).
15. Edgington (2010).
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2.3: The "Mizutani Zemi," CO-PLAN, and Kobe's community of built-
environment experts
In the 1970s, other large Japanese cities such as Osaka or Tokyo had multiple 
centers for their "built environment" professions, tied to the highly profitable and 
competitive major contracting corporations, which often viewed each other as rivals 
and refused to cooperate or share information. One of my informants compared these 
closed and mutually jealous camps to the guilds of medieval Europe.16 In contrast, 
Kobe had a single center for these professions at Kobe University. Kobe's size and 
institutional landscape put it in the "Goldilocks zone" for the development of a vibrant 
yet cohesive community of experts. Kobayashi: 
Planning in the biggest cities like Tokyo and Osaka tended to be on a very large scale 
and backed by the national government, so those cities used major contracting 
corporations to do that work for them. Kobe and Yokohama were only major cities in 
which independent, individual planners (like me) could get work. At the same time, 
machi-zukuri was not likely to develop in a small city, so just one expert might be 
enough for that kind of work in a small city. A population size of about 1 to 3 million 
was necessary to support many experts.17
A local group of urban planners, architects, civil engineers and geographers 
coalesced around Eisuke Mizutani, a charismatic local professor who held successive 
positions at Kobe University and Osaka City University. Mizutani championed public 
participation in planning through community-based machi-zukuri groups. His followers 
and like-minded colleagues called themselves the "Mizutani Zemi" (from the German 
pronunciation for "seminar"). They shared information with each other freely. "Zemi" 
members — including academic scholars, scholar-activists, and practicing 
16. Komori interview (May 2012).
17. Kobayashi interview (February 2012).
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professionals — were united in their conviction that eﬀective planning absolutely 
required the input of the people to be aﬀected by the plans and their implementation. 
In addition to sharing professional and philosophical convictions, members of 
this group were united socially as well. They played tennis together on weekends and 
created their own, informal tennis club — a subject about which they were almost as 
passionate as participatory planning and machi-zukuri. One former member of the club 
joked that the reason they later engaged in PRP so fervently after Kobe's earthquake 
was that all the tennis courts in the city had been co-opted as temporary housing 
sites.18
In 1986, two leaders of the "Zemi" pack, Kobayashi and Yoshimi Amakawa, 
formally institutionalized this tight-knit core group of experts by forming the CO-
PLAN network of urban planners, architects and civil engineers, which eventually 
expanded to include an even larger group of built environment specialists in the Kobe 
area. Kobayashi:
They had detailed knowledge about many diﬀerent areas [of the city]. In order to 
grow the network bigger, we got people such as professors and people with experience 
in redevelopment. Individually, this person knew about that topic but not this one, and
that person knew about this but not that, so with the network we were able to share 
and manage all of this knowledge. For example, everyone got together and talked 
about the current problems which each area was having and if those areas had had 
discussions with the authorities or not.... The concept for establishing CO-PLAN in 
1986 and the Support Network for Disaster Recovery in 1995 were the same.19
 After the earthquake, Kobayashi formed two other NGO's, spinoﬀs of CO-
PLAN, including the "Restoration from the Hanshin Earthquake Disaster / 
18. Komori interview (May 2012).
19. Kobayashi interview (February 2012).
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Supporters Network for Community Development Machi-zukuri" as well as the Kobe 
Machi-zukuri Research Institute, which still exists today and is more commonly called 
"Kobe Machiken" or "Machiken" for short.20 The latter aims to consolidate and 
disseminate knowledge about machi-zukuri and participatory planning, including post-
disaster PRP, and to serve as an institutional center for the community of those 
concerned with these processes — primarily scholars and practitioners, mainly from 
the built-environment professions, but also legal experts, oﬃcials and formally 
untrained citizens who might be involved with local planning. Its mission, described in 
greater detail below through a description of its fukkō juku ( , "recovery school") 
includes the coordination of activities, norms and knowledge, the publicizing of the 
expert community's activities, and the training of younger generations of machi-zukuri 
experts.
Thus, Kobe's peculiar combination of social and historical characteristics — 
including its history of cultivating machi-zukuri organizations, its size and institutional 
landscape, and its socially and organizationally cohesive community of built-
environment experts, with their own history of involvement in participatory, 
neighborhood-based planning — meant that by 1995 the city had become uniquely 
fertile ground for the germination of a field of expertise in participatory recovery 
planning.
20. "Ken" is short for kenkyū jo (
, "research center" or "research institute").
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2.4: The earthquake and its aftermath
At 5:46 AM on January 17, the magnitude 7.3 earthquake erupted at the 
northern tip of Awaji Island to the southwest of Kobe and propagated along a 
previously unknown fault under the most densely developed and populated parts of the
city toward Osaka to the east. Ground shaking reached the maximum shindo Level 7 
on the Japan Meterological Association's ground acceleration scale and continued for 
20 seconds to one minute. The shaking totally or partially destroyed some 150,000 
buildings across the city. Most vulnerable were older, wooden, single-family homes 
with roofs of heavy, traditional tiles.21 In addition, fires broke out in several areas of the
city, consuming over 7000 more buildings. The areas most vulnerable to fires were 
those residential districts with many wooden homes packed densely together around 
narrow streets and alleys. In short, the shitamachi districts were the most vulnerable to 
both fires and earthquake damage. Demographically, these areas tended to be lower 
income, with high proportions of ethnic minority residents and a considerably higher 
average age than other areas. Compounding their vulnerability, the narrow streets of 
such districts severely hindered first responders and other would-be rescuers. All over 
Kobe, power and water systems were down, and a network of emergency water tanks 
provided an insuﬃcient supply for fighting multiple fires that consumed whole blocks 
of houses.
While local first responders were overwhelmed, the central government was 
slow to respond. Rebuﬃng oﬀers of aid from the American military, among other 
organizations, the government eventually sent the self-defense forces (SDF) to help 
with emergency rescues and immediate cleanup. However, many survivors say that 
they waited too long. Meanwhile, the Yamaguchi Gumi, Japan's largest yakuza group 
21. These tiles are said to be eﬀective at resisting typhoon winds, but are a liability in an 
earthquake.
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(and headquartered in Kobe), distributed food, blankets, and tents to needy people.22 
The relatively slow initial response of the government was the first of a series of 
missteps in the rescue and recovery periods that eroded public trust in authorities and 
inflected residents' responses to oﬃcial recovery planning proposals in subsequent 
months.23
The earthquake killed over 6400 people, injured over 40,000 and forced over 
315,000 into hastily constructed temporary shelters.24 As is often the case in "natural" 
disasters, women, elderly, and low-income people were disproportionately aﬀected. 
About 59% of all those who perished were over the age of 60; about 60% were 
women.25 In addition, the quake partially or completely destroyed about 240,000 
homes, while fires burned down an additional 7500.26 The flames consumed about 
800,000m2 of structures.27 All told, the quake caused nearly JPY 10 trillion worth of 
damage, or approximately USD 100 billion, making it the world's single most 
expensive disaster — until it was roughly doubled on March 11, 2011.28
22. Stories of the Yamaguchi Gumi's relative eﬀectiveness in the days following the earthquake
are commonplace among residents of Kobe. It was also mentioned in some of my 
interviews (e.g., Amakawa interview, February 2012) and reported in the media (e.g., 
Sterngold, 1995).
23. Shiozaki (2005). Cf. also Wynne (1992, 1996), Barrios (2010) and Dowty & Allen (2011) on
the deleterious eﬀects of oﬃcial mismanagement, both recent and past, on public trust in 
authorities during post-disaster recovery.
24. Damage statistics vary somewhat with the source and date of publication; these are widely 
reported figures confirmed by the Japanese Red Cross Society (2007), the City of Kobe 
(2011), and Hyogo Prefecture (2013) (all in Japanese).
25. Honjo (2010), Otani (2010).
26. Hyogo Prefecture (2013). 
27. Shaw & Goda (2004).
28. Hyogo Prefecture (2013), Reconstruction Agency (2013).
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Fig. 2-2: Habitable housing rate after the earthquake. The pattern roughly shows the 
distribution of destruction. Source: Honjo (2011).
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2.5: Recovery planning in Kobe: an overview
Less than two months after the earthquake, many victims were still in shelters 
or scattered across Japan's archipelago. At this time, the city's administration released 
its initial recovery plan to the public. The plan was hardly unchanged from the draft 
revision of the Master Plan proposed by the planning department shortly before the 
earthquake. It involved substantial use of eminent domain and "land readjustment" (
., kukakuseiri)29 especially in many of the hardest-hit areas, putatively to enhance 
safety and resilience against future seismic events. After the plan's unveiling, an angry 
crowd besieged City Hall, haranguing oﬃcials for taking advantage of them, as one 
resident said later, "like a thief at the scene of a fire" (#*, kajiba dorobo). The 
residents, already upset by slow governmental rescue response, saw the rapidly 
produced plan as a cynical power play by the city to push through its rapacious 
development schemes while the voices of dissent had been silenced by the tragedy.30 
The five-hour confrontation ended only when Kobe's mayor (a former head of the 
city's Planning Department) made a dramatic about-face and announced plans for 
massive public participation in recovery planning, through the creation and support of 
neighborhood-based machi-zukuri organizations across the city. Each organization 
would be furnished with one or more consultants — primarily experts in the built-
environment professions — who would be vetted, certified, and financially supported 
29. Land readjustment is the process by which ownership patterns are reconfigured, such as 
when the city widens a road, taking a portion of private property. This can be a long and 
diﬃcult process in Japan, partly because the owner of the building is often not necessarily 
the owner of the land upon which it stands. A condominium building may be owned by a 
developer, while the individual housing units may be owned by diﬀerent families, and all 
this may stand upon a plot of land owned by yet another company or individual. Thus, 
there are multiple owners to be consulted and brought into negotiations; achieving 
consensus can be a time-consuming challenge. Note that "land readjustment" is the 
standard term used by English-speaking urban planners; a more literal translation of the 
Japanese kanji characters might read "boundary arrangement" or "block organization."
30. See Edgington (2010), 107-120, for a detailed summary of this sequence of events.
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by the city. Thus, Kobe's recovery planning was to blend the aggressively "top-down" 
technocratic style that typified "Kobe Inc." with the pioneering machi-zukuri 
approaches of local planning for which the city had also become known.31
Kobayashi and his CO-PLAN network were ready to take up the challenge of 
community-based participatory recovery planning.32 Just after the earthquake, 
Kobayashi organized and then incorporated an NGO oﬀshoot of CO-PLAN, oﬃcially
named "Restoration from the Hanshin Earthquake Disaster / Supporters Network for 
Community Development Machi-zukuri." Once the city had designated the specific 
machi-zukuri zones, the planning department established an oﬃcial registry for experts 
to assist these areas. Kobayashi's network was able to help fill this so-called "expert 
bank." The city assigned one or more of these experts to work with a particular 
district, often one with which they were already familiar — in many cases this was the 
expert's own neighborhood.33 The city recognized some two dozen previously existing 
machi-zukuri kyōgikai and established many more, amounting to a total of over 100 
active organizations covering every district in the city at the peak of recovery planning 
activity in the late 1990s. Close to 300 experts served as consultants to these groups 
through the city's oﬃcial "expert bank." Although Kobayashi himself held no oﬃcial 
position within the municipal administration, the city's planning department depended
31. Bauman (1998), Hein (2001), Edgington (2010). The "Kobe Inc." style of planning is 
perhaps most readily visible in the large "symbolic" projects such as Kobe International 
Airport — an artificial island project which large poll majorities consistently opposed, but 
which the city pushed through using, in part, recovery funds from the central government 
of Japan.
32. Since the 1980's and the formation of CO-PLAN, Kobayashi had been a leader of the 
"Zemi" group and the wider community of built environment professionals in Kobe. 
Mizutani himself had died in 1993 of gastric cancer, at the age of 57. Having influenced 
planners and architects across Japan, his memorial service was attended by over 500 
people, including such prominent figures as Tadao Andō and Sachio Ōtani.
33. In several cases, local residents rejected a city-provided expert in favor of one who lived 
among them, as described in Edgington (2010); Kobayashi interview (March 2012).
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heavily upon him; most of the experts on the city's oﬃcial list had been recruited 
through his network and his organizations. Kobayashi emphasized the importance of 
these experts' familiarity with the city's districts:
During the disaster, we knew the areas that had suﬀered damage. Also because those 
areas had had various problems over the decades, we had already examined those 
places from a variety of perspectives. To put it another way, when we were sent to 
those areas as consultants, we could recognize what problems they were having or 
would have. We knew what kind of person would fit into each area and who had 
studied that area before.... Because we knew the places, we knew that the intervention 
of a certain architect or lawyer, for example, could solve their problems more 
eﬀectively than others.34
Though the specific procedures and rates of progress varied from one district to
another, machi-zukuri meetings began in many areas within months of the earthquake. 
Typically, meetings were held at least once per week, and often two or three times per 
week.35 Machi-zukuri groups lent legitimacy to the city's eﬀorts by providing avenues for 
public participation, while also providing coverage for recovery areas for which the 
city was unable or unwilling to provide significant resources. In addition, an influx of 
volunteers and NGO's into Kobe also helped to give local residents unprecedented 
access to technical expertise and other resources. One neighborhood group, for 
example, took advantage of these resources to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) to bolster their arguments for changes such as the cleanup and 
renovation of a local park, which was viewed as a commons and a refuge vital to the 
social lives and general satisfaction of the residents.36
34. Kobayashi interview (February 2012).
35. Tsuji interview (April 2012).
36. Evans (2001).
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Kobe's initial plans for reconstruction involved the identification of 24 
"Intensive Restoration Zones" that would receive significant support from the 
government and involve substantial land readjustment, or, in some areas, "urban 
redevelopment" ($', toshi-saikaihatsu).37 Kobe's planning department had just 
completed a draft Master Plan several days before the earthquake struck; the recovery 
plan closely resembled that document. Later versions of the recovery plan retained the 
concept of the Intensive Restoration Zones, with the eight most "intensive" identified 
as "black zones" on a map. These areas were not chosen for the severity of damage 
alone, but for other reasons as well, such as specific features that the city thought could
be exploited to enhance economic rejuvenation. In addition, there were 16 somewhat 
less intensive "gray zones," leaving the rest of the city — "white zones" — essentially 
unsupported, save major infrastructure. The so-called "black zones" constituted only 
3% of the city's area, while the vast majority of the city was left as "white zones," 
despite the fact that much of this area was more heavily damaged than even some 
"black zones".38 Although the city oﬃcially recognized expert consultants for recovery 
machi-zukuri in all areas, it provided funding for expert consultants primarily in the 
black and gray zones. 
Kobe's recovery over the following 5 to 10 years was uneven, with notable 
37. Whereas land readjustment generally allows landowners to keep their plots, albeit at the 
cost of giving up some portion of their land without compensation (), genbu), in urban 
redevelopment projects the city consolidates all of the land within a specified area and then
redevelops the area and reapportions ownership. Owners are generally oﬀered 
compensation and given the option to sell their portion to the city. In the Shin-Nagata 
district of Kobe, for example, some neighborhoods of densely clustered single-family 
homes, destroyed by fires, were redeveloped into blocks of widely spaced condominium 
buildings. Since many owners preferred their private homes and their old shitamachi 
neighborhood, many residents opted out of the new developments.
38. One question about which Edgington (2010) speculates but does not systematically 
investigate is why the "white zones" rebuilt more quickly than the "black" and "gray 
zones." Indeed, most scholarly research on recovery in Kobe has focused on the "black 
zones," leaving the geographic majority of the city relatively unexamined.
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successes as well as failures. Neighborhoods with a tradition of organized community 
action, such as Mano, and neighborhoods with access to significant resources were 
able to influence recovery planning and outcomes more successfully than other areas.39
A number of issues and challenges arose in districts across the city. In black zones, 
fierce battles over land readjustment ensued, and the need to secure near-total 
consensus from all of the residents involved prolonged the recovery planning process, 
such that recovery in these areas often took longer than that in the white zones in 
which people were left to their own devices.40 On the other hand, few people received 
any financial support from either the government or from insurance. Only 16% of the 
city's residents had earthquake insurance. More had fire insurance, but the insurance 
companies successfully argued in court that they were not liable to compensate for 
damages from fires resulting from seismic activity.41 There were other problems, as 
well. Renters were largely disenfranchised in recovery planning processes; only 
property owners had legal rights in housing and planning-related negotiations.42 
Temporary housing facilities were often located far from the communities they served, 
uprooting residents from their neighborhoods and relocating them far from their 
neighbors and jobs. A lottery system to determine who could enter these numerically 
inadequate facilities broke up communities and groups of neighbors, separating them 
from each other. A "single-track" housing policy, in which prospective residents of 
newly constructed public housing facilities were expected or required to have been 
seeking refuge in a temporary housing facility (rather than with, for example, friends or
relatives), restricted housing options and prevented many families from receiving the 
39. Yasui (1997, 2007), Evans (2002), Olshansky et al. (2005), Edgington (2010), Aldrich 
(2012).
40. Olshansky et al. (2005), Edgington (2010).
41. Shiozaki (2004).
42. Edgington (2010), Maly & Shiozaki (2012).
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support they needed.43 For many who finally moved into permanent public housing 
after several years of living in temporary housing facilities, in which new relationships 
were forged under harsh conditions with new neighbors, the final move amounted to 
yet another separation from community. Perhaps most notoriously, all of the issues 
described here, many of which led to increased social isolation and the dissolution of 
community, led in turn to alarmingly high rates of kodokushi (%, "solitary death") 
among elderly hisaisha, in which residents of temporary or newly built public housing 
facilities would pass away, alone and without anyone noticing for some time.44 
Despite all of these problems, Kobe's recovery has been credited with a rapid 
blossoming in popularity of machi-zukuri, as well as a "renaissance" of volunteerism and 
a strengthening of civil society, across Japan.45 In many districts, the results of the local 
recovery planning projects have become a source of pride, and many machi-zukuri 
organizations have persisted to this day, long after disaster recovery-related eﬀorts 
have ended. For the members of CO-PLAN and its disaster recovery-focused 
incarnation, Kobe's recovery became a showcase for their particular approach to 
participatory recovery and urban (re-)development planning. Although the city's 
recovery was by no means unproblematic and the results of these machi-zukuri groups 
varied significantly from district to district, Kobe's experience with machi-zukuri-based 
recovery planning was widely viewed across Japan as successful overall. Its acceptance 
by the broader planning professions as the standard Japanese approach to recovery 
planning is demonstrated by the fact that in Tōhoku today, expert consultants from all 
over Japan have attempted to adopt or emulate some variation on the "Kobe style" of 
participatory recovery planning.
43. Maly & Shiozaki (2012).
44. Shiozaki (2004), Otani (2010), Maly & Shiozaki (2012).
45. Evans (2002), Shaw & Goda (2004).
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Fig. 2-3: A bōsai (+, "disaster mitigation") exercise in Shin-Nagata, Kobe. Local children 
and seniors participate in these regularly conducted drills, practicing fire suppression and other
emergency response techniques. The logic of these exercises, organized by the neighborhood 
association or sometimes the local machi-zukuri association, is that the next earthquake might 
strike during the middle of the day, when most working-age adults are at work; thus, children 
and elderly residents must be prepared to fight fires and help each other in the event of a 
disaster. Photo by author (January 2012).
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2.6: Machi-zukuri and expert activities for Kobe's recovery
Although many of Kobe's recovering neighborhoods faced common challenges 
and aspired to similar goals, such as the successful negotiation of land readjustment 
processes in black zones, the precise objectives and activities of Kobe's machi-zukuri 
groups and their consultants varied from district to district, consultant to consultant. 
Each of the following vignettes highlights a single district or group of residents working
with a particular consultant, to illustrate empirically the scope and variety of the actual
work of "recovery planning." The vignettes demonstrate how these consultants were 
developing their techniques and expertise in facilitating public engagement and 
participatory recovery planning processes. 
2.6.1. Komori: expanding participation in Higashinada
Seiji Komori is the current President of the Kobe Machi-zukuri Research 
Institute, one of Kobayashi's CO-PLAN spinoﬀ NGO's,46 and an emeritus professor of 
geography at the Himeji Institute of Technology. He is slightly older than Kobayashi 
and Nozaki, more of a contemporary of Mizutani. After the earthquake he helped to 
coordinate the reconstruction of his own condominium building in one of the city's 
many white zones. Even this relatively small-scale project taught him valuable lessons 
about public engagement and facilitating broadly participatory planning processes:
I lost my condo in Higashinada. So my first job [of the recovery] was to reconstruct 
that condominium building along with my own residence. Approximitely 100 
condominium buildings were damaged by Hanshin-Awaji, and I think 70 to 80% of 
them were rebuilt. Our building was the first one which resolved to rebuild and also 
the first one to be reconstructed, so we got a lot of attention from mass media. I 
46. Known as "Kobe Machiken" or "Machiken" for short.
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worked as the leader of that project. At that time I was the dean of a university in 
Himeji.
We had a meeting in Osaka to discuss our condo just two weeks after the disaster, 
and many husbands and wives came together from their temporary housing shelters. If
only husbands had participated, they might have just argued the meeting away in a 
battle of words. If only wives had participated, they could not have made the financial 
decisions [for their families]. But, coming to the meeting from far away, the 
participation of many couples together helped a lot for us to make decisions during the
meeting quite quickly. I advised Nozaki that only men's participation just brings 
argument and only women's participation cannot bring a conclusion.47
My way of conducting the meeting was asking couples to discuss and make their 
decisions at the meeting itself. As I proceeded… I learned how to get consensus, what 
kind of information I should gather, and how to focus the subject of the meeting…. I 
had not had that kind of experience before. The way of making decisions I was 
accustomed to was through discussions of male-only representatives at faculty 
meetings or the like. Making no moves without full family agreement was totally new 
to me. So I learned how to move forward through consensus from Hanshin-Awaji.
I learned that, by being far from the actual location where things are happening, 
or just by virtue of being a man, I might not be able to understand a situation. 
Therefore, I learned that, in order to understand a situation, the truly important thing 
is to go to the actual place, to study on site, and to take those lessons sincerely to 
heart.48
In short, in addition to practical skills at facilitating deliberation and achieving 
group consensus, Komori learned the importance of viewpoint (particularly of gender),
of broadening representation in participatory processes, and of local perspective that 
cannot be appreciated anywhere but in situ. In my many interactions with PRP experts
in Kobe, I heard variations on Komori's learnings intoned periodically by others as 
well, indicating that many of them had also learned the same lessons. Indeed, 
47. As will be seen in Chapter 4, Nozaki apparently heeded Komori's advice.
48. Komori interview (May, 2012).
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Komori's oﬀ-hand aside that he "advised Nozaki" about some of his lessons learned 
demonstrates the sharing of lessons and the mutual learning in which these experts 
were engaged.
2.6.2. Morisaki: forging consensus in Noda Hokubu & Takatori
Teruyuki Morisaki is a local architect from the heavily damaged Shin-Nagata 
area, which included several districts that suﬀered extensive fire damage. He was 
involved in recovery planning with at least three of these districts, including the 
contiguous Takatori Higashi and Noda Hokubu areas just south of JR Takatori 
Station, both of which were old shitamachi neighborhoods with narrow streets and 
single-family homes. Noda Hokubu had already established a machi-zukuri association 
in 1993, while Takatori set up its own machi-zukuri group only after the earthquake. 
Just two months before the earthquake, one of the Noda Hokubu machi-zukuri group's 
early projects had just been completed. A diamond-shaped park between the two 
districts had been expanded and festooned with fire-resistant trees, with an eye toward 
disaster risk reduction. The park is widely viewed as having helped to restrict the area 
of fire damage to the Takatori Higashi district, as most of the Noda Hokubu area to 
the park's west was spared, while Takatori was extensively burned.49
The burned area was designated a "black zone" by the city and required to 
undergo land readjustment. All roads would be widened, and residents would 
therefore need to give up some portion of their land through eminent domain. The 
unburned majority of Noda Hokubu was designated a white area, even though its 
shitamachi townscape shared similar vulnerabilities with Takatori and despite the fact 
that it had suﬀered substantial seismic damage in the earthquake. Because the two 
49. Q.v. Fig. 2-4.
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districts were so closely linked, and both machi-zukuri groups were working with 
Morisaki for their recovery planning projects, the residents of Noda Hokubu embarked
on a similar process of negotiating new standards for road widths and land usage as 
Takatori, even though its status as a white zone meant that such eﬀorts were not 
mandated by the city.
Within each district, smaller sub-planning groups, based on individual blocks, 
formed. Thus, a blizzard of recovery planning meetings followed, some at the block 
level, some at the district level, and occasionally some at the joint-district level, 
involving both machi-zukuri associations and residents from both districts. After 
considerable deliberation, complaining, negotiation, and voting, ultimately the 
Takatori district's land readjustment process resulted in an average genbu (), the 
percentage of land taken by eminent domain) of 9%, just under the city's initially 
proposed 10% rate.50 Morisaki was able to facilitate consensus on this number by 
patiently discussing the issue with residents and city oﬃcials together at numerous 
machi-zukuri meetings. At these meetings, where at least 90% of participants were older,
male heads of households, Morisaki explained the advantages of a swift agreement to 
the city's requests while acknowledging the painful consequence of reducing the size of 
plots for homes and businesses. Often, irate residents at these meetings would explode 
in angry outbursts. Morisaki's response would be to repeat the resident's complaints 
and express sympathy with the resident's position. However, he maintained that the 
costs of drawing out the recovery by fighting the city for a few percentage points were 
considerably greater than what might be gained through such an oppositional stance.51
Ultimately, not all residents were able to rebuild on their smaller plots of land. 
Others were able to rebuild through the construction of cooperative housing or the use
50. Noda Hokubu Machi-zukuri Council (2005).
51. Morisaki (1998); Noda Hokubu Machi-zukuri Council (2005).
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of cooperative rebuilding techniques. The former is simply multi-family housing in 
which residents share common areas or live in diﬀerent parts of the same building. 
The latter is both a construction technique and a legal strategy in which two or more 
families agree to share, for example, a wall between their two houses, which are jointly 
constructed. This allows them to eliminate the meter of space between the structures 
that is usually required by Japanese building law.52
In Noda Hokubu, Morisaki and the residents were able to enforce a kind of 
voluntary land readjustment policy, allowing for the expansion of roads from less than 
3 meters to eﬀectively 4 or 5 meters, through several creative solutions. First, they 
worked together to produce a District Plan for the Appearance of the Townscape, 
which set goals and guidelines for neighborhood planning and building. For example, 
the plan explicitly established the goal of rebuilding and maintaining a shitamachi kind 
of townscape and community. In addition, the plan specified that home owners set 
their structures back 50 centimeters from the front of their property, which eﬀectively 
expanded the roads by a full meter. This permitted the upper floors of these homes to 
be used more fully, whereas usually these floors were restricted by slant plane 
regulations.53 By agreeing to maintain 50 centimeters of their private property as 
publicly accessible space, owners would be able to use the full floor space on the 
second and third floors of their homes, which would slightly overhang the 50-
centimeter setback of the street level, rather than slanting back at an angle 
52. Hein (2001).
53. The "slant plane" is a plane that is articulated at a given angle from the curb on the far 
side of the street back over a building on the near side. This plane establishes a forward, 
street-facing boundary beyond which a structure may not extend. Thus, the forward-
facing walls of the second or third floors of a three-story building may resemble a steeply 
slanting roof, perhaps with windows cut into it. The result is reduced usable floor space on 
the higher floors of the structure, relative to a block-shaped building with vertical walls 
from ground to roof.
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proportionate to the width of the street as generally required by law.54
Through such creative planning innovations, Morisaki was able to find ways to 
satisfy both the city's requirements for "safer" neighborhoods as well as most residents' 
desires to continue using as much of their property as possible. 
2.6.3. Tsuji: finding the middle path in Matsumoto
Nobukazu Tsuji is an oﬃcer of Kobe Machiken and a frequent visitor to 
various parts of Tōhoku. Prior to Kobe's earthquake in 1995, he was an urban planner
and a member of the Mizutani Zemi and Kobayashi's CO-PLAN. He worked on 
urban redevelopment projects with machi-zukuri groups. After the earthquake, Tsuji 
served as the primary consultant for the heavily fire-damaged Matsumoto district. The 
roads of this district needed substantial widening, requiring residents to undergo a 
process of land readjustment. As in Takatori and Noda Hokubu, residents went 
through a process of negotiation over how to accomplish this readjustment and rebuild
on smaller plots, while simultaneously allowing for wider roads and yet maintaining, as
much as possible, the intimate shitamachi feeling of the townscape.
What we call the "Kobe style" of having an expert consultant work with a district's 
machi-zukuri council was already established in Kobe before the Hanshin earthquake.
After the quake, Kobayashi told the city that we would have to use that system [for 
recovery planning], and considered which consultants should be sent to which 
districts. We thought that experts who had already researched a district, worked with 
that district, or had knowledge of it before the earthquake should be assigned to that 
district. I am from the Matsumoto district, so our thinking was that the consultant to 
work with Matsumoto district had to be me. 
In Matsumoto, although only a few people passed away, almost the whole area 
was burned down. At the time, Matsumoto's neighborhood associations (NA's) were 
54. Morisaki (1998), Hein (2001). Q.v. Fig. 2-5.
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breaking up, and some areas of the district didn't have any. We built a machi-zukuri 
council without any connections to the NA's, although we got some people who had 
previously been involved in the old NA's that had broken up. My style is to involve 
both people who were prominent in the old community and also some people who 
hadn't been. In the first 6 months we held 60 meetings. Since a machi-zukuri system 
hasn't been set up in Tōhoku yet, they haven't had such frequent meetings there. In 
Matsumoto, the city decided that we had to use land readjustment for our recovery 
process. Everyone had to face that reality. Through the planning process, I tried to 
help people to realize that working with the [city] government would ultimately be 
more productive than trying to oppose their plans.55
The signature achievement of Matsumoto's recovery planning was its 
innovative plan for widening trunk roads without incurring the blight of wide, parking-
lot-like avenues cutting broad, divisive swaths through the neighborhood. Working 
with Tsuji, residents came to an agreement with city oﬃcials that the required 17-
meter overall trunk road width could include, not only sidewalks, but also vegetation 
and even small parks. The result was a somewhat widened road flanked by broad, tiled
sidewalks, with a small, winding stream and small trees integrated into one sidewalk on
one side of the street. The stream flows under cross streets and is gathered into small 
pools on each corner, into which the residents placed koi, the large Asian carp that 
features prominently in many Japanese religious and cultural traditions.56
Tsuji describes the cooperative working relationship among the administration,
the residents, and expert consultants as critical to the success of participatory recovery 
planning processes and machi-zukuri projects in general. He asserts that this "triangle," 
in which each role is given equal weight and importance, is the very essence of the 
"Kobe way" of expert-facilitated participatory planning.57 Within this triangle, the 
55. Tsuji interview (April 2012).
56. Q.v. Fig. 2-6.
57. Tsuji (1998).
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expert's role is not only to mediate between oﬃcials and residents and to help generate 
creative solutions to planning challenges, but also to "put himself in the position of the 
local people, to think like the local people."58
2.6.4. Nozaki: enrolling networks in Uozaki
Ryuichi Nozaki is an oﬃcer of Kobe Machiken and an active facilitator of PRP
machi-zukuri groups in Kesennuma. He holds an architect's degree and license, but 
prior to Kobe's earthquake he had not worked as an architect or planning consultant. 
After the quake, he did volunteer work in the rescue and immediate recovery period. 
As a former Zemi member, tennis player, and friend of Kobayashi and Amakawa, he 
was recruited to help with recovery planning in the Uozaki area, a white zone. 
If I had had experience as a consultant, I could have participated in a black or gray 
zone. So I worked in a white zone. The most important thing in the white zone was to 
get residents' consensus. If you could get agreement from everyone, you could also get 
support from the government. The area was a white zone, and everyone needed to use
their own money, but if the residents could all reach consensus, Kobe city would 
support consultants to be sent to help.
I mainly worked in Higashinada Ward. With my architect friends from about 60 
oﬃces in the region, we formed the Kansai Volunteer Architects group. My friend was
a leader of a shelter in the Uozaki area. He asked me to help the people in that shelter.
I held consultations with residents and colleagues from the Kansai Volunteer 
Architects group every Saturday and Sunday. We gave advice such as informing 
people whether their house was structurally okay or not. Because of our advice, the 
number of people who could go home increased. One day, we held a recovery 
symposium. This big tent at Uozaki elementary school was our base, and we used a 
scale model of the area made by volunteer architecture students from all over Japan. 
58. Tsuji (1998), Tsuji interview (April 2012). Kinmokusei (1999) also describes this "triangle" 
relationship as the "Kobe System." Q.v. Fig 2-7.
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Displaying those models, we gave a variety of suggestions59 — for example, to rebuild 
a simple wooden house, or to use a shipping container as a house…. For example, we 
showed how to build a house quickly using shipping containers, and then how to add 
on to it later, once the residents were in better shape financially…. We held the 
symposium once a month, starting in April. Professors from Tokyo came and gave 
lectures, too. People who had evacuated to other areas also came and participated. We
were all thinking about machi-zukuri together. After the symposium, I had an 
opportunity to work with some people as a consultant on some residence 
reconstruction projects.60
Nozaki's story illustrates the importance of professional networks (and 
volunteer networks) in the recovery. The Kansai Volunteer Architects were an NGO 
separate from Kobayashi's network, though with a great deal of overlap in 
membership. In addition to practicing pro bono work for residents, the network 
mounted an eﬀort for collective, mutual learning and communication, with its monthly
symposium and invited speakers. Notably, the symposium involved non-expert 
residents and evacuees as well as academics and professional architects. 
Nozaki notes that eventually he was able to procure some (income-generating) 
work on specific reconstruction projects. For most consultants in white zones, this was 
their only opportunity for any significant compensation for their eﬀorts. Even in black 
and gray zones, government-provided compensation for their consulting work was 
paltry compared to what they could earn on design and construction projects that 
derived from machi-zukuri planning. The very fact that consultants can eventually make
money from reconstruction projects can become an obstacle to trust between them 
and the residents with whom they work. Note that many residents in Tōhoku are 
59. Nozaki mentions that the volunteer architects used a scale model to give advice to local 
people. Diﬀerent uses of such models will play a significant role in expert-resident 
interactions described in Chapter 4.
60. Nozaki interview (February, 2012).
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aware of this fact. Some have expressed a certain degree of skepticism toward the PRP 
experts because of this.61 Consultants themselves downplay any compensation they 
receive for their eﬀorts, whether it be government remuneration or potential private 
income. They engage in trust-work to fortify trusting relationships and to overcome any 
skepticism by residents, as I discuss in Chapter 5. Nozaki notes that his group 
encountered diﬃculties with trust issues in Kobe, due to their approach, the public's 
unfamiliarity with their organization, and his group's relative lack of institutional 
accreditation:
By Japanese law, buildings need to be set back at least two meters from a four meter 
road. These laws were made after World War II. Before the war, unethical builders 
just built and left, and many of those buildings cannot be rebuilt in the same place. 
There are certain places where they can only be reconstructed if they are re-built as 
cooperatives with adjoining properties. [After the quake,] we searched for those kinds 
of landowners and send them letters to ask if they were interested in our help, but most
did not show any interest. There were a few places where we met with some owners, 
of total of eight that wanted our advice. Out of those eight, five could build 
cooperative apartments and started living there. Because the Kansai Volunteer 
Architects group had not been approved by the government, it could be hard for 
people to trust us, just by being sent a sudden letter. That might have been the biggest 
problem. Also these areas had a lot of renters, and in some cases land owners were 
actually opposed to rebuilding. But I think that one of the biggest reasons landowners 
objected was that they could not trust us because they just didn't know about us.62
61. Hatakeyama interview (March 2013).
62. Nozaki interview (February, 2012).
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Fig. 2-4: Aerial photograph of Takatori and Noda-Hokubu districts after the earthquake and 
fires. Note the diamond-shaped park near the center and the extensive fire damage to the east. 
The park is widely believed to have acted as a fire break, preventing the spread of damage. 
Source: video screenshot from Noda Hokubu Machi-zukuri Council (2005). 
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Fig. 2-5: Diagram of Morisaki's solution to enhancing usable upper-floor space, with visual 
explanation of the "slant plane" concept. Source: Morisaki (1998).
Fig. 2-6: Illustration of the street widening plan for Matsumoto district, incorporating broad 
sidewalks, shade trees and a small stream. Source: Tsuji (1998).
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2.7: Kinmokusei: constructing a community of PRP experts
Many districts' machi-zukuri organizations produced newsletters for the benefit 
of their communities. Similarly, Kobayashi's NGO produced its own newsletter, 
Kinmokusei, named after a fragrant olive tree native to many parts of East Asia. Here is 
the description of the newsletter given in the preface of the NGO's publication Key 
Terminology in Restoration from Hanshin Earthquake Disaster (English Version) (henceforth 
"Kinmokusei (1999)"):
"Kinmokusei" was the newsletter published right after the earthquake to exchange the 
information and to support the communications among the professionals who 
consulted and supported the restoration in the community. The newsletters reported 
the restoration projects of the Network members and gave out the information of the 
restoration activities in the damaged area. These reports and information are precise 
records of actual conditions of the restoration from the earthquake disaster in the 
urban area. They gave us a lot of lessons about the future Machizukuri: community 
development.63
As the description notes, the newsletter served as a vehicle for group 
communication and collective learning within the community of consulting 
professionals. Perhaps more precisely, it served as a record of this communication and 
learning. Experts regularly held meetings and symposia to update each other on the 
latest news of their projects' progress and to learn from each other's ongoing challenges
and experiences.64 Furthermore, in addition to the Kinmokusei newsletter, Kobayashi's 
NGO published a quarterly compilation of machi-zukuri newsletters from individual 
districts, as a step-by-step record of the city's recovery progress. In one Kinmokusei 
63. Available online: http://www.gakugei-pub.jp/kobe/key_e/en1001.htm. In the oﬃcial 
English version here, fukkō ( ), which I have generally translated as "recovery," is 
rendered as "restoration."
64. Kinmokusei (1999), Amakawa interview (March, 2012).
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article, network member Yasuyoshi Hayashi, recalls the crucial role played by 
Kobayashi in coordinating the eﬀort to muster built-environment experts for the machi-
zukuri-based recovery planning eﬀort:
The thing that I clearly remember even now is the facsimile from Mr. Ikuo 
Kobayashi. Ten days hadn't passed after the earthquake when Machizukuri 
consultants and architects started "Restoration from Hanshin Earthquake Disaster/
Supporters' Network for community development 'Machizukuri' ".
I guess that the reason why many "Machizukuri specialists" could rush to the 
damaged areas so quickly was that they couldn't stop themselves from doing it because
of their eager zeal to help the victims, as well as the fact that they had connections 
with various areas before the earthquake.
It is already well known that these specialists worked together, not individually, 
and established a network, supporting each other, and that acting in partnership with 
the local government they became an important power for restoration. I think that it 
opened up a totally new way for "Machizukuri specialists" to make a contribution to 
society and has had significant results, unlike in the past.65
Hayashi's account calls attention to the important fact that many of these 
experts were locals themselves. In addition, he emphasizes that these individuals 
"worked together, not individually," as a community, and that they coordinated their 
eﬀorts with the support of local government. On the question of what makes these 
"Machi-zukuri specialists" unique, and why, perhaps, their eﬀorts "had significant 
results, unlike in the past," Hayashi continues:
Special domains such as land readjustment, redevelopment, engineering and 
architectural design played an important role in previous disaster restorations. In this 
restoration "machi-zukuri specialists" who think about "machi-zukuri together with 
residents" had an important role along with these specialists. The feature of these new 
65. Kinmokusei (1999).
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specialists is that they don't think about restoration from systems' and methods' points 
of view, but that they try to think how they can meet the needs of residents from "life's 
points of view", that is, "reconstruction of residents' life and housing and 
reconstruction of the community". "Machi-zukuri  specialists" are a new breed of 
specialists who specialize in thinking about restoration in cooperation with residents.66 
As Hayashi notes, the collective eﬀorts and experiences of these experts in a 
range of specialized fields, including architecture, urban planning, law, and geography,
all working on community-based participatory recovery planning, ultimately produced
"a new breed of specialists," a distinct community of experts whose new field of 
expertise was the facilitation of participatory recovery planning with non-expert 
residents through machi-zukuri organizations. The "Kobe System," with its triangular 
relationship among residents, oﬃcials, and PRP experts, was born.
66. From the English version of Kinmokusei (1999). In this translation, fukkō ( ), which I 
generally translate as "recovery" throughout this dissertation, is rendered as "restoration." 
Here, semnonka ( -) is translated as "specialist(s)"; "expert(s)" is an equally common 
rendering.
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Fig. 2-7: Diagram of the triangular relationship uniting (from top, clockwise) "local area," 
"experts," and "governing administration." The rounded boxes specify (from top, clockwise) 
"Matsumoto District machi-zukuri kyōgikai," "consultant (names)," and the Kobe City 
Department of City Planning. Source: Tsuji (1998).
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2.8: After Kobe: Tōhoku, the Fukkō Juku, and the legacy of Kobe's PRP 
expert community
Since the most intense years of Kobe's recovery planning in the late 1990s, 
Kobayashi and other members of the recovery planning expert community in Kobe 
have extended their influence internationally. For example, they traveled to Taiwan to
assist recovery planning eﬀorts after the so-called "921 Earthquake" in 1999. (Also, the 
Catholic church in Takatori shipped its famed Shigeru Ban-designed Paper Dome 
church building to Taiwan to be reconstructed there.) In addition, they have 
participated in study exchanges with American recovery planning experts such as 
Robert Olshansky and Laurie Johnson in post-Katrina New Orleans and elsewhere. 
Furthermore, they have published a number of articles and books on machi-zukuri and 
post-disaster recovery planning.
In 2004 a magnitude 7.3 earthquake struck central Niigata Prefecture near the 
northwestern coast of Honshu. Fortunately, this "Chūetsu" area of Niigata was not 
densely developed or populated, limiting severe damage mostly to small villages like 
Yamakoshi (population approx. 2000). It was, nevertheless, the strongest and most 
destructive quake to hit Japan since Kobe. Kobayashi's Kobe Machi-zukuri Research 
Institute ("Kobe Machiken") put together a Chūetsu Juku for themselves and younger 
members of their network. ("Juku," or , is often translated as "cram school", and 
typically used to refer to supplementary after-school study classes for young students. 
Here, it might best be translated as a "study group" or an informal "school.") Some of 
Kobe's PRP experts went to Yamakoshi and nearby towns to provide advice and to aid
the recovery. In addition to Hanshin-Awaji veterans like Kobayashi, members of a 
younger generation also participated. Furthermore, Chūetsu also attracted recovery 
planning experts from other areas of Japan. Thus, it was a place for diﬀerent groups 
and generations of experts to practice their own approaches, whether that be to try to 
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emulate experiences from Kobe or to try new techniques. Like the meetings and 
symposia held by Kobayashi's network after Kobe's earthquake, the Chūetsu juku 
provided a space for those based in Kobe to update each other on their progress and 
to share their experiences. It also provided a model for the 3.11 Shien Fukkō-Juku (3.11
(, "March 11 Support Recovery Study Group"), a similar endeavor 
instituted after March 11, 2011.
Today, the core group of experts from Kobayashi's network with experience in 
Kobe's recovery are now in their 60’s and 70’s. Kobayashi and Amakawa still run CO-
PLAN, but Kobe's community of built environment and disaster recovery experts has 
diversified as it has grown, with diﬀerent social and professional circles centered upon 
various academic departments within several universities, as well as upon government 
and international and nonprofit organizations, and a few private firms. These circles 
also depend somewhat upon age, as some younger experts now work with minimal 
interaction with the old guard. As part of Kobe's recovery, Hyogo Prefecture, with the 
help of the Japanese national government, built facilities in a new waterfront 
development called "HAT Kobe" (HAT="Happy Active Town"), which include the 
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Museum as well as oﬃce buildings 
designed to house international organizations dedicated to studying disaster recovery 
and risk reduction, such as the Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution
(DRI), the International Recovery Platform (IRP), and various UN branch oﬃces.67 
Therefore, in addition to the local community of built environment design 
practitioners and disaster recovery experts, there is a new concentration of publicly 
funded, policy-oriented international expertise. It is no accident that the successor to 
67. A reminder that, as mentioned in the introduction, I worked at IRP for about a year from 
2012 to 2013, participating in the international and governmental sides of Kobe's disaster 
expert community.
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the 1994 UN-authored Yokohama Strategy for international disaster risk reduction 
was the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). Currently, Japan again is leading 
the eﬀort to put together the next international agreement, with plans to host the 
meetings in 2015, most likely in Sendai.68
"Kobe-based experts" are by no means a monolithic bloc. They are a growing 
and diverse group. However, through Machiken's fukkō-juku, Kobayashi and the core 
gang of those old hands who had been directly involved with Kobe's recovery are now 
using Tōhoku as an opportunity to help train their successors, producing the next 
generation of experts in their interdisciplinary field of participatory recovery planning. 
The fukkō-juku is generally held on or near the 11th of each month, from 6:30 to
9:30 pm. It receives some support from Kobe City and Hyogo Prefecture, and is held 
in large meeting rooms in government buildings. Attendance varies from a dozen to 
perhaps 50 participants or more. Participants include not only PRP experts, both 
academic and professional, but also journalists, government oﬃcials, business 
consultants, volunteers (such as Kobe's Valentine Team), and interested members of 
the public (including former residents of Fukushima Prefecture, who relocated to Kobe
following the disaster). There is an entrance fee of 500 yen (about USD $5) per person.
The current president of Machiken, Seiji Komori, opens and closes each meeting. 
Usually, Tsuji facilitates the meetings as emcee, encouraging presenters to stay within 
time limits and asking questions. The presentation schedule is not determined 
beforehand; rather, presenters put a sticky note with their name and the name of their 
topic on a white board at the beginning of each meeting. The number of presenters 
68. Given that the experience of Fukushima has made obvious the porosity of boundaries 
between natural and technological disasters, one might assume that the successor to the 
HFA would explicitly acknowledge this point. Surprisingly, however, it appears that the 
Japanese government has expressly forbid any such explicit mention of the nuclear crisis 
(according to highly placed sources directly involved in preliminary talks, with whom I 
have spoken).
84
determines the time allotted to each. Each presenter discusses his or her "recovery 
support" activities for Tōhoku since the previous meeting. For example, Nozaki 
presents updates on his activities with machi-zukuri and collective relocation planning 
groups in Kesennuma. A younger member of Nozaki's team might give an additional 
presentation on another aspect of their activities. Kobayashi describes his eﬀorts to 
bring student groups from Kobe and from Taiwan to Tōhoku, to teach them about the
recovery while providing volunteer services to local people. Chiharu reports on the 
latest volunteer work of the Valentine Team. Yamaji presents findings of her research 
on gender in recovery. After each presenter, audience members are given a chance to 
ask questions. Quite often, the Machiken leaders such as Kobayashi, Komori or Tsuji 
ask questions or make comments. At the end of the evening, every attendee who did 
not present is asked to give a brief self-introduction and to give a reaction to the 
meeting's contents — be it a general response or a specific question or comment for a 
certain presenter.
Here follows an example of an exchange at one fukkō-juku. Nozaki's team has 
just returned from a trip to Tōhoku. He and Rumi are presenting a report on their 
activities, which included discussing the concept of collective housing with residents in 
several districts of Kesennuma. Okuda, a researcher from Kyoto University, and 
Komori engage them in dialogue about whether or not collective housing is a viable 
solution for residents of Tōhoku.  In order to demonstrate the variety of issues 
discussed and to give a fuller sense of the texture of these exchanges, I will refrain from
editing the dialogue down to a few, selectively significant statements.
Nozaki (Machiken oﬃcer): I told machi-zukuri participants [in Tōhoku] which kinds of
houses we built after Hanshin-Awaji. Also I suggested that we should consider together
what kind of preparation people in Tōhoku need…. Another topic I told them about 
was researching collective housing in Scandinavia and the concept of living together. I 
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introduced some overseas examples to them while we were discussing whether this 
way of living might actually work in Japan. Because the style of family may change, I 
told them that we need to think of a style whereby we can support others and also be 
supported by others….
In Kobe, there are lots of 3- and 4-floor condominiums, but people in Tōhoku 
want to have their own individual houses. In the future I think that it would be good 
for houses in Tōhoku to be made in a style characteristic of the area using local 
materials, by local craftsmen….
Okuda (Kyoto University researcher): Likewise, at the time of the Great Hanshin-
Awaji Earthquake, the extent to which neighbors and blood relatives such as parents 
could or could not live together was central to the demise of some prospective housing 
reconstruction in the Nagata area. Especially, the system for determining if they could 
move into [public] recovery housing did not always go well. Regarding the topic of 
takadai-iten [, "relocation to high ground"] in Tōhoku, I heard that there is a 
trend toward something like collective housing in Kesennuma. I wonder if the local 
people are aware of these kinds of issues?
Rumi (Machiken staﬀ): Not at all. They don't reject [collective housing], but the land 
for their takadai-iten was finally just determined, so right now they are only thinking of 
their immediate situation. Henceforth we will continue to support them and give them
suggestions such as, "Why don't you build collective housing rather than such-and-
such, if you are going to build something anyway." Perhaps, some people may think, 
"Even if end up alone, I may be able to live without worries." I would like to give them
this kind of direction if it is possible. But there are really a lot of people in that area 
who live with three generations [together], and I am not sure whether they will accept 
the collective housing style or not. At least I didn't feel that they rejected it. But one 
thing they all share is that nobody wants to live in an apartment made of concrete.
Komori (Machiken oﬃcer): I don't think people will go for [collective housing] if you 
just oﬀer a suggestion. They need to see more beneficial terms, such as tax reductions 
or reduced interest rates on loans.
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Rumi: In Hyogo Prefecture's case, they provided subsidies for collective hosing 
projects, so this becomes more of an administrative issue. But I think that there is no 
progress in an individual case unless they get some kind of benefit by doing it.
Nozaki: Two points, based on everyone's comments. First, how should we capitalize 
on our experience of the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and how should we convey 
[those lessons]? Kansai and Tōhoku are diﬀerent regions. The damages wrought by 
the disasters are diﬀerent. What I keep thinking about is process, like what kinds of 
procedures we followed, etc. At this point, even if discussing things together with 
residents seems like a roundabout way, that kind of process may be the only way to 
convey [our experience]. I have been feeling this way more and more lately. 
I break into Nozaki's comments to point out that the discussion thus far has 
featured frequent comparisons of Kobe to Tōhoku, recalling what worked, and what 
did not, in Kobe's own recovery. As Nozaki observes, the group seems to be wrestling 
with the relevance of their experience to Tōhoku's circumstances, as well as how to 
approach communication of specific issues, such as to what extent they should or 
should not recommend collective housing as a possible solution for reconstructing 
homes. As Rumi notes, one advantage of collective housing is that elderly residents 
living by themselves — a likely prospect for many displaced residents of Tōhoku's 
fishing villages, whose children have moved to distant cities — have regular contact 
and close social support from their neighbors. Regardless of outcomes or particular 
recommendations, Nozaki asserts the importance of paying attention to process, and 
argues for the necessity of "discussing things together with residents," as opposed to 
pushing specific suggestions or lecturing residents about their own experiences, even if 
such a deliberative process "seems like a roundabout way" and takes more time to 
reach a conclusion. As the dialogue proceeds, the Kobe-Tōhoku comparisons 
continue, although Nozaki now refers back to an earlier moment at this fukkō juku, 
raising an additional matter of concern: 
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Nozaki: Second, someone mentioned earlier the story of "I am also hisaisha." I have 
felt that many people presume that hisaisha are only those who live in temporary 
housing because their houses were washed away by the tsunami. There has been that 
assumption. Right now, in many areas in Kesennuma, people whose houses were 
washed away have been working for their takadai-iten association, while people whose 
houses were okay have been taking over the local residents' association. There has 
been conflict between those two groups. We started to meet with a residents 
association two or three months ago, and everyone there said to us, "Even though we 
did not lose our homes, we are also hisaisha. But no one has recognized that." This is 
why people who support hisaisha need to be careful and try to understand those 
sensitive emotions. It does not matter if someone lost his or her house or not. Even if 
he did not lose his house, he may have lost his fishing grounds or his workshop. 
Everyone has been aﬀected by the disaster in some way, so it is important for us to 
deeply understand in order to support them for the long term.
Nozaki is concerned about the tension that has arisen between diﬀerent groups of 
residents in Kesennuma, based on the kind of damages they suﬀered in the tsunami, 
especially whether or not their houses were destroyed. It is a social and political 
minefield that Nozaki and the others conducting activities in Tōhoku must navigate 
with care and sensitivity.69 Finally, Komori tries to synthesize the discussion, to 
articulate broader lessons, and to clarify and reinforce the group's goals and norms:
Komori: What is the diﬀerence between Tōhoku and Kobe? In fact, regional 
characteristics or customs may be diﬀerent. And it might be that one more diﬀerence 
is the (grandiose-sounding) "level of development:" family life and family relationships 
are becoming increasingly urbanized. Especially in the Hanshin area the collapse of 
the old structure of family relationships has become common, or we might say that 
there is now a new structure. Tōhoku may also become like that. In that case the 
supply of three-generation residences we just talked about will emerge as a problem. 
69. Q.v., the discussion in Chapter 5 on kizuna (togetherness) vs. bundan (division).
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It's too early to reach a conclusion, and I think we just need to watch carefully. But if 
things continue developing to the point that there is a really huge gap, indeed it will be
impossible [to sustain traditional multigenerational family homes]. 
Shouldn't machi-zukuri be something that supports new ways of living? In times like 
these, it is necessary to gather the opinions of young people more. By no means should
we consider machi-zukuri to be something only by or for representatives from Kobe. 
This means that when we go to Tōhoku we should not talk simply about Kobe's 
experience. Instead, because Japanese society, the composition of Japanese families, 
and communities' ways of being seem to be in the process of changing, we should 
recognize that we need to take in the opinions of young people in order to deal 
adequately with the new situation. Otherwise, newly built towns will already be 
obsolete.
[On the question of who is hisaisha,] when we visit the hisaichi in order to support 
the people there, the hisaichi zone is limited. Some areas are not considered hisaichi 
because they didn't suﬀer damage directly. The basic concept of this fukkō-juku is that 
we support hisaichi and hisaisha. Even in those areas that aren't legally recognized as 
hisaichi, we still support those people as hisaisha…. I say that it is wrong to treat people 
mechanistically as if they're not hisaisha just because their area isn't considered hisaichi. 
We members of this fukkō-juku should not categorize hisaisha mechanistically — for 
example, only someone who has documentary proof is hisaisha. We should recognize 
that there are many kinds of hisaichi and many kinds of hisaisha. And also, we should 
keep in mind that we ourselves may end up becoming hisaisha again tomorrow….
The foregoing dialogue shows the PRP experts at the fukkō-juku reflexively 
grappling with a number of interlocking issues. They discuss concrete questions such as
specific options for housing reconstruction, as well as broader questions of theory and 
methodology. They talk about on-the-ground social realities in Tōhoku, such as the 
tensions between diﬀerent groups of residents over categories of victimhood, and how 
such realities may aﬀect their work with the locals. (I will describe the consequences of 
working in such conditions and attempting to deal with these issues in subsequent 
chapters, especially Chapter 5.) They question how they themselves should approach 
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the issue of categorizing Tōhoku's residents — an issue with material consequences, 
since the experts of the fukkō-juku receive government funding for the expenses they incur in their 
ongoing work. They frequently compare Kobe to Tōhoku, noting diﬀerences in 
demographics, home ownership preferences, family structures and regional culture, 
while pointing out how both regions are caught up in larger demographic and 
sociological trends sweeping Japan as a whole. Note, however, that, at least in this 
particular exchange, they do not make such distinctions at a finer than regional scale, 
even though (as I will show) there are noticeable cultural variations from town to town,
district to district, within Tōhoku (and within Kobe, for that matter). 
Throughout this discussion, the participants try to hash out which of Kobe's 
experiences can be applied to the Tōhoku's current situation. At issue, as well, is how 
precisely to discuss their own experiences and knowledge with residents of Tōhoku, 
and how to frame their advice. Should they, based on their positions as experienced 
experts, push for specific options and outcomes such as "collective housing", or should 
they focus more on guiding the deliberative process of machi-zukuri? Finally, even the 
question of what machi-zukuri really is, or at least what it is for, comes up in the course of
discussion. Apparently, for this community of experts, their journey of collective 
learning continues today, almost two decades after Kobe's earthquake.
The fukkō-juku provides a semi-public, performative and somewhat deliberative 
space that fulfills multiple functions for its organizers, the "old guard" PRP experts and
leaders of Machiken, who are currently members of CO-PLAN and former members 
of the Mizutani Zemi. As the above dialogue demonstrates, it is a place for members to
problem-solve, to exchange information, to discuss issues, and to hash out group 
norms, values, and philosophy. It provides a forum through which personal and 
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professional links can be forged and strengthened. It performs "face-work"70 — that is, 
it puts human faces upon Machiken and upon the otherwise "faceless" institutions 
whose representatives participate, including government agencies. As the fukkō-juku is 
open to government oﬃcials, it provides a visible "deliverable" to demonstrate a return
on investment for prefectural and municipal support. Likewise, its being open to 
journalists and the public provides its participants with a stage upon which to 
demonstrate their value to ongoing and future recovery eﬀorts, and to remind people 
of the value of their experience after the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. In practice, 
members of the public rarely attend, unless they are involved in volunteer activities in 
Tōhoku. Those who do attend, as noted above, are asked to comment at the end of 
each meeting; thus, they are assured the floor for at least a few minutes. Moreover, 
nearly every meeting is attended by journalists from major daily newspapers, NHK 
(the national public broadcast company), and other television networks, so each 
meeting is conducted eﬀectively in the public eye. Thus, the fukkō-juku gives Kobe's 
PRP experts a stage upon which to perform their expertise in front of key audiences of 
peers, patrons and clients.
Finally, the most important purpose of the fukkō-juku may well be its function as 
a place to consolidate the ongoing training of the next generation of Kobe-based 
specialists in the PRP-related fields. Komori:
When we held the first fukkō-juku meeting around March 20, 2011, people said that the
reason we go to Tōhoku is to show gratitude. We were helped by many people after 
our disaster and we appreciated it very much. Indeed, we could say that we will help 
70. In the sense of Giddens (1991), which diﬀers from Goﬀman's more famous formulation. 
Giddens argues (and is hardly alone in this argument) that public trust of "disembedded" 
institutions is mediated by interpersonal interactions — e.g., one's judgment of a bank's 
trustworthiness depends crucially upon one's judgment of the trustworthiness of bank 
employees with whom one personally interacts. I discuss "face-work" in both Giddens's 
and Goﬀman's senses as important components of what I call trust-work in Chapter 5.
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others because we received help from here and from there — call it reciprocity — but 
rather than saying that we give back to Tōhoku what we received from Tōhoku, I 
would rather say that the things we received from people in the past, we return to the 
people of the future…. The next huge disaster to occur might happen again right here.
If that happens in the future, there's a good chance that those people would not be the 
ones who actually remember Hanshin-Awaji or who actually worked for that event. So
who, then, will inherit the legacy of Hanshin-Awaji?
Now, people in their 30s and 40s, who are actually central to the fukkō-juku, need 
to accumulate experience to become the core and to work for the next disaster. That is
the purpose of the fukkō-juku. That is why I don't think that we are repaying Tōhoku. 
We are going there to study for the future. Therefore, there is absolutely no need for 
anyone to thank us. We are investing for the future. This means that Tōhoku is in no 
way the place where we teach the lessons of Hanshin-Awaji; it is the place for us to 
learn. We don't go there as sensei, we go there as students.
We have asked Kobayashi, Nozaki, Tsuji and others to visit Tōhoku and bring 
some of the "regular troops" with them. There, we intend to learn something we 
cannot experience anywhere but the actual site of the disaster. Because we have no 
money, we request travel expenses from Hyogo Prefecture; on paper, we are 
dispatched just to support Tōhoku, but it is actually for the future. Someday, those 
people will be active in the field. We went to Hyogo Prefecture to ask for the subsidy 
in order to train those people. We study to prepare against the great disaster of the 
future which may come to western Japan, not just to Hyogo. That is why the fukkō-juku 
is diﬀerent from other volunteer groups.71
Komori's concern — "who, then, will inherit the legacy of Hanshin-Awaji?" — 
demonstrates a reflexive awareness of the necessity to perpetuate this expert 
community — and their expertise — into a future in which they may once again be 
called upon in a time of need. One implication is that the regeneration of Kobe's 
group of experts is good not only for Japan but also for Kobe; there is an implicit 
interest in maintaining Kobe’s position as a hub of disaster recovery expertise. 
71. Komori interview (May 2012).
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Through the activities of Kobe-based PRP experts in Tōhoku, coordinated by 
Machiken and consolidated at the fukkō-juku, Kobe's community of experts is working 
to reconstruct, not only the tsunami-devastated communities of the northeast, but also 
itself.
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2.9: "Japan Inc." planning vs. post-Kobe participatory planning
As a final note on the legacy of Kobe's PRP experts, it is a measure of their 
success in establishing their own expertise and in promoting their own methods that 
participatory planning (not only post-disaster) through machi-zukuri exploded in 
popularity throughout Japan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is a further measure 
of their success that other experts working with communities in Tōhoku today evince a
similar ethos and employ analogous techniques in their praxis. Thus, participatory 
planning (including participatory recovery planning) in Japan has become a recognizably
coherent field — loosely and informally organized around shared principles and goals 
(e.g., to democratize the planning process and to maximize diverse stakeholder 
involvement). Kobe's recovery, and the experts who facilitated it, are widely given 
credit for ushering in the popularity of machi-zukuri and participatory methods in 
general, and for establishing these methods as the preferred modus operandi for pursuing 
post-disaster recovery planning in particular.72
At the same time, however, it is important to point out the boundaries of their 
influence on the Japanese built-environment professions overall. Generally speaking, 
Japanese planners, architects and engineers operate within four, relatively distinct 
spheres: 
1. academic institutions and NGO's (such as Kobe Machiken) — mandate 
includes education of built-environment professionals and scholars; typical 
clients include small businesses, NGO's, and communities
2. small, private firms — typical clients include individuals, small businesses 
and communities
72. Hein (2001), Evans (2002); Amakawa interview (February 2012), Takeuchi interview 
(February 2013).
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3. massive design-and-engineering contract corporations — typical domestic 
clients include large companies and government planning agencies
4. government planning agencies
Participatory planning through machi-zukuri is primarily espoused and enacted 
by scholars and practitioners of the first sphere, and to a lesser degree the second. The 
third and fourth spheres may eﬀectively be considered a single world unto itself, 
comprising a major portion of Japan's doken kokka (%) or "construction state."73 
As later chapters of this dissertation will show, oﬃcial planners and government-
aligned engineers tend to follow Japan Inc.'s traditional methods of technocratic toshi-
keikaku. Although they may boast, in public relations materials, of public involvement, 
while employing the language of "machi-zukuri," their "public engagement" practices —
e.g., surveys and guided focus groups — diﬀer significantly from those performed by 
Kobe's PRP experts.
Tōhoku's recovery planning is being conducted at multiple levels, by local 
communities, facilitated by PRP experts, and by government agencies and their 
contractors. Thus, while the primary focus of this dissertation is on the local practices 
of PRP experts from Kobe and the residents with whom they are working, such eﬀorts 
are only part of Tōhoku's overall recovery planning story, bounded as they are by 
oﬃcial planning initiatives and, ultimately, government approval. I discuss these 
institutional arrangements and their ramifications further in the following chapter.
73. Cf. McCormack (1995, 2012).
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3. "BETWEEN THE LAND AND THE SEA" : CONTEXTUALIZING
THE SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE OF RECOVERY
The sea was very much a part of our town, and we lived together with the sea. Our 
environment was the space between the land and the sea, and that is why it was so 
rich. But now they are trying to harden it into implacable concrete. I think they drew 
up such a plan because they don't truly understand this place's culture.... But humans 
cannot live in the midst of only built things....1 
Concrete is just a material that makes people complacent. Everyone [here] knows 
that, but people without experience think disaster prevention has to take the form of 
something visible. They can get job opportunities or make profits for the companies of 
concrete, so the authorities pour money into public construction works. I really don't 
want to destroy our history and culture for such reasons.2
— Mayumi Kudō
Fishermen built their own original culture seashore by seashore. The people of each 
seashore believed in their own gods. They did not have anything else they could 
depend on, so they prayed for their safety. They protected their culture through 
customs and traditions. That is why each village has its own original culture. There 
are 18 inlets on this single Karakuwa peninsula. Those 18 inlets have 18 villages, each 
with its own system of beliefs and mores. So when people move their residences to 
high ground, all 18 cannot go to one place, because they each have their own distinct 
culture.
— Norio Katō3
3.1: Lurching toward 3.11: a short history of fishing villages on the Sanriku 
coast
The name "Kesennuma" combines the Japanese word numa (, "marsh") with 
1. Kudō interview (March 2013).
2. Kudō interview (October 2012).
3. N. Katō interview (March 2013).
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a word from the Emishi language, kesemoi ("southernmost port"), an artifact of the 
region's history. As late as the Heian Period (CE 794-1185), Tōhoku was still a "wild" 
land inhabited by the indigenous Ainu and Emishi peoples.4 It was during this era that 
the Japanese brought the area under their control, through a mix of military conquest, 
trade and political alliances.5 The region's rich forestry, fishing and opportunities for 
trade with the indigenous tribes helped it to quickly become the largest and among the 
wealthiest domains in Japan. Its urban center of the time, Hiraizumi, now a popular 
tourist destination near Ichinoseki, some 40 km west of Kesennuma, was once the 
second largest city in Japan after the imperial capital of Kyoto. Yet the culture and 
landscape of the Tōhoku region retained its rugged frontier character. Over the 
ensuing centuries, as the center of Japanese power moved east to Kamakura and then 
to Edo (later renamed Tokyo), the region's seas, forests, arable lands and mineral 
wealth were increasingly exploited — and ordered — to feed the voracious resource 
appetites of the realm's expanding urban capital.6 If Tōhoku remained a frontier-like 
region, it became a kind of "internal colony" of the Japanese Empire.7 To this day, its 
economy depends upon "exports" to Tokyo, and its resourceful residents are proud of 
their frontier heritage.8
Until the second half of the 20th Century, the inhabitants of the steep valleys 
and rugged inlets along Tōhoku's Sanriku coast had maintained a similar livelihood 
and culture for generations. "Sanriku" is the name given to the jagged, sawtooth-like, 
4. On the contested boundaries and ethnic diversity that historically make up the famously 
"homogeneous" Japan, see, for example, Morris-Suzuki (1998). On the Japanese conquest 
of the Ainu, see Walker (2006).
5. Totman (2005).
6. Walker (2001a, 2001b).
7. Totman (2005), Akasaka et al (2011).
8. Horinouchi interview (Mar 2012), Baba H. interview (March 2013), Baba Y. interview 
(May 2012), Katō interview (June 2013), Yoshino interview (May 2013).
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mountainous coastline of myriad inlets that extends from northern Miyagi, through 
Iwate, to the town of Hachinohe in Aomori, the northernmost prefecture of Honshu 
island. Nestled in many of the small inlets are fishing villages. In the villages of the 
Karakuwa Peninsula, within the municipality of Kesennuma, where I conducted much
of my fieldwork, families lived in large, multigenerational houses. The main, patrilineal
line of the family, or honke (*, "main house"), maintained close ties with the other 
family branches, or bunke ( ), and hosted large, extended-family gatherings during 
festivals. The peninsula is too compact and rugged, with no rivers and insuﬃcient fresh
water, to permit the wet rice agriculture upon which most Japanese depended 
historically, but local residents produced silk, which they traded for rice or cash. 
Indeed, Karakuwa () translates as "T'ang mulberry," and the local legend is that the
area's first mulberry tree was brought to this area by a ship from T'ang Dynasty China.
In addition, residents grew their own fruits and vegetables in small plots. Today, most 
houses still have their vegetable gardens. In fact, the produce section of the local 
supermarket, in addition to a small selection of fruit and vegetables, sells seeds.
Fishing, however, has historically been the center of the community's culture 
and livelihood. Indeed, the name of one village on the peninsula is Shibitachi (+,): 
"Tuna-Built." Locals say that, at one time, as many as 70% of the captains of Japan's 
entire tuna fishing fleet hailed from this single village. Fishing set the social rhythms of 
the villages, as the women went out en masse to the beach to send oﬀ their husbands in
the morning and then again to greet them in the evening, helping to haul in the boats, 
nets and the day's catch. Those fishers who had been particularly successful gave part 
of their catch to those who had been less fortunate, a practice that continues today.9 
Especially successful families displayed their wealth in a particular way: by 
9. Wilhelm (2006).
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constructing ever more ornate roofs for their houses. This gave birth to a style of roof 
for which Karakuwa became famous. Because they grew their own produce and 
procured their protein directly from the sea, locals rarely needed to purchase food, 
aside from rice. These were remarkably self-suﬃcient people. Even into the late 20th 
Century, Karakuwa fishermen crafted much of their own equipment — nets, boats, 
fishing rods — from wood and other materials sourced from the local forest.10 
Only in recent decades had these traditions begun to change, with fishermen 
relying increasingly upon purchased "high-tech" equipment and less upon local 
resources or friends and neighbors. In doing so, their work became less social, more 
solitary. To a certain degree, it also became somewhat less dependent upon embodied 
skills and tacit knowledge rooted in experience working directly with nature. For 
example, traditional hoya (sea-squirt) fishing entailed probing the seafloor with a long, 
flexible rod constructed by the fisherman himself from local plants. "Modern" methods
used electronic sensors and synthetic nets. Meanwhile, local forestland became 
increasingly privatized, and land owners grew less and less inclined to allow access to 
the materials fishermen traditionally used to make their equipment.11 At the same time,
the honke-bunke family structure began slowly to dissolve. Multi-generational households
gradually became less common. Families grew more independent, but also more 
socially isolated from each other.12
The fishing industry, including the oyster and wakame seaweed aquaculture 
which accounted for a significant portion of the local economy, not only became more 
technology-oriented, but also more globalized. By the end of the 20th Century, 
10. Takahashi (2003), Wilhelm (2006).
11. Takahashi (2003).
12. Following Aldrich (2012), we could describe this as a deterioration of "bonding"-type social
capital, and we would expect this to reduce the resiliency of the community in the 
aftermath of a disaster.
99
Karakuwa fishers were competing in a relatively open market with much cheaper 
products from other parts of Asia, pressing them to increase production and lower 
costs. Yet, simultaneously, the local waters around the peninsula began suﬀering from 
mysterious environmental contamination, causing die-oﬀs or the ruining of whole 
"crops" of oysters and the other shellfish raised by the aquaculture fishermen. The 
problems were traced to runoﬀ from mining, the logging industry, and agriculture, 
which varied from year to year and altered the chemistry of the coastal waters.13
During the heyday of Japan's postwar "economic miracle" and its late-80's 
"bubble" economy, Karakuwa also enjoyed a robust tourist industry. City-dwellers 
from Sendai and Tokyo were attracted to the spectacular beauty of the ria coast. 
Karakuwa Township invested in a number of expensive and questionable projects, 
such as an amusement park and half a dozen million-dollar high-tech public toilets. 
However, even during these halcyon days, fishing towns like Kesennuma and 
Karakuwa never quite fully shared the level of aﬄuence or the material comforts 
enjoyed by urban centers like Sendai or Tokyo. They remained unambiguously on 
Japan's internal periphery. As the rest of the country slid into the "lost decade," coastal 
and rural villages faced significant declines in their economies. Their populations 
rapidly aged and declined as birth rates fell and young people left, seeking oﬃce jobs in
the large cities. Tourists stopped coming, and facilities catering to them fell dormant 
and unused. 
Across rural Japan in recent decades, both tax revenue and populations have 
been declining, and numerous small towns and municipalities have merged through a 
13. A Karakuwa fishing cooperative leader, Shigeatsu Hatakeyama, has become 
internationally known after responding to the crisis by creating an environmentalist NGO,
Mori wa Umi no Koibito (54-, "The Forest is the Sea's Lover"), which tries to 
encourage responsible logging, and engages in tree planting and other activities of both 
practical and symbolic value.
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process known as gappei ()). In 2006, Karakuwa Township was absorbed by its 
neighbor to the west, Kesennuma City. Kesennuma also annexed its southern 
neighbor Motoyoshi in 2009. Residents of these formerly independent townships 
nearly universally complain of slower, degraded quality of service from the municipal 
administration as a result of this process. City oﬃcials also admit to the increased 
diﬃculty of serving a much larger area with a more diverse population, including some
districts unfamiliar to them. Nearly everyone I have asked about the topic 
acknowledges that gappei has exacerbated the challenges of the recovery process.
In short, in half a century these villagers on Japan's periphery endured 
significant transformations to the social, material and economic foundations of their 
livelihoods and culture. They became increasingly ensnared in Japan's globalized, 
techno-industrial, capitalist economy, reaping the benefits that came with being able to
sell their fish and other products to urban and global markets, but also suﬀering the 
social and environmental costs that accompanied their entanglement. Indeed, their 
ways of life and social and environmental conditions began increasingly to reflect those
of Japan's urban center. 
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Fig. 3-1: Some houses and vegetable plots in the hilly terrain of Karakuwa. An inlet can be 
seen in the upper right. Photo by author (October, 2012).
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3.2: 3.11 and its aftermath
The depositional ages inferred from 14C dating suggest that gigantic tsunamis 
occurred three times during the last 3000 years…. The recurrence interval for a large-
scale tsunami is 800 to 1100 years. More than 1100 years have passed since the [CE 
869] Jōgan tsunami and, given the reoccurrence interval, the possibility of a large 
tsunami striking the Sendai plain is high.
— Minoura et al (2001)14
In March of 2012, I was with an international group of graduate students in 
the town of Kamaishi, Iwate Prefecture, visiting one of the many temporary shopping 
centers set up along the Sanriku coast over the previous year, when a spry old man 
rushed out of his shop and ran toward us. He was pointing up a slope to an old gate 
marking the entrance to the grounds of a Buddhist temple and cemetery. "The water 
came up to there!" he shouted excitedly. "The water came up to there!"15 As we 
engaged him in conversation, he began to tell us his life story, organized around the 
three times he had witnessed Kamaishi destroyed and the two times that the American
navy had visited. He remembered escaping with his mother to a hill overlooking the 
town when he was four years old, watching as a massive tsunami washed much of it 
away. This could only have been the Sanriku Earthquake of 1933, which was the last 
tsunami on this coast powerful enough to devastate seaside communities, killing several
thousand people. Kamaishi had been particularly hard-hit. The second time the old 
man saw much of his hometown destroyed was the first time that the Americans came,
as a fleet of Navy warships shelled the town's extensive ironworks and other structures 
14. This report by a team of paleo-geologists based at Tōhoku University, about an overdue 
"mega-tsunami" with a periodicity of around 1000 years, which had last struck in CE 869, 
unfortunately did not receive much attention from the public or from policymakers until 
after March 11, 2011, ten years after it was originally published.
15. Q.v., Fig. 3-2.
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in 1945. Finally, when the tsunami came around 3:30 PM on March 11, 2011, it was 
the third time he witnessed the devastation of his hometown. Within days, the U.S. 
Navy was back for its second visit, assisting with emergency rescues and providing 
food, shelter and warm clothing to the locals.
It was on the same trip that I first entered the visitors' center at the tip of the 
Karakuwa Peninsula in Kesennuma. In addition to general tourist information, the 
center serves as a tsunami museum. A two-meter long cutaway model of a coastline, 
complete with blue-dyed water visible through plexiglass, simulates a tsunami when a 
button is pushed. The majority of the small museum comprises photographs and 
newspaper clippings depicting numerous tsunamis striking the local coast, as well as 
literary and artistic depictions, mounted on several walls and dividers. A prominently 
displayed board of names, dates, and numbers lists Japan's seismic disasters in 
chronological order, over the past 150 years.16 The 1933 event is listed as having killed 
3064 people, while the 1896 Meiji-Sanriku tsunami is listed as having killed even more
people (about 22,000) than the most recent catastrophe. (Other sources agree with 
these figures.)
The museum and the old man's personal history show just how intimately 
familiar with destructive earthquakes and tsunamis the people of Tōhoku's Sanriku 
coast have become. "Sanriku" is the name given to the ria coastline that extends from 
northern Miyagi, through Iwate, to the town of Hachinohe in Aomori, the 
northernmost prefecture of Honshu island. Ria (or sometimes rias) coasts are formed 
when a mountainous land mass subsides or when the seas rise, allowing the water to 
gradually inundate the valleys, eventually forming a sawtooth-shaped coastline of 
jagged inlets. These inlets eﬀectively funnel tsunami waves, focusing their power and 
16. Q.v., Fig. 3-3.
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leading to shocking run-up heights. The seismic activity of the region is caused by the 
subduction of the Pacific tectonic plate under the Okhotsk plate (upon which this part 
of Japan rests) at the Japan Trench, just oﬀ Japan's eastern coast.17 The Japanese 
archipelago is a classic example of an island chain formed by "back-arc spreading" at 
such a subduction boundary. This crumples Japan's landform, pushing up its 
mountains while dragging down other areas such as the Seto Inland Sea (near Kobe) 
and the Sanriku coast. Geologists call temblors occurring at such subduction 
boundaries "megathrust earthquakes." Other examples include the subduction zones 
oﬀ the coasts of Chile, Sumatra, Kamchatka, and Alaska, each of which has produced 
M9.0 or greater, large-tsunami-generating earthquakes since 1952 — together with 
Tōhoku's earthquake, these are the five most powerful seismic events ever recorded. 
The same geological forces that create the rugged fjord-like beauty of the Sanriku 
coast also generate the quakes and tsunamis that periodically devastate its 
communities.
Thus, in some respects, few people in the world could have been better 
prepared for what occurred on March 11, 2011. This was demonstrated, for example, 
by fishermen who saved their boats by sailing out to sea, riding over the tsunami wave 
before it became dangerous. Or by the widely reported "Kamaishi Miracle," when 
almost all of the 3000 elementary and junior high school students in Kamaishi orderly 
enacted their training and successfully evacuated their school, making it to high 
ground before the tsunami struck. Only five children in the town perished — none of 
them were at school that day. (Over 1000 adults perished in Kamaishi, out of a total 
population of about 40,000 people.)
 On the other hand, the magnitude of this earthquake and tsunami exceeded 
17. Japan actually rests upon several, interacting plates, including two "triple junctions" — 
places where three plates meet.
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even its antecedent event of CE 869 in the Jōgan era. The quake itself occurred when 
a 500 km-long section of the subduction zone slipped at 2:46 PM on March 11. The 
northern portion of Miyagi Prefecture, including the towns of Kesennuma and 
Minami-Sanriku — about 45 miles west of the epicenter — experienced the highest 
level of shaking (shindo 7) on the Japan Meterological Association's surface intensty 
scale. All of eastern Honshu and much of Hokkaidō experienced potentially 
destructive ground motion of shindo 5- or greater. The quake was remarkably long, 
with intense shaking lasting several minutes. Skyscrapers in downtown Osaka, some 
400 miles from the epicenter, continued to sway for over 10 minutes. Despite its scale, 
intensity and duration, the earthquake itself did remarkably little damage, probably 
owing to the seismic engineering of Japan's buildings and infrastructure.
According to survivors, many people in the towns along Tōhoku's Sanriku 
coast spent the next 45 minutes seeking out loved ones and trying to escape to an 
elevation that they believed was safe.18 In the villages of the Karakuwa Peninsula, for 
example, residents knew the extent to which the 1933 and 1896 tsunamis had 
reached — in fact, many had intentionally built their homes just above this line.19
About 35-40 minutes after the quake, the water began pulling back from the 
shore. In Kesennuma, the underwater columns supporting the wharfs and piers 
became visible for the first time in living memory. Soon even the bases of these 
columns could be seen.20 Then the water level began to rise rapidly. Residents who 
watched the tsunami approach from the sea describe a white wall of water, and behind
that, an even larger and more terrifying black wall. In fact, " it didn't look like water at 
18. Katō interview (February 2013).
19. Horinouchi interview (March 2012).
20. Katō interview (February 2013).
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all. It was more like a vast wave of black concrete," said one.21 Many who thought they
had reached a safe elevation were forced to run to even higher ground — if they could.
Unfortunately, some were caught on the upper floors of buildings that were still 
overwhelmed. Witnesses note the eerie and remarkably loud noise; layered on top of 
the roaring water and the crushing of buildings and vehicles were the sounds of fuel 
tanks exploding, cables snapping, ships colliding, and a vast sea of debris grinding 
together and scraping cliﬀ walls.22 The scars of that scraping are still visible on rock 
cliﬀ faces.
The tsunami came in three or four waves over a period of about an hour, 
taking several more hours to subside. Most people report that the second wave was the
largest of the set. The height of the water varied, depending on location and local 
geomorphology. In the Sendai plain, it reached two to four meters. In the Shishiori 
District of Kesennuma, it was about nine meters — enough to carry the 330-ton fish 
carrier vessel Kyōtoku Maru No. 18  some 800 meters inland. In the Shizugawa District 
of Minami-Sanriku, the 11-meter wave overwhelmed the city's three-story disaster 
management center, killing about 10 percent of the town's public workforce, most of 
whom had attempted to escape by climbing to the roof. In Onagawa, Miyagi 
Prefecture, I visited a hospital perched on a 15-meter high cliﬀ overlooking the harbor;
the tsunami had nearly reached the ceiling of the hospital's first floor, or about 17 
meters in height.
A tsunami's power is not only a function of its height, however. It is also a 
horizontally conveyed hydraulic wave of immense energy. The Kamaishi Tsunami 
Protection Breakwater, a massive concrete structure that had taken three decades and 
USD $1.5 billion of central government funds to construct — considered the world's 
21. Arakawa interview (March 2013).
22. Katō interview (February 2013), Arakawa interview (March 2013).
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deepest breakwater23 — was pulverized by this wave.24 All along the coast, seawalls and
breakwaters intended to protect citizens and property were overtopped or smashed to 
pieces. Floodgates at the mouths of streams, designed to prevent the tsunami from 
climbing up the streambeds, failed with few exceptions.25 
In Otsuchi, Iwate, the first wave destroyed the gate mechanism; the second 
wave overtopped the structure, killing eight firemen who were desperately trying to 
close the gate manually.26 In some towns, such as Tarō, Iwate, entire districts had been
built and populated only after seawalls had been constructed following the 1933 
tsunami, leading developers to consider these areas safe;27 such districts were 
destroyed. In Tarō, where white lines painted on the face of a cliﬀ mark the 10- and 
15-meter heights of the 1933 and 1896 tsunamis, respectively, residents lived behind a 
system of 10-meter high walls. Now they will have to paint a third line, at 17 meters.
In all, 18,577 people perished or disappeared on March 11, 2011, including 
10,848 in Miyagi, 5842 in Iwate, and 1817 in Fukushima Prefecture.28 Nearly two 
years later, 321,000 people were still considered "evacuees" by the national 
Reconstruction Agency.29 Damaged buildings included 129,000 "totally collapsed," 
267,000 "half-collapsed," and 734,000 "partially damaged" structures. In addition, 29 
railways, 45 dikes, 116 bridges and 4200 roads were damaged or destroyed, including 
JR's Sanriku train line. Thousands of boats and aquaculture platforms were lost, 
23. Glenday (2012).
24. Despite widespread criticism, Japan's central government has announced that it will 
rebuild this breakwater.
25. Notable exceptions included the 14-meter seawall protecting the Onagawa Nuclear Power
Plant and the 15-meter seawall at Fudai, Iwate.
26. Kobayashi interview (March 2012). Q.v. Fig. 3-9.
27. Smits (2011).
28. Except where noted elsewhere, the source for the figures in this paragraph is the National 
Police Agency of Japan (2013).
29. Reconstruction Agency (2013).
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devastating the fishing industry upon which the region depends economically. 
Estimates of total economic damage vary from USD $178 billion30 to USD $235 
billion.31
30. ibid.
31. World Bank (2011).
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Fig. 3-2: The temporary shopping center in Kamaishi, with the Buddhist temple gate beyond. 
(Photo by author, March 2012.)
Fig 3-3: Chronological list of Japan's seismic disasters since the Meiji Era, displayed on a board
at the tsunami museum in the Karakuwa visitors' center. By columns, the list shows the date 
(by Japanese era), name, seismic magnitude, and death toll. (Photo by author, March 2012.)
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Fig. 3-4: One of my informants who lives in Karakuwa showed me this history book that 
documents multiple times that a local district rebuilt itself following destructive tsunamis.32 The
right side shows the village before and after the 1896 Meiji-Sanriku tsunami. The left side 
shows resettlements following the1933 and 1960 tsunamis (the latter having been caused by 
the Great Chile Earthquake, which killed 142 people in Japan — q.v. Fig. 3-2). (Photo by 
author, March 2013.)
32. N. Katō interview (March 2013). The village shown is, in fact, Tadakoshi District, which 
features prominently in this and subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
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Fig. 3-5: Damage in Onagawa one year after the tsunami. I took this photo while standing in 
the 15-meter-high parking lot of a hospital. I still would have been entirely under the water on 
March 11, 2011. The building in the foreground was tossed onto its side; the right-facing wall 
is actually the roof.  Photo by author (March 2012). 
Fig. 3-6: Damage in Rikuzen-Takata one year after the tsunami. The first four floors are 
heavily damaged. This building stands several hundred meters from the water and its 
foundation is a few meters above sea level. The strange shapes hovering in the sky are 
reflections in the window of the car from which this was taken. Photo by author (March 2012).
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Fig. 3-7: Damage in Minami-Sanriku one year after the tsunami: a concrete building frame, a 
car on top (deposited by the tsunami), in the midst of a field of bare foundations. Photo by 
author (March 2012).
Fig 3-8: Debris was sorted into piles, many of which remained one year after the tsunami, like 
this pile of cars in the Shishiori District of Kesennuma. Photo by author (February 2012).
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Fig. 3-9: The floodgate in Otsuchi, where eight firefighters perished after the gate closing 
machinery failed and the structure was overtopped while they struggled to close it manually. 
Photo by author (March 2012).
Fig. 3-10: A smaller floodgate, in Tadakoshi District, Karakuwa. The tsunami went over and 
through the structure. Photo by author (February 2012).
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3.3: Dramatis institutionae: key actors in Tōhoku's recovery
Unsurprisingly, given the scale of the destruction and the complexity of 
reviving an entire region, Tōhoku's recovery is a national project. Individuals and 
organizations from across Japanese society are involved. In order to provide some 
basic context for the reader, this section provides a brief guide to the key institutional 
actors and their respective recovery-related activities.
Although rooted in a constitution written by American legal scholars, Japan's 
government is a parliamentary system, with three main levels of government: the 
central (national) government, prefectures (numbering 47 in total), and municipalities. 
Disaster recovery eﬀorts are guided by a set of national laws, such as the Basic Act on 
Disaster Management of 1961 (Saigai taisaku kihon hō) and the Act on Support for 
Reconstructing the Livelihoods of Disaster Victims (Hisaisha seikatsu saiken shien hō), 
passed in 1998 as a response to the widely perceived need for greater "livelihood" 
support for victims of the Kobe earthquake. These laws describe the responsibilities of 
the central (national) government and aﬀected prefectures and municipalities in 
responding to a disaster. The primary role of the central government is to provide 
financial and other support to the prefectures. The prefectural governments are 
supposed to take the lead in managing the overall response, including coordinating the
needs of local municipalities with the resources provided by the central government 
and the prefectures themselves. The prefectures are also responsible for formulating 
reconstruction plans. Municipal administrations are tasked to "take care of victims, 
distribute aid materials, assess the damage of each household, and carry out financial 
support procedures to put people's lives back on track."33
The Fukushima nuclear disaster and the scale of destruction more generally — 
33. Kimura (2011), p. 69.
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including the loss of substantial numbers of government workers in aﬀected 
municipalities — were such that the central government needed to take a stronger 
leadership role in response and in guiding recovery than perhaps envisioned in the 
existing legal framework. Some of that has been directed specifically to the 
management of the nuclear crisis in Fukushima; here I will only describe the broader 
recovery eﬀorts.
The Diet, Japan's legislature, has budgeted funding for recovery projects 
through several bills, currently a total of about 25 trillion yen (250 billion USD).34 
Projects include debris cleanup, public and private reconstruction, and grants for 
businesses. According to NHK, Japan's public broadcasting organization, over one 
quarter of disbursed funds have been spent outside of the disaster zone, as far away as 
Okinawa. Soon after it took power in December 2012, the administration of Shinzo 
Abe said that it would stop such disbursements.
About 11 months after the disaster, the Cabinet Oﬃce of Japan (the nation's 
executive) set up the national Reconstruction Agency ('
, fukkō chō), which is 
intended to be a "one-stop shop" for government entities involved in the recovery, 
including prefectures and municipalities, as well as other agencies of the national 
government. Its primary function is to oversee allocation of the recovery funds. The 
Reconstruction Agency itself comprises about 330 members drawn from each of the 
other executive agencies. An oﬃcial of Hyōgo Prefecture informed me that each 
agency has a distinctive culture and work style, so conditions within the 
Reconstruction Agency are likely to be somewhat chaotic as individual members figure
out how to work with each other. The Reconstruction Agency wields three tools to 
facilitate recovery. First, it has designated Special Zones for Reconstruction (SZR's) 
34. Reconstruction Agency (2013).
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throughout eastern Japan, where tax breaks and regulatory easements are intended to 
stimulate business activities. Second, it can authorize exceptions to additional 
regulations in special cases, when requested. Third, it provides grants of two major 
types: "business acceleration" grants for stimulating local industry and "national 
project" grants provided to local governments for certain classes of reconstruction 
projects. There are eight such classes, which the Reconstruction Agency lists as 
follows:35
1. Road projects
2. Land readjustment projects
3. Collective residential relocation to high ground for disaster risk 
reduction
4. School facilities development projects
5. Earthquake resistance reinforcement for hospitals
6. "Eco-friendly" water purification projects
7. Agricultural area development projects
8. Fishery village development projects
Grants are of course subject to approval. For example, if a municipal 
government applies for a residential relocation grant for a particular district, 
Reconstruction Agency oﬃcials determine whether and how much funding to provide 
based on the ratio of requested funds to number of households involved in the 
relocation. They assume that local governments have performed, or will perform, due 
diligence in assembling the proposal — for example, to confirm the technical feasibility
of the proposed project. The grant approval process would thus seem to be a missed 
opportunity for the national government to enforce accountability in the recovery 
35. Reconstruction Agency (2013).
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process. For example, the reconstruction agency could use a rubric for assessing 
whether or not the proposed plan had been devised with the approval and 
participation of local residents. However, by basing approval solely upon a simple cost-
per-unit quantitative formula, the agency has abstained from questions of participation
or representation.36 Indeed, even with these eight, seemingly broad project categories, 
the reconstruction agency has already determined a great deal of how the recovery will
take shape by designating such categories at all, as I discuss in more detail in following 
chapters.
Another central government agency with a major role to play in the recovery is
the Urban Renaissance Agency, vernacularly known as "UR."37 This agency was 
formerly called the Japan Housing Corporation, when it played a key role during the 
postwar years of the "economic miracle" by providing public housing for Japan's 
burgeoning population. When that population grew less slowly and began to age along
with the nation's postwar infrastructure, the agency changed its name and shifted its 
focus to "urban revitalization." Taglines used in its current marketing materials include
"The power to revitalize cities," and "Linking a city's past to its future." UR identifies 
the following "four fields we devote our energies to":38
1. "Urban Renaissance: Promoting urban renewal in cooperation with 
private businesses and regional public institutions." 
2. "Living Environment: Utilizing and revitalizing housing stock. 
Conducting appropriate maintenance management."
3. "Suburban Environment: Promoting a rich natural environment and 
safe, comfortable new suburban housing."
36. Interview with oﬃcials at the Sendai Bureau of the RA, 2013/2/28. 
37. Its name is often given in oﬃcial documents and websites as "UR," using the 
English acronym; the Japanese characters, toshi-kikō, mean "City Organization."
38. The UR corporate profile brochure, English version, p. 4.
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4. "Disaster Redevelopment: strengthening disaster readiness and 
recovery."
In Tōhoku, UR has deployed over 311 employees, mainly engineers, to 18 
municipalities,  primarily in Miyagi and Iwate prefectures, where they are working on 
the construction of over 2100 new multi-unit residential structures, including 730 in 
Kesennuma.39 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA; rhymes with "Leica"), 
similar to USAID, usually provides funding and other resources for development 
projects in Japan's former Asian colonies, as well as in South Asia, Africa and South 
America.40 However, they have been involved in the recovery through ostensibly 
educational projects that bring in international volunteers, who are to return to their 
home countries with recovery and development skills, as well as a deepened 
appreciation for Japan. 
The Development Bank of Japan (DBJ; tagline: "Applying financial expertise to
design the future") has also set aside some funding streams to aid economic re-
development of the private sector in Tōhoku.
The earthquake and tsunami aﬀected a total of around 20 prefectures, but the 
three most significantly damaged were Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima. Taking a cue 
from a strategy employed by China after the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, these 
prefectures have been paired with unaﬀected partner prefectures, with whom they 
exchange information, manpower, and other resources. Miyagi Prefecture, for 
example, is paired with Hyōgo Prefecture, of which Kobe is the seat. There is also an 
exchange of municipal oﬃcials. At the town or city halls of municipalities along the 
39. UR brochure on recovery planning support activities, May 2012, page 2.
40. Historically many of these development projects have been led or carried out by Japanese 
companies.
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Sanriku coast, one can find a number of oﬃcials wearing their jumper suits with pins 
and embroidered patches from a variety of towns in Hyōgo and elsewhere. In order to 
see the recovery through, the workload on government oﬃcials — especially 
prefectural and municipal oﬃcials — is overwhelming. Exacerbating the situation is 
the fact that many towns lost a number of their public workers in the tsunami. The 
town of Minami-Sanriku, in particular, lost about 10% of its public workforce. Thus, 
the exchange program with other locations not only brings money and expertise, but 
also functioning bodies.
In addition to governmental actors and their contractors, an array of NGOs, 
private firms, and educational institutions — as well as prominent individuals — from 
all over Japan are involved in Tōhoku's recovery. Some, like the Kobe Machi-zukuri 
Research Institute, are focused specifically on recovery planning and working in 
concert with local groups, with some government recognition and support. Others are 
independent volunteer organizations focused on clearing debris (now mostly but not 
entirely complete) or on kokoro keh-ah ("kokoro care"), where kokoro () can be translated 
"heart," "mind," or "spirit". Organizations like Kobe's "Valentine Team" help 
facilitate social and community-building activities, including group arts and crafts 
projects for residents of temporary housing facilities. Some of these craft projects bring 
income to the residents, through sales of their products. Typically, these are elderly 
women who engage in knitting and other activities, through which they not only make 
products to sell but also strengthen social ties and enjoy each other's company. In 
addition, private consultants, such as Shōgoro Hagiwara from Kobe, provide advice to
local companies for expanding their businesses. Also, a number of large corporations 
have stepped into the marketplace void cleared out by the tsunami, reestablishing 
commercial services in the aﬀected areas more quickly, in many cases, than local 
businesses could have done.
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Most neighborhoods in Japan, including many of the devastated districts in 
Tōhoku, have a jichikai () or chōnaikai ("), usually translated as 
"neighborhood associations" or "residents associations." Traditionally dominated by 
senior or otherwise prominent male residents, these groups organize annual festivals, 
enforce local norms, and help distribute responsibilities for such tasks as cleaning and 
maintaining "garbage stations." In some cases the jichikai exists alongside other groups, 
including fujinkai (&, women's social clubs, literally "wives' associations"), rōjinkai 
(., seniors' associations) and machi-zukuri kyōgikai (61207	, 
"community-making associations"), which focus on local planning initiatives. There 
are also local industry groups; Japanese fishing communities generally have a Fishery 
Cooperative Association (	 , gyogyō-kyōdō-kumiai) which helps to maintain 
the boundaries of local fishing territories and enforce fishing rights. There may be 
substantial overlap in the memberships of diﬀerent groups, and the jurisdictions of 
each group may be drawn at diﬀerent scales. For example, my own neighborhood in 
Kobe, Shirakawadai Block 7 in Suma Ward, has its own fujinkai but shares its jichikai 
with Block 6 (and there is no machi-zukuri group). Tension between groups is also not 
uncommon. In one district of the Karakuwa peninsula, for example, the respective 
leaders of the local jichikai and machi-zukuri carried on a feud that, for a time, 
threatened the progress of the district's collective relocation initiative. In that case, a 
PRP expert from Kobe was able to broker a truce and secure consensus between the 
two leaders and groups.
That brokered truce is just one example of how PRP experts are helping locals 
with their recovery planning projects through a number of diﬀerent mechanisms and 
institutions. Some are working with local organizations, some directly with 
governments, while others are funded through universities or through NGOs. Most of 
the PRP experts working with local communities are aﬃliated with universities or non-
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profit institutes in Kantō, Kansai or Tōhoku.41 Note that all of Tōhoku's major 
universities are located inland, away from the devastated coastal area, so very few 
experts are from the hisaichi ("disaster zone").
As I discuss in subsequent chapters, unlike in Kobe's recovery, there has been 
no system for recruiting, vetting, or assigning experts to diﬀerent districts or projects. 
According to the Reconstruction Agency, there are 24 municipalities comprising 245 
districts currently going through participatory recovery planning processes, with some 
districts engaging in multiple projects. Some experts are working with multiple 
districts, while many districts are working with multiple experts. 
Nearly all prefectures and municipalities had completed initial recovery plans 
by the end of 2011, and they continue to flesh out the details of these plans while 
reconstruction work is ongoing. Government planning departments do not have the 
capacity to cope with this kind of workload. Many do not have the in-house expertise. 
Therefore, they have worked closely with UR as well as large engineering firms such as
Pacific Consultants (taglines: "We add value for a bright future" and "Comprehensive 
planning capability for building the future"), Kokusai Kōgyō ("Machi-zukuri for the 
future"), and Hasshu ("Who is it that is making the "machi?").42
Finally, it is important to emphasize that recovery planning is being carried out
by multiple organizations at multiple levels and scales, loosely organized. At the local, 
neighborhood level, PRP experts facilitate machi-zukuri meetings for participatory 
recovery planning at the neighborhood level. At least in the case of Kesennuma, these 
local PRP initiatives are oﬃcially recognized by the municipal and prefectural 
41. Kantō is the megalopolitan area comprising Tokyo, Yokohama, and environs, while 
Kansai is the region of Japan that includes the megalopolis of Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto.
42. Note the theme prominent in the taglines of the organizations mentioned thus far: 
planning/designing/making/building "the future."
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governments, which sometimes send representatives to confer with residents and 
consulting PRP experts at machi-zukuri meetings. The experts often meet with oﬃcials 
at City Hall or elsewhere, in order to keep each other apprised of issues and 
developments and, occasionally, to seek agreement on proposals. However, local PRP 
initiatives are not instigated by government, and their outcomes are not guaranteed 
government acceptance. Indeed, municipal and prefectural governments are 
ultimately responsible for oﬃcial recovery plans, although as has been indicated above,
these plans are subject to fiscal and other constraints provided by the national 
Reconstruction Agency, the Diet and the Cabinet Oﬃce of Japan. Local planning can 
and does influence oﬃcial plans, as I will show, but to some degree it also competes 
with municipal and prefectural plans that have been compiled with little regard to the 
input or desires of local residents. Aspects of local plans that substantially contravene 
oﬃcial plans receive no government support and, consequently, are unlikely to see 
implementation. Thus, PRP experts who facilitate local machi-zukuri face a daunting 
challenge: to enable planning at the local level which substantially reflects the 
community's will and to help shepherd these plans to implementation through the 
oﬃcial support of government agencies (and, practically speaking, their contractors) 
even when such plans may well conflict with those same agencies' own plans.
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Fig. 3-11: A temporary housing structure in Kesennuma. This building contains four living 
units, divided from left to right. Each unit has two small multi-use rooms, a kitchen, and a 
bathroom, and may house up to four family members. These structures, designed by engineers
in Tokyo, have little insulation, such that in the cold Tōhoku winter, moisture tends to 
condense on the ceiling and drip onto the interior and inhabitants below. External water pipes 
have to be retrofitted with insulation as well. The genkan or doorway thresholds, where 
residents and visitors don and remove their shoes (visible jutting from the building), an 
important part of any Japanese house, have also been retrofitted onto these units, as they were 
not in the original design.  Photo by author (February 2012).
Fig. 3-12: A temporary housing facility in Kesennuma. Photo by author (February 2012).
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3.4: Recovery, or coup de grâce? 
Why has the plan been done in this way? We were never informed of anything. It's 
wrong. I think it is wrong that people who will live here in the future are not given a 
place for discussing the plan of the town. I think the new town should become a place 
where we want to live, even better than the former town. We have that kind of 
opportunity now, so it makes me extremely sad not to be given a place for discussion. I
sometimes feel that this is a plan for destroying the town. People will leave.
— Tadamori Arakawa43
The initial recovery plans compiled by the municipal government of 
Kesennuma, in late 2011 boasted three prominent features for future disaster risk 
reduction: (1) a larger, redesigned seawall; (2) mass residential relocation to high 
ground; and (3) a zoning scheme based on elevation and proximity to water.44 By the 
end of 2011, residential relocation was also explicitly listed as a project category to be 
funded by monies appropriated for the new national Reconstruction Agency ('

).45 In other words, largely before any significant participatory planning processes 
had begun, government at the local and national levels had already decided to make 
several fundamental changes to the built environments of towns and villages in the 
disaster zone.
By early 2012, residents of the Tadakoshi district of the Karakuwa Peninsula in
Kesennuma City had begun participatory planning processes involving expert 
consultants from Kobe, and then later also city oﬃcials and the city's engineering 
consultants. They met once or twice per month. Most of the local participants were 
over 60 years old, and the average age of the group was probably close to 70. Some 
were retired. Many had children who had moved away to become lawyers and 
43. Arakawa interview, March 12, 2013.
44. Kesennuma City (2011).
45. Reconstruction Agency (2011).
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salarymen in Tokyo, Sendai, or other cities. Of course, some villagers had passed away
in the tsunami, while others had moved away to other towns afterwards. 
During the early stage of the planning process, these residents expressed 
profound reservations about both seawalls and relocation to high ground. One resident
summed up the issue when he said, "When we say the word seikatsu (, 'livelihood'), 
what that really means is umi (, 'the sea')."46 Plans to enhance safety by moving away 
from the water or building ever more gargantuan seawalls merely separate the 
community from the source of its identity, and yet cannot guarantee people's safety. In 
fact, some residents argued the opposite. People who live here understand from a 
young age that tsunami follow powerful earthquakes, and that ōtsunami (#, "great 
tsunami") especially are preceded by an acute withdrawal of the water from the shore. 
The more pronounced the withdrawal, the more dangerous the tsunami. Therefore, 
once alerted by an earthquake that a tsunami may come, being able to see the sea 
allows people to judge both the timing and the power of the tsunami. In such a 
situation, people knew either to run to high ground or to take their boats far enough 
out to sea that the tsunami would roll under them. Meanwhile, on March 11, massive 
and extravagantly expensive tsunami defenses, such as the famed Kamaishi 
breakwater, had been decisively overwhelmed. Some coastal towns such as Tarō, 
heavily damaged by past tsunami (especially in 1933 and 1896), had largely 
redeveloped their lowland areas only after such defenses had been erected, only to be 
even more thoroughly devastated than before. Aware of this context, residents argued 
that large seawalls would accomplish little beyond merely encouraging an exaggerated 
sense of safety. Rather, they argued that the indigenous knowledge of tsunami risk 
embedded in their local culture — born from deep historical experience and, for some,
46. Tadakoshi meeting (February 2012). Note also that the title of Kesennuma City's oﬃcial 
recovery plan is "Living With the Sea" (3/8, Umi to Ikiru).
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personal experience — could be more eﬀective at saving lives than concrete walls.
Despite these objections and the clear preference of most residents not to build 
a large seawall, its inevitability never appeared to be seriously in question. The 
government had already expressed its intention to build such structures. Everyone 
knew that group relocation to high ground was a preferred strategy of the Japanese 
government, and that the national Reconstruction Agency had already allocated 
significant funds for that purpose. The prefectural and municipal governments would 
follow suit without question. Opposing relocation would therefore entail a steep uphill 
battle for any local groups. 
At a later stage in the planning process, Miyagi Prefecture presented specific 
plans for a redesigned seawall to the residents of Tadakoshi. Like most towns and 
villages on the Sanriku Coast of Tōhoku, Tadakoshi is built upon a hama (%), generally
translated as "beach" but in this area often equated to the entire zone of flat land near 
the seashore of a narrow ria valley. Typical of such valleys, a small stream runs down 
the length of the hama to the sea. Most of these streams in Tōhoku have been protected
by floodgates intended to prevent tsunami from surging uphill along the river course. 
So many of these structures failed on March 11, 2011 that oﬃcials have largely 
abandoned them as a defensive measure against large tsunami. Instead, current plans 
call for seawalls to be extended into a system of levees along the river banks. The cross-
sectional shape of these structures is roughly triangular; the backside of the 
embankment slopes gradually downward to ground level. Thus, an 11-meter high 
seawall or levee may be more than 40 meters deep, back to front. But Tadakoshi's 
hama may be only the size of a few football fields; the footprint of a levee, two elevated 
highways, and a large seawall would use as much as a third of the village's entire area. 
Moreover, the sloping backsides of the seawall and a parallel highway would overlap, 
forming a concrete "V" upon which nothing could be built. In meetings, a few 
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residents wondered aloud if that "V" could be filled in to make a broad, flat space, 
upon which a community center or a banya ($, fishermen's lodge) could be 
constructed overlooking the sea, but nothing came of this sensible suggestion, at least 
initially. Residents were concerned that their village was about to be inundated by yet 
another tsunami — this time one made of concrete. 
In addition to the risk introduced by being unable to see the sea, residents 
pointed out further risks posed by plans for larger seawalls and levees and group 
relocation to high ground. For example, a stream bounded by sheer, tall, concrete 
levees would incur a much greater risk of accidental drownings, were someone to fall 
into the flowing water. Not only would such walls be diﬃcult to grab and scale for 
someone in the water, but they would also make it more diﬃcult for would-be rescuers.
Several residents said that some years before, a child had been rescued after falling into
the stream, and they worried that no one would be able to rescue the next person to 
fall in. 
Residents also wondered aloud whether there weren't unseen or unconsidered 
risks of living on top of a wooded hill, such as landslides or fire. The government's 
plans were fundamentally targeted at reducing the risk of lost lives and property due to
tsunami — and only tsunami. Other risks seemed not to be considered, and formal risk 
assessments of the new plans were apparently not being carried out, or at least not 
communicated to the public.
Eventually, however, residents accepted both group relocation and the system 
of amplified levees — that is, an organized and determined resistance never 
materialized. When asked why, some said "shikata ga nai kara" — "because there is no 
(other) way" — while others said, "mou kimachattan da" — "it turns out that it has 
already been decided." Residents clearly felt that the government would push these 
measures through, regardless of local wishes. If they were to exert any influence over 
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the shape of their local built environment, it would have to be within the parameters 
set by bureaucrats in Tokyo, Sendai, and Kesennuma City Hall.
Exactly how and why Japanese governments made these decisions is beyond 
the scope of this project, but actors' perspectives on this question are relevant. When 
asked to speculate, actors generally gave two answers.47 First, they surmised that 
oﬃcials felt genuine responsibility to protect citizens' lives, and feared the possibility 
that, if they did not take the obvious steps of building stronger defenses and moving 
populations to high ground and if another tsunami were then to strike and deal more 
death and damage, that they would bear ethical responsibility, as well as political 
backlash. Therefore, even if there were arguments that resources would be better spent
elsewhere, or even if local residents balked at the measures, political leaders could not 
in good conscience decline them. My interviews of oﬃcials and observations of them in
meetings — including municipal oﬃcials from Kesennuma and Minami-Sanriku, 
Miyagi and Hyōgo Prefecture oﬃcials, and some oﬃcials with the national 
Reconstruction Agency and the Cabinet Oﬃce of Japan — corroborate, or at least do 
not contradict, these conjectures. Second, some informants pointed out that "Japan 
Inc." has enjoyed a cozy relationship with the construction lobby at least since the end 
of World War II. Public works construction helped to stimulate Japan's postwar 
economy and spark its so-called "economic miracle" in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. During 
the so-called "Lost Decade" of the 1990s and early 2000s, Japanese administrations 
repeatedly tried to stimulate the economy through massive debt-financed construction 
projects. In short, actors often cited the doken kokka (!) or "construction state," 
and speculated that the Japanese government was simply institutionally incapable of 
47. A number of interviews and casual conversations yielded variations on the following 
remarks; e.g., Arakawa interview (March 2013), Kannō interview (March 2013), Yoshino 
interview (May 2013).
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innovative solutions.48 Thus, participatory recovery planning in Japan is fundamentally
constrained by parameters set by the government, and such parameters are rather 
predictably narrow.
At any rate, after more than a year, Tadakoshi's relocation plan has nearly 
been finalized. Assuming that land ownership details can be worked out,49 it would 
move residents to a hill near the sea, overlooking their old village. There will be no 
traditional roofs, no large honke houses for extended family gatherings, and no attached
plots for vegetables. (The residents are trying to negotiate with a landowner to use his 
land for raising vegetables, but that land is on the other side of a major highway from 
the new subdivision, diﬃcult to access for most residents, many of whom are over 70 
years old.) Houses will be small and packed closely together, much more like urban 
residences. Although not far, residents will have to descend a steep access road and 
drive down the highway a short distance to the waterfront, a very diﬀerent experience 
from simply walking a few steps to the beach.
Another challenge the locals face in their recovery is the fact that large 
companies based in Tokyo or Sendai have been moving in to the spaces in local 
economies cleared out by the tsunami. The national Reconstruction Agency provides 
funding to start new businesses in the area regardless of whether they are locally 
owned operations or branches of a national chain. Municipal governments, desperate 
for speedy economic revival, welcome all comers. Yet, it is those companies based 
outside of the disaster zone which have the resources to establish a local foothold, 
while locally owned businesses — smaller and battered by the tsunami — struggle to 
reestablish themselves. Local business owners are worried that the long-term eﬀect of 
large-scale non-local investment will be, as one said to me, "like a huge vacuum 
48. Cf. McCormack (1995, 2002, 2012).
49. This is by no means a safe assumption, yet one that current designs are predicated upon.
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sucking all the money out of our economy."50
Corporations are not the only non-local entities benefiting from the recovery 
process. Recovery experts from Kobe, Tokyo and elsewhere may be motivated by the 
best of intentions, but they also are using the ongoing recovery process as a training 
ground for the reproduction of their ranks. In addition, they receive a small amount of 
funding by governments, universities and NGOs to support their activities. They are 
able to solidify or augment their professional reputations through these activities, and 
some will probably be able to procure government contracts for planning and 
rebuilding work. Some residents have told me of doubts or suspicions about the 
motivations of expert consultants: "For them, this is a business. They can get money."51
Thus, regardless of the extent to which any of these experts are actually motivated by 
such crass concerns, the mere potential of a future business proposition may aﬀect 
residents' trust, a topic that I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5.
When considered in light of social and historical context, the "recovery" might 
reasonably be interpreted, not just as a chance for revival, but also as a possible 
instrument for hastening a decades-long process of social and cultural decline, possibly 
delivering a coup de grâce to the old social order in small fishing villages like Tadakoshi. 
Such an observation is consistent with some disaster recovery research which has 
indicated that post-disaster recovery tends to exacerbate pre-disaster trends, 
particularly with regard to economics and population movements. Notably, for 
example, Edgington shows that those districts within Kobe which had been declining 
in population and economic vibrance prior to the earthquake saw these declines 
accelerate afterwards, while districts that had been on the upswing continued their 
50. Katō interview (February 2013).
51. Hatakeyama interview (April 2012).
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growth at a faster pace.52 Similarly, in post-Katrina New Orleans, relatively 
economically depressed neighborhoods have generally struggled to recover as quickly 
as those that had been more economically vibrant. In both Kobe and especially in 
New Orleans, the socio-economic circumstances of residents and districts maps onto 
racial and, to some extent, age demographics (as well as physical elevation — a crucial 
determinant of vulnerability to cataclysms such as floods, storm surges and tsunamis).53
On the other hand, recently scholars have argued that a community's "social 
capital" or "community capacity" can play at least as great a role in shaping its 
recovery as its socioeconomic condition or demographic marginality. Yasui, for 
example, showed that the Mano neighborhood in Kobe, with its long history of 
community engagement and machi-zukuri activities, was able to withstand the shocks of 
the earthquake and to recover more quickly and eﬀectively than the geographically 
contiguous and socioeconomically and demographically similar Mikura district, which 
lacked these traditions.54 Indeed, residents of Mano became heroes of one of the more 
famous incidents associated with the catastrophe, when they quickly formed a "bucket 
brigade" on the day of the earthquake, successfully dousing fires before the flames 
could grow and consume the district — while large portions of neighboring areas were 
razed. Likewise, through his comparative analysis of five major disasters within the 
past century (including both Kobe and Hurricane Katrina), Aldrich argues forcefully 
that "social capital," in its various forms, is the single greatest determinant of a 
community's disaster resilience, or lack thereof.55
Thus, it is too early to say definitively whether or not recovery in the fishing 
52. Edgington (2010).
53. Campanella (2007).
54. Yasui (2007).
55. Aldrich (2012).
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villages and other coastal towns of Tōhoku will come to be seen as a "final blow" to 
their old social orders and ways of life, or to say conclusively which communities will 
fare better than others based on advantages in socioeconomic resources or "social 
capital." However, studies of recoveries from past disasters provide clues for the kinds 
of "factors" to which scholars should pay attention as the recovery in Tōhoku's 
communities proceeds through the following years (and, likely, decades).
That said, there are a number of significant diﬀerences between the PRP 
processes in Tōhoku and Kobe. For example, whereas Kobe had an organized system 
for pairing districts with planners, architects, engineers, lawyers, and other registered 
experts from an oﬃcial "expert bank" derived from Kobayashi's pre-existing CO-
PLAN network, Kesennuma and other towns on the Sanriku coast had no system in 
place for ensuring that each district would have access to expert help. Indeed, when 
asked, two years after the tsunami, if all districts were working with expert consultants, 
a city oﬃcial told me, "most of them,"56 implying that perhaps one or two were not. As 
the narrative below will show, the majority of Kesennuma's districts working with 
expert consultants entered such arrangements on an ad hoc, haphazard basis, through 
mundane social connections.57 
In addition, whereas nearly all of the consultants working with machi-zukuri 
groups in Kesennuma (and most of Tōhoku) are from outside the Sanriku region and a
majority are from outside Tōhoku, most of the experts assisting districts in Kobe were 
local — often earthquake victims themselves working with their own neighbors for the 
recovery of their own districts. Thus, in Kobe the primary distinction between the 
experts and the non-experts was just that — the status of "expertise." In Tōhoku, 
56. Kannō interview (March 2013).
57. This is an example of the importance of "bridging" social capital for bringing vital 
resources into a recovering community. Such informal social resources become even more 
important in the absence of formal, institutional support. Cf. Aldrich (2012).
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however, there is the additional distinction of local vs. non-local status. 
One consequence of Tōhoku's remoteness is that the time and money required 
for experts to visit the area from Kobe, or even from Tokyo, limits how often they can 
meet with the locals. As mentioned in Chapter 2, machi-zukuri meetings in Kobe 
districts were often held two or three times per week. In Tōhoku the norm is once or 
twice per month. Progress feels glacially slow in Tōhoku. 
Deeper consequences of Tōhoku's distance include the diﬀerences in 
knowledge and ways of knowing between non-local experts and local non-experts. 
Questions about the nature of those diﬀerences, whether and how they can be closed, 
are of course a central concern of this dissertation, and of the next chapter in 
particular.
134
Fig. 3-13: Overview map of Kesennuma's recovery plan. The large peninsula in the lower 
right is Karakuwa. The ovals mark takadai-iten targets — the areas of high ground to which 
hisaisha from low-lying areas are planning to move. Source: Kesennuma City (2012).
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Fig. 3-14: Topographical map of the Tadakoshi Disrict, showing the roughly triangular hama 
in the center with roads (note T-shaped intersection towards the water), stream (the wavy 
snake in the center of the hama), and three possible locations for takadai-iten. Source: 
Kesennuma City (2012).
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Fig. 3-15: Elevation diagram of basic recovery plan incorporating measures for resisting the 
impact of future tsunamis, with "before" on top and "after" on the bottom. This particular 
diagram comes from the recovery plan of Minami-Sanriku; other towns on the Sanriku coast 
have similar plans. It is based on a two-tier disaster risk reduction (DRR) model corresponding
with the waves labeled "A" and "B " in the lower right. The letter "B" denotes a large, "1-
in-100-year" tsunami. The combination of a breakwater, a higher seawall, and raised land are 
intended to provide 100% protection from such an event. (Note the removal of material from 
the mountain to provide infill for part of the low-lying area, and the relatively taller seawall.) 
The letter "A" denotes a much larger tsunami, on the order of what struck on March 11, 2011.
In such an event, people in the commercial and industrial zones near the water would flee up 
evacuation routes toward schools, hospitals, and residences at higher elevations. Note the 
amount of construction involved for a small town with an aging and declining population; 
further note that the "after" town is represented as being considerably larger and more 
developed than the "before" town. Source: Minami-Sanriku Town (2011).
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Fig. 3-16: The Twitter avatar of Kesennuma City, featuring the city's oﬃcial mascot, Hoya 
Bōya, "the child of the sea," riding upon a shark. (The city has historically processed a huge 
quantity of shark fins, and features a large "shark museum," which was heavily damaged by 
the tsunami.) The character's design emphasizes the city's connection to the sea: his headpiece 
is a hoya or sea-squirt; his belt buckle is a scallop; and he wields a silver fish as if it were a 
sword. Source: Twitter (accessed November 2013).
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4: LOCALS, EXPERTS AND KNOWLEDGES IN TŌHOKU
What my theory is now, regarding the relationship between experts and 
residents, is that residents become experts, and experts become residents…. 
What I mean is, this process — residents becoming experts and experts 
becoming residents — this is actually machi-zukuri itself. That is my assertion.
— Osamu Tsukihashi1
4.1: PRP in Karakuwa: collaborative strategies for recovering townscapes 
and lifescapes
Several months after the tsunami, many of the survivors who had lost their 
homes were living in temporary housing. In some cases, such as the village of Osawa, 
residents from the same district were clustered together at the same temporary housing
facility. In other cases, such as the neighboring village of Tadakoshi, they were 
scattered to several facilities, each of which also housed residents from other villages. 
Around this time, post-disaster recovery experts from around Japan — planners, 
engineers, architects, economists, psychologists, and others — began to enter the 
disaster zone, oﬀering their help. Initially, the Osawa district appeared to receive more
attention than others, including Tadakoshi. Among the residents of Tadakoshi, who 
also needed and wanted outside support, some were envious of their neighbors in 
Osawa. They surmised that Osawa attracted more attention from prospective expert-
consultants because its residents were about twice as numerous and clustered together 
in a single location. This caused some tensions between the populations of these 
districts. 
In fact, the reason for Osawa's apparent "head start" was far more prosaic than
presumed by the residents of Tadakoshi. A professor from Yokohama City University 
1. Tsukihashi interview (April 2013).
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had come to Karakuwa to check on a former student from Osawa, after hearing that 
the student's home had been washed away by the tsunami. While there, he met 
Mitsuyoshi Kumagai, a local community leader who had been wondering how to go 
about planning the recovery of the district. When asked about the community's plans 
for group relocation, Kumagai replied that he and his neighbors had no knowledge of 
such things, nor any idea about what to do for the future of the village. Through their 
discussions, the professor agreed to help the district as an expert consultant, eventually 
bringing in a team of other experts and students from several diﬀerent universities.2
Mr. Neguchi, a local store owner and respected former head of the Residents 
Association in Tadakoshi, worried that his own village was "falling behind" Osawa, 
and probably other districts as well.3 No experts had come calling. The municipal 
government in Kesennuma was distant and preoccupied, and had oﬀered no help. He 
was wondering how Tadakoshi could "catch up," and he decided to take matters into 
his own hands. He compiled a survey of questions for his neighbors, intended to be a 
starting point to gather basic information about their current situation as well as their 
plans and hopes for the future. Meanwhile, he had relocated his family to an 
apartment half an hour away, and had his hands full with the reconstruction of his 
own shop, which had suﬀered extensive but partial damage. He felt that Tadakoshi 
needed help from experts a la Osawa, and he was thinking about asking his son, a 
university student, to try to find a suitable person on the faculty of his son's school. 
Shortly before that, a member of CO-PLAN and Kobe Machiken named 
2. Yoshida interview (April 2012), Kumagai interview (March 2013), Tsukihashi interview 
(April 2013).
3. Details from the following account of Tadakoshi's PRP activities and the involvement of 
Kobe-based PRP experts have been compiled from field notes and interviews with a 
number of actors, most notably Nozaki (numerous interviews and conversations), 
Takasago (February 2013), Neguchi (March 2013), Kameya (March 2013), Hatakeyama 
(March 2013).
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Harumi Takasago had entered Neguchi's shop, asking for help with a flat tire.4 The 
two had exchanged pleasantries and business cards. Takasago had been sent by Hyōgo
Prefecture to work with the Volunteer Station, a local organization that coordinated 
volunteer work in Kesennuma. Later, on November 22, 2011, just when Neguchi was 
thinking about talking to his son, Takasago came back to his shop with Nozaki, a 
fellow CO-PLAN member and one of Kobe Machiken's leaders, who asked Neguchi 
whether he knew anything about the local community that had been mentioned in the 
Kesennuma newspaper for having developed their own recovery planning survey. 
When Neguchi informed them that, in fact, that was his survey and his own 
community of Tadakoshi, they oﬀered their services as advisors. They arranged a 
meeting with Mr. Kameya, the head of Tadakoshi's Residents' Association, on 
December 6. At that meeting, the relationship between the residents of Tadakoshi and 
the experts from Kobe was made oﬃcial, pending the consent of the residents. That 
consent was provided at the next meeting, with a large group of displaced residents, on
December 17. Specifically, the agreement was for Nozaki's team of experts to assist 
with the takadai-iten project focused solely on relocating residences to high ground, 
rather than the broader ambit of a machi-zukuri organization aimed at reshaping other 
aspects of the community. In fact, to this day Tadakoshi district technically does not 
have a machi-zukuri group, only a Residents Association and the takadai-iten association. 
Nevertheless, Nozaki has largely proceeded as if he were facilitating a machi-zukuri 
kyōgikai. Although the initiative is not, strictly speaking, "machi-zukuri" because its 
oﬃcial ambit is takadai-iten only, rather than recovery planning for the entire "machi" 
or village,5 Nozaki has conducted the project largely as if it were indeed machi-zukuri. 
4. As described in Chapter 2, CO-PLAN and Kobe Machiken (short for Kobe Machi-zukuri 
Research Institute) are NGO's and institutional homes for Kobe's PRP experts, both 
founded by Ikuo Kobayashi.
5. Neguchi interview (March 2013), Kameya interview (March 2013).
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Therefore, for the analytical purposes of this dissertation I will also treat it as if it were 
a machi-zukuri project.
On January 21, 2012, displaced residents of Tadakoshi held their first recovery 
planning meeting with Nozaki's group of experts at a community center near the 
temporary housing facility where many of the residents were now living.6 Using 
Neguchi's questionnaire as a starting point, Nozaki handed out a survey to the 
assembled residents. Most of the questions were designed to gather basic information 
about demographics, family status, jobs, and so forth. Some questions were oriented 
toward peoples' desires and intentions for the recovery, such as, "Do you intend to stay
in Tadakoshi? Do you intend to move to another area in Karakuwa or Kesennuma, or
go elsewhere?" Other questions were more open-ended, such as, "What kind of machi 
(, "town" or "community") do you want to live in? Do you want Tadakoshi to be like
it was before?"7
As discussed in Chapter 3, the government had already decided that they 
would need to move their residences to higher ground, the explicit raison d'être of this 
group. At the January meeting they discussed possible locations for building their new 
homes. In Japan, and especially on the Sanriku coast, identifying undeveloped parcels 
of land suitable for building residences is a non-trivial task. Much of the land is 
mountainous and prohibitively expensive or otherwise unsuitable for development. Of 
the remaining space, much is privately owned. In both Kobe and Tōhoku, a major 
challenge faced by the government in setting up temporary housing facilities was 
simply finding the space to put them. In both cases, rows of the temporary structures 
were set up in school yards and public parks. In Onagawa, for example, south of 
6. Nozaki interview (February 2012), Fukkō juku notes (February 2012), Neguchi interview 
(March 2013).
7. Nozaki interview (February 2012), Neguchi interview (March 2013).
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Kesennuma, temporary houses fill the playing field of the local high school's baseball 
park.8 Most of the current relocation plans throughout the region involve "cutting" 
mountaintops, an expensive procedure as measured in money, manpower, and 
machinery, as well as time — all things in short supply in post-disaster and post-
industrial Japan.9 Despite the relative lack of options, the group was able to identify a 
particular parcel of land that seemed promising — elevated enough to be relatively 
safe, close enough to feel pretty much like home. The only catch was that the parcel in 
question spanned a patchwork of ownership. Thus, the city would need to secure the 
agreement of all of the current landowners. After the meeting, Nozaki took the group's 
suggestion to Kesennuma City Hall as a proposal. It was subsequently up to the city to 
negotiate with the landowners.
While waiting for the city's response, the group held another meeting on 
February 26.10 By that time, Neguchi had collected all of the survey responses and 
passed them to Nozaki for collation and analysis. At the meeting, printouts of the 
results, including tables and color graphs, were handed out. The group went over the 
results together and discussed them, focusing especially upon the more open-ended 
questions.11 Residents clearly and forcefully expressed their concerns about the risks 
and negative implications for their way of life due to relocation to high ground and, 
especially, larger seawalls. This was the discussion during which one resident equated 
local lifestyle with the sea itself, as described in Chapter 3. 
This meeting was conducted at the same community center as before, with 
8. Q.v. Fig. 4-7.
9. Q.v. the elevation-cutaway diagram in Fig. 3-15.
10. The following account is based on meeting notes (February, 2012), which include 
photographs and audio recordings as well as live notes, and on post-meeting debriefing 
discussions with Nozaki and other members of the "Kobe Machiken team."
11. Q.v. Fig 4-1, in which residents can be seen poring over the survey report at this meeting.
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about 25 or 30 residents participating. Most of the participants were over 60 years old, 
with many over 70. Nozaki's team consisted of himself, two other "old guard" PRP 
experts from CO-PLAN and Machiken (Takasago and Tsuji), two younger PRP 
experts from Machiken, two legal consultants, and a prominent architect — all from 
Kobe. In addition, journalists from NHK television, the Kobe Shinbun newspaper, and 
the Mainichi Shinbun newspaper attended, as well as Michiyo and myself. There was a 
whiteboard at the front of the room and a U-shaped arrangement of tables at the front
and sides, with a few chairs toward the back and numerous zabuton (, "sitting-
futon") cushions scattered upon the floor in the middle of the room.12 Nozaki's team sat
on zabutons behind the tables at the front and sides of the room, with several local 
leaders also sitting behind the tables. This group faced the majority of residents who 
were clustered towards the back and in the center of the room. The men sat around 
the edges, many up on Western-style chairs, while most of the women sat on the 
cushions in the center. A large space remained in the front-center portion of the room, 
where there were many unused zabutons, perhaps reflecting the still-incipient and 
tentative nature of the relationship between the experts and the residents. (At later 
meetings, this physical distance dissolved.) In short, the physical arrangement of the 
room reflected social and political relationships, with the experts and leaders at the 
front, the local residents toward the back, and the men sitting on chairs higher than 
the women. On the other hand, the women, who comprised about half of the group, 
were more vocal than the men, freely expressing their opinions, while the men 
remained relatively taciturn. 
On this weekend in late February 2012, Nozaki's team participated in several 
machi-zukuri meetings at several diﬀerent districts around Kesennuma. The 
12. Q.v. Fig. 4-1.
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assertiveness of Tadakoshi's women stood out especially in comparison to other areas, 
particularly the Ozaki District, a larger and more populous community near the center
of Kesennuma. At the Ozaki meeting, the room's arrangement was similar to that at 
Tadakoshi, except that there were twice as many residents, with a much smaller 
proportion of women.13 Those women who did attend refused to speak even when 
encouraged by Nozaki, Tsuji and others to express their opinions. Later, residents of 
yet another district told us that Tadakoshi and Ozaki are famous for exactly these 
gender dynamics.14 The local theory is that the fishermen's wives of Tadakoshi, 
because they are left to manage the household alone while their husbands spend so 
much time out on the sea, become exceptionally self-suﬃcient. Whatever the reason, it
was apparent that there were obvious cultural variations, and diﬀerences in gender 
roles and expectations, even from district to district within Kesennuma. 
When asked why meeting rooms were arranged as they were at Tadakoshi and 
Ozaki, members of Nozaki's expert team suggested that such concerns were trivial, as 
long as the process was truly participatory and the contents of the meetings were 
acceptable.15 However, other PRP experts, such as those working with Osawa District, 
disagreed somewhat on this point. They indicated that seating arrangements were an 
integral part of the choreography of the proceedings, depending upon who was 
participating and what were the objectives for that particular meeting.16 Noted one: 
"People feel more comfortable to contribute to discussions in smaller groups at the 
round tables."17 
13. Ozaki meeting notes (February 2012), "Kobe team" post-meeting discussion. Q.v. Fig. 4-4 
for a picture of Nozaki speaking at the Ozaki meeting.
14. Minami-Saichikawara meeting notes (February 2012).
15. Post-meeting discussion with Nozaki, Tsuji, Takasago (February 2012).
16. Tsukihashi interview (April 2012).
17. Yoshida interview (April 2012).
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One of the Osawa meetings that I attended, for example, took place in a school
gymnasium and featured a number of round tables surrounding a low platform in the 
center, with a large projection screen at the end of the gym.18 The population of this 
district is about double that of Tadakoshi, and the consulting expert team is also larger,
with professors of architecture and planning from Yokohama City University, Kobe 
University, and Tōhoku University of Architecture and Design, as well as a small 
platoon of these professors' students. The meeting began with slick videos and 
PowerPoint presentations by a professor and some students, recapping the results of 
the previous meeting and setting up the day's tasks. The residents then gathered 
around the platform in the center, upon which was displayed a white, detailed three-
dimensional model of the district as it existed before the tsunami, constructed from 
foam-core materials, about 2 by 3 meters in size. The professors discussed the 
importance of remembering what their village had been like in the past, before 
beginning to plan what shape it would take in the future. Next, the residents sat at the 
round tables, about 12 per table, with one professor or senior student also at each 
table. At one table sat only women, at another sat only men, while both men and 
women sat at the remaining tables. (Generally, women at the mixed-gender tables 
seemed much less vocal than those at the all-female table.) As with Tadakoshi, most 
participants were over 60 or 70 years old, although there were also several in their 30s 
and 40s. The expert team handed out promotional materials and a questionnaire 
about the kinds of architectural details the residents wanted in their future homes. As 
the experts facilitated the discussion, junior students hovered about, jotting notes and 
recording comments. I will return to Osawa below, but my immediate point is that the 
seating arrangements and the procedures for conducting PRP meetings do vary from 
18. Osawa meeting notes (April 2012).
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district to district, facilitating expert to facilitating expert.
After Tadakoshi's meeting in February, the "Kobe team" and some of the 
residents had dinner together at a restaurant owned by one of the residents.19 In 
addition to consuming copious amounts of locally sourced sushi, sashimi and other 
foods, the participants engaged heartily in nominikeishon, a bilingual portmanteau 
composed of the Japanese word for "drinking" (, nomi) and the English word 
"communication." Far from an ancillary activity, the evening's festivities went a long 
way to strengthening the social bonds between the locals and the occasional visitors 
from Kobe — an example of what I call trust-work, which I describe in more detail in 
Chapter 5.
 As I learned from attending numerous meetings over 18 months, most of the 
PRP meetings run by Nozaki's group followed a particular template. Local leaders 
would open with a brief (or sometimes not so brief) introduction or speech, and then 
the experts would give presentations — for example, regarding the results of the survey
or a meeting with local oﬃcials. Next there would be free discussion, followed by a 
more structured discussion in which each person in the room was asked to express an 
opinion on the preceding proceedings. Finally, arrangements would be made for the 
next meeting. 
Throughout this process, Nozaki's younger expert assistants would be taking 
notes — Ms. Kobayashi jotting in her notebook and taking pictures, Mr. Asami 
writing notes on the whiteboard. Asami tried to capture everything that anyone said 
throughout the meeting, writing encapsulated summaries of each statement on the 
board. Periodically, everyone would stop while Asami reviewed the comments. The 
most important such review took place towards the end of the meeting after each 
19. Field notes (March 2012).
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participant had been asked for his or her opinion.20 The experts' objectives were to 
ensure that all participants had at least one chance to express themselves, and that 
these opinions and feelings would be captured without fail.21 Asami and the other 
experts argued that it was important for the participants to see that their own opinions 
and feelings had been heard and recognized by the experts and by the group as a 
whole. Furthermore, Asami noted that often a participant would remark that she was 
worried that she was the only one with such an opinion, but was relieved to see that 
she was not alone. In fact, Asami's notes would be left on the board until the next 
meeting the following month. At the beginning of the next meeting, Asami would once
again review the notes from the previous meeting to ensure continuity and to catch up 
anyone who had missed it.
By the time the residents of Tadakoshi met again in late March 2012, more 
than a year after the tsunami, they had received word from the city that their proposed
site for relocation had been rejected. At the time, there was no explanation. However, 
later it was revealed that just one of the current landowners had declined to sell, single-
handedly vetoing the entire proposal.22
It was back to the drawing board for the displaced residents. On March 25, 
they met again, this time in the tiny community meeting room within their temporary 
housing facility.23 City oﬃcials also packed into the room with the residents and 
experts, and presented several alternative parcels of land which they had tentatively 
surveyed and identified as developable. At this meeting, several residents asked 
whether the new sites were not vulnerable to other kinds of disasters such as landslides 
20. Asami presentation and interview (October 2012).
21. Nozaki interview (February 2012), Kobayashi interview (February 2012), Asami 
presentation and interview (October 2012).
22. Neguchi interview (March 2013).
23. Tadakoshi meeting notes (March 2012).
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or fires. Oﬃcials responded by saying that no location would be entirely risk-free, but 
that city engineers would certainly assay the properties in terms of the suitability of the 
soil and other such concerns. After some discussion, the residents chose one of the 
three parcels proposed for development by the oﬃcials.24 A small group immediately 
went to take a look at the proposed space, and found no objections. On April 10, 
Nozaki's team visited the principal landowner of the parcel in question. Although they 
did not get a signed agreement, the owner verbally agreed in principle to selling his 
land.25
In the first week of May, Nozaki's team held individual hearings with 
Tadakoshi's residents, meeting one household or couple at a time.26 Within this more 
private context, they were able to discuss again many of the questions asked on the 
survey, as well as to get to know some of the individual residents a little better. 
Although the information gathered did not diﬀer significantly from group discussions, 
it gave Nozaki a deeper appreciation for the struggles that many of these people were 
enduring. For example, whereas before they had always been able to raise vegetables 
and catch fish for food, it was only now, at precisely the moment that they found 
themselves without jobs and income, that they were forced to purchase their food with 
cash.27 In addition, Nozaki emphasized the fact that couples were able to show their 
disagreement with each other; in particular, wives were able to express their 
disagreement with their husbands, something they were generally reluctant to do in 
24. Q.v. Fig. 3-14, which shows the three proposed sites for relocation. The residents chose 
the site on the upper right (northeast) of the figure.
25. Nozaki interview (April 2012), Fukkō-Juku notes (May 2012), Neguchi interview (March 
2013).
26. Nozaki interview (May 2012), Fukkō-Juku notes (May 2012), Neguchi interview (March 
2013).
27. Kikuta interview (April 2012).
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the public context of a group meeting with their neighbors.28 In general, people were 
able to speak more freely about their concerns. The residents themselves reported that 
these hearings helped to reassure them that Nozaki and his team genuinely cared 
about them and their specific situations.29 In short, beyond providing additional data 
or new information, like nomi-nication the hearings functioned as trust-work, deepening 
mutual trust between experts and residents.
Based on information collected in the hearings as well as in the earlier survey, 
Nozaki compiled a series of simple questions regarding the kinds of housing conditions 
that people desired for their future homes.30 For example, how much space and how 
many rooms did they want? How important was a view of the sea? Did they want to 
stay close to their previous neighbors? Their current neighbors in the temporary 
housing facility? Did they prefer public or private housing? Separate homes or 
townhouses? Etc. The group went through these questions at the next meeting on May
27.31 
In addition, Nozaki presented the concept of collective housing, which had 
been an experimental solution to recovery housing in Kobe, favored by some CO-
PLAN members.32 In this model, two, three, or four houses share a common area such
as a kitchen, lounge and courtyard, where the families socialize and make and eat 
meals together. In the first several years after the Kobe earthquake, this kind of 
housing arrangement was a kind of craze among some planners and architects, and 
many such structures were built. At first, there were plenty of enthusiastic residents, 
28. Thus Nozaki appeared to have learned a lesson from Komori, as mentioned in Chapter 2.
29. Kikuta interview (April 2012), Neguchi interview (March 2013), Kameya interview (March
2013).
30. Nozaki interview (April 2012), Fukkō Juku notes (May 2012).
31. Tadakoshi meeting notes (May 2012).
32. Kinmokusei (1999), Otani (2010), Maly & Shiozaki (2012), Amakawa interview (February 
2012), Nozaki interview (April 2012).
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happy to have a new home after several years in cramped temporary housing. An 
advantage of the collective housing model is its eﬃcient usage of space, which is 
especially attractive to residents whose total land area will shrink 10% or 20% through 
land readjustment. However within two or three years in Kobe, many of these 
arrangements were failing, as people were rapidly tiring of constant contact with their 
neighbors and the inability, for example, to have dinner privately and quietly with 
their own families.33 At the meeting in Tadakoshi, residents listened politely to Nozaki's
presentation, but were unimpressed and uninterested in the idea of collective housing. 
This was, after all, a place where people had lived in huge, spacious houses separated 
from each other by vegetable plots and — especially by Japanese standards — 
considerable space. Indeed, during the discussions, it emerged that the most likely 
target size for the future home plots of Tadakoshi's residents was about 100 tsubo (	), 
or about 330m². There were grumbles and expressions of surprise at this news. The 
locals were shocked and disappointed at what they considered to be clearly inadequate
space for long-term human habitation. The Kobe contingent was equally shocked that 
the locals considered 100 tsubo to be small. By Kobe standards, that would be an 
extremely large plot of land, fit for a huge house.34 After the meeting, the Kobe group 
discussed the 100 tsubo issue with amazement. 
Later, one resident commented to me that this particular meeting in May of 
2012 seemed to reveal a cultural knowledge gap between the locals and the experts 
from Kobe: "When I saw that presentation about collective housing, I thought, these 
guys just didn't understand our ways and our culture."35 To Nozaki's credit, however, 
33. Amakawa interview (February 2012). The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Museum 
features an exhibit that tells the story of the experiment in collective housing.
34. According to the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications, the floor area of the 
average dwelling in Japan is about 29 tsubo or 95 m².
35. Hatakeyama interview (March 2013).
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he took the polite but cool reception to heart and dialed back his pressure on the topic 
of collective housing (although we saw in Chapter 2 that the discussion was carried 
back to Kobe's Fukkō Juku). Furthermore, from this meeting forward, Nozaki's team 
demonstrated more understanding of locals' desires for spacious homes. For example, 
some months later, once the land for the new residential subdivision had been 
identified, they worked with Miyagi prefectural planners and contractors, as well as the
residents, to ensure that the sizes of private home plots did not get reduced further.36
At the next meeting on June 17, residents learned that the city had oﬃcially 
approved their choice of land for their relocation, although there still was no oﬃcial 
sale or contract with the current landowner.37 Also at this meeting, representatives of 
the Miyagi Prefecture Dept. of Civil Engineering came to present a proposal for 
gigantic seawalls, elevated roadways, and massively constructed levees along the banks 
of Tadakoshi's stream. This was the original version of the plan described in Chapter 
3, which concerned residents because of the scale of the structures. However, they did 
not object strenuously at this meeting, but rather appeared to acquiesce to the plans as 
the will of the government.
On July 22nd, the experts from Kobe organized a very diﬀerent kind of activity
from the usual meeting. This time, the group performed machi-aruki (, "town 
walking").38 That is, they visited their old hama, which, with the exception of Neguchi's 
reconstructed general store, was now almost entirely leveled and cleared of debris, and 
walked around, pointing out places that had mattered to them. The group from Kobe 
asked questions like, "What was this?" "What was in that place?" and "Where did you 
36. Private plots in the most recent plan remain at 100 tsubo, although public housing plots are
specified as just 50 tsubo each.
37. Fukkō Juku notes (July 2012), Nozaki interview (August 2012).
38. Nozaki interview (August 2012), Fukkō Juku notes (August 2012), Neguchi interview (March
2013), Kameya interview (March 2013).
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live?" The residents eﬀectively reconstructed their old machi out of the fabric of 
memory. The machi they conjured did not merely comprise physical structures and 
technological infrastructure, but also social relationships and the rhythms of daily 
life — in the words of one recovery expert, not just a landscape full of rocks and trees 
or a townscape full of buildings, but a lifescape full of people and activity.39 For example,
they would say things like "I used to live over there, and I liked it there because every 
morning I could go two doors down to K's house, and we would walk down to the 
water and stop at Neguchi's to get some tea on the way. Then K and I used to watch 
the sunrise as the boats went out." Reconstructing such memories was emotional and 
probably therapeutic for many residents, and it also served to remind them of the kinds
of places and structures and practices which they valued in their community, past and 
imagined future. At the following meeting on August 25, the group reviewed and 
discussed the memories and places they had "seen" during their walk.40
Machi-aruki is an example of a classic machi-zukuri activity. It is intended to serve
much the same purpose as the scale model at the Osawa district meeting. Indeed, the 
model enables residents to see and remember and walk through (or even fly through) 
their old machi in an analogous, somewhat virtual way. Prof. Osamu Tsukihashi of the 
Kobe University Dept. of Architecture, who built the Osawa model with his students, 
notes that while the model generally serves a similar function as the practice of machi-
aruki, the advantage is that it fixes the past townscape — and thus residents' memories 
of their "lifescape" — in a relatively durable, physical artifact. In Tsukihashi's memory-
and lifescape-building activity, residents pore over the model, identifying personally 
significant locations such as their homes, their favorite shops, or the tree under which a
husband-to-be first proposed marriage. Using diﬀerent colored paints supplied by 
39. Tsukihashi interview (April 2013).
40. Nozaki interview (September 2012), Fukkō Juku notes (September 2012).
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Tsukihashi's team, they paint the model, a ritualistic and symbolic embodiment of 
instantiating their lifescape of their memory.41
In the case of Tadakoshi, although it was undoubtedly useful for many of the 
residents, others commented to me that, while they found machi-aruki to be a pleasant 
way to spend an afternoon, it was not the most productive expenditure of time, 
especially since Nozaki's team had not been brought on for machi-zukuri, but rather 
only to help facilitate residential relocation to high ground.42 However, such an 
activity, which helps the residents to remember the structures, places and practices that
had been valuable to them in their pre-disaster past, is designed not only to benefit the 
residents themselves, but also to educate the non-local experts about local culture, the 
predisaster condition of the village, and the residents' current state of mind.43
During the machi-aruki activity, it became evident to Nozaki and his colleagues 
that, despite the residents' initial misgivings, the locals still did not fully grasp the scale 
of the re-designed seawall and levees.44 Therefore, the expert team set about 
constructing a scale model of Tadakoshi that would clearly demonstrate the full impact
of the new structures on the hama. They unveiled this model at the next meeting on 
September 23.45 When residents saw it, they gasped and cried out in shock and 
disbelief. The group discussed possible measures to deal with the levee plans that were 
41.  Japanese houses often have colorful tile roofs, so this activity works especially well in such 
a context.
42. Neguchi interview (March 2013), Kameya interview (March 2013).
43. The practice of machi-aruki, be it through the ruins of the town or through a scale model, 
somewhat recalls the process of collective, communal learning described by Lee & Roth 
(2003), in which members of a community walk through their local environment and 
subsequently engage in environmental policy deliberations. While individual members 
may not master all the aspects of the situation, technical or otherwise, as a collective whole
the community is able to master it.
44. Nozaki interview (September 2012), Asami interview (October 2012), Fukkō Juku notes 
(October 2012).
45. Tadakoshi meeting notes (September 2012).
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now more unpopular than ever. As described in Chapter 3, one suggestion was to fill 
in the "V" between the seawall and the roadway, so that the resulting flat area could be
used for something like a community center or a fishing banya. However, 
fundamentally, people did not seem to feel that they had the power to influence these 
plans. 
As of this writing, it remains unclear what will happen to Tadakoshi's hama. A 
recent publication suggests that the lower portions of it may be raised as much as 4.5 
meters, still less than half the height of the planned seawall.46 Such a project would be 
less extreme than the solution proposed for a similar district on the Sanriku coast, 
which, for reasons that will become clear, I pseudonymize in this account as 
Kamegawa. This village, like many others on this coast, resembles Tadakoshi — a 
small hama situated in a narrow valley, punctuated by a stream and criss-crossed by 
some roads. As with Tadakoshi, the oﬃcial plans called for massive seawalls and 
levees, rendering much of the hama unusable and aesthetically unappealing. The 
Kobe-based PRP expert working with Kamegawa took it upon himself to press the 
prefecture to find a way to modify their plans. Armed with the opposition of the local 
residents, he was able to persuade the prefecture to look into alternatives. Eventually, 
the government's planners and engineers (including contractors) revised their plans. 
According to their revised plans, the entire hama will be elevated to the height of the 
seawall.47 Clearly, such a solution is only remotely feasible because of the relatively 
small size of Kamegawa's hama. Even so, especially when considering that the 
government will "cut" a hilltop for residential relocation, the scale of this project, 
including the funds and manpower required to implement it, is impressive. 
46. Oguma (2013). This English translation of Oguma's Japanese article spells Tadakoshi as 
"Tadagoshi."
47. Neguchi interview (March 2013), Nozaki interview (April 2013).
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Undoubtedly, the cost will exceed the total income of Kamegawa by orders of 
magnitude. Nevertheless, this revised engineering plan appears to be a clear case of 
citizens and experts working together to successfully produce a significant change in 
oﬃcial plans for the community's built environment. Yet, even this change is 
somewhat limited and within the basic parameters set by governmental planners and 
engineers. Indeed, it is instructive that this tentatively successful "compromise" plan is 
one that entails even more intensive engineering and construction work than the 
government's original plan. For the infamous Japanese "construction state" or doken 
kokka (), public works construction is, by far, the biggest hammer in its 
toolbox of solutions, and this problem, too, looks like a nail.48
As it stands now, only the experts and a few local leaders of Kamegawa are 
aware of these plans. They specifically asked administrative oﬃcials not to announce 
this plan until at least 2015. One of them informed me that they decided to conceal the
plans from the other residents because they reasoned that, once everyone knew that 
their old land would be substantially raised to a relatively safe elevation, they would 
decide to opt out of the relocation project in favor of waiting for the hama engineering 
project, or they would immediately move back.49 Although backed by funds from the 
national Reconstruction Agency, financing for the relocation project depends in part 
upon a scheme whereby the government would purchase the residents' old land in the 
hama and either convert it to public space or, ideally, sell it to a commercial concern. 
As with most of the recovery plans throughout the districts and towns of Tōhoku, the 
low areas of Kamegawa's hama are slated to become zoned for public park space and 
48. McCormack (1995). At the time McCormick was writing, Japan spent more, as a 
percentage of its GDP, on public works construction than the United States spent on 
defense. I further discuss the consequences for the recovery of the "construction state" in 
Chapter 6.
49. Neguchi interview (March 2013).
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industrial and commercial use (oﬃces, shops, processing plants for fish and other sea 
products, etc.).50 Perhaps two or three residents could pull out of the relocation plan 
without sinking it, but any more than that, and the relocation eﬀort would disintegrate,
and the village population would remain in limbo for a much longer time while 
waiting for the completion of the hama elevation project. In any case, if the oﬃcial 
plans for Kamegawa were to be adopted, even in a less extreme form, for Tadakoshi, it
would have the potential to severely disrupt the takadai-iten and overall recovery 
planning processes there, as well. 
Beginning with the meeting on October 24, 2012, Tadakoshi's residents began 
discussing the layout of their planned subdivision as well as the specifics of their new 
homes.51 They talked about how to angle the houses and streets such that as many 
homes as possible would be on a corner and have a view of the sea. They talked about 
preferences for Japanese tatami mats or Western-style floors. (Consensus was that 
everyone wanted both.) From this meeting onwards, the atmosphere at the planning 
meetings changed. People were looser, more positive and optimistic as they were 
further removed from the disaster and looking forward to a home that was beginning 
to seem realistically attainable in the not-too-distant future.
Tadakoshi's current status, at the time of this writing, is hopeful but still 
uncertain. The layout of the new subdivision has been settled, with roughly a dozen 
private homes on 100-tsubo plots and 20 or so public housing units on 50-tsubo plots 
(the latter also being separate, single-family homes, however). As discussed at the 
meetings, residents feel that they had no choice but to accept these smaller-than-ideal 
plots, although they are excited about the prospect of being able to move into their 
50. Thus, it would be understandable if some residents were to interpret this plan as a land-
grab by the government on behalf of commercial interests.
51. Tadakoshi meeting notes (October 2012).
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new homes within the foreseeable future. Yet, as all of the tsunami-devastated coast 
enters a phase of intensive reconstruction, manpower and machinery are becoming 
scarcer and increasingly costly. It may be three, five or more years before the displaced
residents of Tadakoshi can move into their new homes.52 As many of them are in their 
70s or older, it is possible that a few of them may not make it. Furthermore, as was the 
case in Kobe, the temporary housing facilities have nurtured their own sort of 
community among the densely packed residents, and leaving that behind is not entirely
an occasion for celebration.53 Indeed, in cases where residents have moved out early to
rent housing elsewhere, many of them find themselves regularly returning to the 
temporary housing settlements to meet friends or to engage in community activities at 
the meager common rooms in the facilities.54 Furthermore, a topic that few want to 
discuss explicitly is the fact that few young people remain; some have acknowledged 
the prospect that massively expensive, engineering-intensive towns and subdivisions 
will be sitting mostly empty within 10 or 20 years.55
Although the relocation site has been approved and agreed upon in principle 
by the current owner, the terms of the sale have yet to be negotiated. Neguchi, among 
others, is worried about the possibility that the sale could still fall through. There are 
also ongoing negotiations with the owner of the parcel across the highway to use it for 
vegetable plots. Nozaki has been in talks with the Residents Association about 
52. Neguchi interview (March 2013), Nozaki interview (April 2013), Yoshino interview (May 
2013).
53. Olshansky et al (2005), Edgington (2010), Otani (2010), Maly & Shiozaki (2012).
54. K. Baba interview (March 2013).
55. Tanaka interview (February 2013), Kawawaki interview (February 2013). At a meeting 
between researchers of the International Recovery Platform (IRP) and oﬃcials of the 
Reconstruction Agency (RA), the former asked the latter about the extent to which these 
prospects were considered in their policies. An RA oﬃcial winced and drew back as if 
struck, replying that such considerations were unethical and anathema to even think 
about. IRP-RA meeting notes (February 2013).
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beginning a machi-zukuri kyōgikai for the entire district, and discussing specific options 
for re-envisioning the entire village and reconstructing the hama.56 Whereas 
participants in the takadai-iten association are primarily displaced residents who lost 
their homes, the Residents' Association also comprises some who did not sustain 
damage. In other districts, as Nozaki discusses at the Fukkō Juku in Chapter 2, there has
been tension between those who lost homes or businesses and those who did not; 
however, in Tadakoshi this has been minimal. Regarding Nozaki's role, a concern for 
the residents is that his funding is limited to 15 total visits to each district.57 His own 
organization, Machiken, provides little financial support. Primarily it is Hyōgo 
Prefecture that provides the funds for his travel and accommodation. Since he has just 
begun working with one or two other nearby villages, he has proposed to continue 
advising Tadakoshi while on trips oﬃcially tied to those other districts.58 Nevertheless, 
his funding is limited, and the recovery will be a long one, leaving questions about the 
long-term viability of the community's eﬀorts to re-establish itself.
The lack of a system for selecting, funding and distributing expert consultants 
not only aﬀected the starting dates for various districts' PRP initiatives, it is also likely 
to impact what happens to these endeavors down the road. Outside PRP experts like 
Nozaki will need to find alternative sources of funding or else bring their activities to a 
close, while others such as Tsukihashi — funded by Kobe University as well as by a 
special project of NHK Television — will likely be able to carry on further, but 
perhaps not forever. Kobe's recovery arguably took 10 to 15 years.59 Even ignoring the
unique problems posed by the ongoing Fukushima nuclear crisis, given the scale and 
56. Tadakoshi Residents' Association meeting notes (October 2012).
57. Neguchi interview (March 2013).
58. Nozaki interview (April 2013), Neguchi interview (March 2013).
59. Olshansky et al (2005), Edgington (2010).
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array of challenges facing Tōhoku, it seems highly unlikely that the region will achieve 
anything close to a recovery in 10 to 15 years. 
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Fig. 4-1 : PRP meeting for Tadakoshi District, Karakuwa. Note the experts and leaders 
around the outside of the table, residents toward the back of the room. The women are on the 
floor in the center, while many of the men sit on chairs. The young people standing in the 
back are journalists from NHK and the Mainichi Shinbun newspaper. Photo by author 
(February, 2012).
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Fig. 4-2 : A PRP meeting for discussing takadai-iten in Tadakoshi District, Karakuwa. The men 
in the jumpsuits, in the center of the photo, are Miyagi Prefecture planning oﬃcials. Note the 
foamcore model on the right, the man standing and taking notes, and the wall-mounted maps 
of the takadai-iten plans. Photo by author (October 2012).
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Fig. 4-3 : Residents and PRP experts discuss the takadai-iten plans for Tadakoshi. Photo by 
author (October 2012).
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Fig. 4-4: A PRP meeting in Ozaki District, Kesennuma. This meeting was completely 
dominated by males, despite Nozaki's strenuous eﬀorts to encourage women to participate. 
Photo by author (February 2012).
Fig. 4-5: A PRP meeting in the cramped community center of a temporary housing facility. 
Photo by author (February 2012).
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Fig. 4-6: A meeting to plan for participatory recovery planning in an elementary school 
building in Shishiori District, Kesennuma. The participants of this particular meeting included
experts, local leaders, journalists and scholars, but no other residents of the district. Photo by 
author (February 2012).
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Fig. 4-7: Part of the 
temporary housing 
facility in the baseball 
outfield in Onagawa, 
Miyagi Prefecture, with 
the scoreboard visible on 
the right side. Space for 
such facilities is at a 
premium in Japan. These 
are the only multi-story 
temporary housing units 
in Japan. They were 
designed and built based 
on shipping containers by 
renowned architect 
Shigeru Ban, who had 
earlier contributed the 
famed "Paper Dome" 
Catholic Church to the 
Takatori neighborhood in 
Kobe. Onagawa is a 
small town with a 
population of around 
10,000, but is famous for 
its high-quality public 
facilities such as this 
baseball field. It is 
generally thought that 
these facilities are possible 
because of payments from 
the Tōhoku Power 
Company, which 
operates a nuclear power 
plant on the town's 
Pacific coast. The plant is 
slightly elevated and 
surrounded by a 14-meter 
seawall (whereas 
Fukushima's seawall was just 5 or 6 meters high). The tsunami reached the 13-meter mark, but
the wall held, and the plant served as an evacuation center for homeless residents in 
subsequent days. Photo by author (March 2012).
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4.2: Diﬀerences among experts, diﬀerences among residents
Within the relatively small city of Kesennuma (population approx. 78,000 
before the tsunami; 73,000 now), Shishiori District had been a fairly urban waterside 
community, an area densely packed with a variety of residences, restaurants, 
commercial shops, and fish processing businesses. Now about two thirds of the area 
was a nearly empty expanse of rectangular building foundations with a few temporary 
structures here and there — the most prominent of which was now the red, blue, and 
white 330-ton fish carrier vessel Kyōtoku Maru No. 18, resting in its final berth about 800
meters from the water, on top of a burnt-out car and a couple of house foundations. 
Because of its relatively high population, urban-like development and complex 
patterns of land and building ownership, Shishiori District faced a more complicated 
recovery planning process than the small fishing villages of Karakuwa. As was the case 
with black zones in Kobe,60 it would require land readjustment — a process that 
entailed extensive negotiations between the city, land owners and structure owners in 
order to reach consensus agreement over future ownership, and thus the ultimate 
shape of recovery plans. In addition, because of the size and social complexity of the 
district, including multiple institutions and fragmented groups, it had proven 
exceedingly diﬃcult to corral everyone, or even a reasonably representative group of 
everyone, into a single meeting, much less an ongoing, coherent process of 
deliberation.61 
 While Nozaki had been able to hold a workshop on how to organize and run a
machi-zukuri kyōgikai, neither he nor the locals had been able to actually pull one 
together. By March of 2013, the municipal government of Kesennuma was proceeding
60. Q.v., Chapter 2.
61. Shishiori meeting notes (October 2012), Nozaki interview (October 2012), Takeuchi 
interview (March 2013).
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with its own recovery plan for the area — the city's third draft, all compiled by oﬃcial 
planners and major contracting firms, with minimal public input. With each successive
draft, residents saw their future townscape (and lifescape) mysteriously revised. One 
displaced resident, Eiichi Katō, described the radical changes in the plans for his own 
land: 
First, my house was in the middle of the green belt, between the commercial zone and 
the residential zone. So, I was worried, what am I going to do? Will the government 
pay me enough for my land so I can build my new house in another location, 
especially when, you know, prices are so much more expensive now after the tsunami. 
Then, they changed. My friend in the city hall told me, don't worry, we made the 
green belt more narrow, so now your house is in the residential zone. But now, in the 
latest plan, they're going to build big public housing apartments right on top of my 
land! And it's been two years we've been waiting; many people have already moved 
away…. Anyway, people in my situation, they are going to let us exchange for 
diﬀerent land in the district. We have to select from residential zone or commercial 
zone or industrial zone. This is something I want you to write down in your report: 
why do we have only three choices? Why is this menu so limited? They should let us, 
the community, decide for ourselves. This is an opportunity for creativity. We can't 
just go back to the same old ways.62
Although Katō's complaints were directed at the municipal government's own 
planners and contractors, not at PRP experts such as Nozaki, he expresses a sentiment 
common among residents, which such experts must address. Katō balks at any attempt
to restrict his choices, to circumscribe his and his neighbors' abilities to plan their own 
community's future. In addition to his annoyance at the seeming capriciousness of the 
planning outcomes, he feels that the "opportunity for creativity," to revitalize and 
improve his community, is being wasted because oﬃcial planners are dictating a 
62. Katō interview (March 2013).
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limited set of unimaginative possibilities. 
Tadamori Arakawa, a tea seller in the Shizugawa District of Minami-Sanriku, 
a town just south of Kesennuma in Miyagi Prefecture, echoes Katō's complaint of 
limited choice and limited control, and goes perhaps even further in his indictment of 
processes that fail to involve residents in planning for their own future. Arakawa's 
conjoined house and shop were destroyed, and he now lives with his family in 
temporary housing while running his shop in the temporary shopping center "Minami 
Sanriku San-San." He said that residents had been invited by city oﬃcials to form a 
machi-zukuri group for recovery planning only after the municipal administration and its 
contractors had made the major decisions, such as building a seawall nearly twice as 
high as the one that was overtopped on 3.11, and moving displaced residents of the 
single hama to three separate parcels of high ground.
I met some oﬃcials in the planning department. I told them to please explain whose 
opinions they adopted to design [the plan]. They answered that they didn’t know. I 
asked them if we would discuss whether the plan is good or bad in the first place. They
said no, it has already been determined, so we need to discuss how people will move to
one of the three parcels of high ground, as outlined in the plan. So I was very 
surprised, because they skipped that crucial discussion. This means that people need to
discuss the implementation of a decision the city already made. It is totally backwards. 
So the administration made the "machi-zukuri" association and just treats it as a 
delegation of residents to explain things that have already been determined, and to 
secure agreement. The association is for that purpose only. They already have an 
agenda and topic for discussion. Rather than [letting us] discuss things freely, or make 
our own outline of issues, it has already been prepared…. Well, that's not machi-
zukuri…. Participants are only permitted to freely discuss points that completely lack 
any importance whatsoever.63
63. Arakawa interview, February 23, 2013.
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In a subsequent interview, Arakawa expanded further on these themes:
It would have been better if they could have presented several diﬀerent types of plans 
as a starting point, and then flexibly discuss modifications, but even that seems 
impossible. For example, let’s say that we have three plans. One is the plan on the 
distributed model [of three separate residential areas], in another the town is 
concentrated on just one mountainside site, and the third plan is something else 
entirely. Then if the administration would ask which one is okay for us out of these 
three, this method is better. But they say, "There is only this one. This has already 
been determined." We feel like we're ignored....
You know, we don't need the seawalls. We don’t need to have them that high. But 
the national government and the prefecture have chosen to move forward with this 
plan.64 They should ask us about the plan because we are the people who actually live 
in this town. People continue to live here, so this town belongs to us, right? But without
making any eﬀort to listen to us, they just do what is easy for them. This is about their 
vested interests, probably…. We don’t need the seawalls. We decided not to live [in 
the hama], so they shouldn't spend wasteful money. If they have that kind of money, 
they should build our houses for us! 
Why has the plan been done in this way? We were never informed of anything. It's
wrong. I think it is wrong that people who will live here in the future are not given a 
place for discussing the plan of the town. I think the new town should become a place 
where we want to live, even better than the former town. We have that kind of 
opportunity now, so it makes me extremely sad not to be given a place for discussion. I
sometimes feel that this is a plan for destroying the town. People will leave.65
Arakawa is upset that residents had not been properly consulted in the most 
fundamental planning decisions prior to the completion of the basic recovery plan. He 
feels that oﬃcials were ignoring the voices of residents and that the machi-zukuri 
association was a sham, a tool for legitimation, designed to appear to oﬀer the 
opportunity for residents to participate in the planning of their town's recovery, but 
64. The word used for "national government" here was  (kuni, "nation" or "country").
65. Arakawa interview, March 12, 2013.
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actually denying them the chance to deliberate on anything other than trivial details 
and, in fact, serving only as a mechanism to secure agreement from what appeared to be
a legitimately representative group of citizens. Furthermore, he reveals some distrust of
oﬃcial motives ("this is about their vested interests"),66 and feels that the specifics of the
plan may be counterproductive to recovery and perhaps even ultimately destructive to 
the town. 
To further illustrate the residents' perspective and ultimately for the purpose of 
drawing a stark contradistinction between PRP experts and oﬃcial, government-
aligned planners, I present more of Arakawa's incisive critique:
I was talking to some guys who said they worked for a general contracting company in
Sendai. They said that they made the town's recovery plan. I asked them why they 
designed it like this, and what was their objective. They answered that the top priority 
was the consideration of residents' safety. Securing safety by living on high ground is 
the primary point. Then I asked them if they had considered [the point of view of] the 
people who actually lived there or not. They said, no, they hadn't thought about it. 
Also I asked how people can get from one [of the three planned residential districts] to
another. They answered that people around here use their car. Incredibly, they 
thought that even old people drive around here! I was amazed — can it really be that 
such people make a plan? That is impossible to understand. They believe that there 
are no problems, because they have cars. 
Are there any lively communities anywhere that are split apart into separate 
areas? I want to know. Of course it makes sense to connect those areas with a road. 
Do you think we can walk? It's not within walking range. Also, there are steep grades 
in between. In the winter, the road may be frozen, so we don’t know if old people can 
get around.67
66. Cf., Chapter 5, on motives, interests, and trust. This relates to the "construction state" and 
the corrupt yet accepted and endemic practice of amakudari (
, "descent from 
Heaven"), by which government agencies and private corporations are inextricably linked.
67. Arakawa interview, March 12, 2013.
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Here, among Arakawa's complaints is the fact that the government-hired 
engineers who made the initial recovery plans did so while making erroneous 
assumptions based on their own perspectives (e.g., "we drive, so everyone can drive"), 
which did not fit local conditions (elderly residents may not be able to drive). The 
engineers to whom Arakawa spoke stated outright that they did not consider the 
perspective of the people who were to live in the town they were planning, but only 
that they had prioritized "safety" through residential relocation to high ground. The 
engineers' perspective appears to be that "safety" is an objective category that can be 
measured and "secured" regardless of local conditions, and that it is only measured 
with respect to tsunami risk, whereas Arakawa points out other forms of risk —  elderly
drivers, winter driving, social dissociation and the fracturing of community from 
splitting residential areas into three distinct and somewhat isolated locations.
Arakawa and Katō's experiences with "bureaucrats and experts," to paraphrase
Wynne, conform well to accounts within PES studies describing distant (geographically
and otherwise), context-insensitive, government-aligned scientists and technical 
experts.68 As the following account demonstrates, however, PRP experts such as 
Nozaki and his colleagues from Kobe do not follow this pattern.
In late October 2012, Nozaki and his team met at Shishiori Elementary School
with several leaders of Shishiori District, including Mr. Onodera, head of the 
community hall. The school, still undergoing repairs and renovation, was now the 
temporary home of the community hall, as the latter had been destroyed. It had been 
more than a year since their first meeting, yet still they had not begun machi-zukuri or 
any kind of participatory planning process. This day's meeting would include a mildly 
68. E.g., Wynne's soil radiation scientists who failed to understand or even consider the local 
conditions in Cumbria in which their advice would be implemented (Wynne 1989, 1992, 
1996).
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contentious and quite revealing exchange between Nozaki and Onodera.
Prior to the October meeting, Nozaki and his compatriots told me of their 
frustration with Shishiori's lack of progress. After almost a year of meeting with local 
leaders, they had been unable to get a more broadly participatory process under way, 
but now time was running out. The central and prefectural governments had dictated 
a March 2013 deadline for the city of Kesennuma to produce a basic land-use and 
reconstruction plan for Shishiori. Decisions to be specified in the plan included 
drawing the boundaries of industrial, commercial, private residential, public 
residential, and public park zones, and whether to keep the Kyōtoku Maru as a kind of 
memorial or not.69 Residents and businesses needed to decide what they wanted do 
with their land and buildings — rebuild on site, relocate elsewhere in the district, or 
emigrate. Decisions needed to be made about the kinds of structures that would be 
used as public housing (e.g., single-family homes, collective housing clusters, multi-unit
condominiums, etc.), about the widths and elevations of roads, about the locations and
types of bulwarks or tsunami defenses, and about the elevation of each zone. The land 
had subsided about 80 centimeters in the earthquake, and the main roads were already
being elevated over a meter.70 In short, a huge range of critical decisions had to be 
settled in a highly compressed time period. At the meeting in October, the group of 
PRP experts and local leaders was discussing how to go about an accelerated PRP 
process before the deadline, when the following exchange occurred.71
Onodera: You have experience with machi-zukuri in Kobe and did a lot of work there.
So we want you to give us suggestions, such as do this or don't, we should do things 
69. The latter decision ended up being delayed, and was heavily debated, but eventually the 
mayor decided to scrap the ship, in a bow to those who argued that it was too painful a 
reminder of the tragedy of 3.11.
70. Q.v., Fig. 4-8.
71. Transcribed and translated from notes and audio recording, October 26, 2012.
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this way, etc. We are such beginners, so what residents are thinking is, basically, we 
just have the image of our former town. That is all. We don't know anything about the
wonderful systems of big cities. That is why we want you to give us your expert advice,
because we know nothing about such matters. 
Nozaki: Well, if the machi-zukuri association in Shishiori had been established much 
earlier, we could have done more, such as doing a survey and conducting individual 
interviews. In that case we could get to understand people's situations and opinions 
more deeply. Unfortunately, we all know the deadline. If we simply give you those 
suggestions now, it might complicate the situation. If we had time, it would be fine. 
We could discuss things thoroughly and get consensus. But right now we do not have 
the time to do this properly, to be honest.
Onodera: So you are saying that the only thing we can do is just something really 
basic?
Nozaki: That is right. I have to be clear about things we cannot compromise. [long 
pause] Of course, we could bring in some examples of Kobe's experiences of land 
readjustment. For example, planning the details of a park, such as putting benches 
here or there. We could bring some specific cases. But I don't know if those would 
work here.
Onodera: We here don't have that kind of urban planning sense. Parks, or wooded 
areas of the townscape, for example, or bringing the murmur of a stream into the 
town, like the Matsumoto district in Kobe.72 We don't have such kinds of images in 
our mind. We want you to teach us about those examples. We want you to draw a 
blueprint. You know, like, if a road is set up here, then you can make a stream. If the 
width of road is 16 meters, then build 1-meter channels on each side. Build a fountain.
Something like that. That kind of expertise is what we are missing, and that is what we
need to rebuild Shishiori.
In this exchange, Nozaki expresses frustration that he has been unable to 
72. Q.v., Chapter 2, "Tsuji: finding the middle path in Matsumoto."
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engage personally with local residents and thereby steep himself in knowledge of local 
conditions prior to any discussion of concrete, technical options. Although he 
acknowledges that there is no longer suﬃcient time to do so, he implies that failing to 
proceed in this manner, especially without allowing enough time for subsequent 
deliberation and consensus-building, would risk the outcome of locally inappropriate 
decisions through premature framing. By cautioning that solutions which "worked" in 
Kobe might not be appropriate for Shishiori, he implicitly denies that recovery 
planning know-how can be universally applied across disparate contexts. In short, he 
wants to elicit and give due consideration to local knowledge and opinions prior to 
providing "expert advice" so that any recommendations given are appropriate to local 
conditions. Onodera, on the other hand, presses Nozaki to share his expert knowledge 
with the locals in the form of a rule-based "blueprint."73 He wants unambiguous 
"expert advice" in the form of specific options, including "lessons learned" in Kobe 
that can be simply transferred to Shishiori.74 His implicit position appears to be that 
expert knowledge is universal — or at least that the responsibility for contextualizing 
Nozaki's technical knowledge and advice belongs to the locals themselves, not to the 
experts.
This scene demonstrates several points of interest. First, it is by no means the 
case that the only thing non-experts want from experts is to be understood on their 
own terms. They are not necessarily concerned about whether experts consider local 
conditions or exhibit "reflexivity." They also want to learn the technical knowledge of 
the experts — specifically the knowledge which they perceive themselves to lack — or 
at least to be able to take that knowledge into consideration when making their own 
73. At other points in the meeting he speaks of a "menu" of options.
74. Cf. the "two-stage model" of popularization of scientific knowledge, in which such 
knowledge is first unambiguously produced, and then subsequently disseminated to the 
public (Hilgartner, 1990).
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decisions. For non-experts like Onodera, that is the essence of technical advice, and 
the primary reason that expert advisors are consulted or invited to participate in 
endeavors such as recovery planning. The second point is the inverse of the first: for 
PRP experts such as Nozaki (as opposed to oﬃcial technocrats), it is not necessarily the
case that their preferred approach is to blithely dispense putatively universal technical 
knowledge to non-experts regardless of local conditions or the recipients' situation; 
rather, they proactively seek to deepen their understanding of locals' perspectives and 
conditions. Moreover, they tie that understanding closely to the way they construct 
their own eﬀectiveness as technical experts.
Note that whereas Onodera expressly asks Nozaki for an unambiguous 
"blueprint" and a set of concrete, well-defined choices, other residents like Arakawa 
and Katō do not want their choices to be limited. They want to take advantage of the 
"opportunity for creativity." They want to have a say, and they want to be understood.
At the same time, there are those who, like Onodera, may primarily be concerned with
extracting putatively universal technical knowledge from experts. Note that these 
desires are not necessarily incompatible; Katō also told me that he wanted more 
experts to come to Kesennuma to share their knowledge, and Arakawa spoke with 
gratitude of a businessman from Kobe who shared his own knowledge of revitalizing 
retail businesses in the aftermath of a disaster. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that these examples demonstrate a certain tension 
between two, divergent impulses: one seeking expanded possibilities of self-
determination and deeper, more contextualized understanding from experts; the other 
seeking useful, actionable technical knowledge and concrete options to clarify possible 
paths forward. Inasmuch as experts such as Nozaki necessarily "engage" non-expert 
locals, they must deal with both impulses simultaneously. 
It is important to emphasize that the phrase "experts such as Nozaki" 
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specifically refers to PRP experts who specialize in "engagement" or in facilitating participatory 
processes, not to those built-environment technical professionals involved in recovery 
planning, mainly working for government agencies and major general contractors, 
who largely do not play this "engagement" role. They engineer and design and draw up
blueprints without engaging members of the public. Unlike them, Nozaki expressly takes
into account local knowledge and conditions while also advising local non-experts 
based on his built-environment "expertise" in the more conventionally conceived guise 
of a technical consultant. Certainly, as one who possesses specialized knowledge about 
recovery planning and the built environment, his role entails a responsibility to share 
this knowledge with residents going through recovery planning. Indeed, as Onodera 
implies, this is likely the primary reason that he and the other local leaders have invited
Nozaki to participate in Shishiori's process. 
Unlike Nozaki, Onodera sees a clear distinction between, on the one hand, 
Nozaki's desire to learn about local conditions, and, on the other hand, his role as an 
"advisor" or dispenser of technical knowledge. While learning about the neighborhood
and getting to know residents better may be helpful and appreciated, such things are 
fundamentally ancillary to Nozaki's role as an expert consultant, in Onodera's view. 
However, from Nozaki's perspective, in order to fulfill his "advising" role eﬀectively, he
must also become familiar with local conditions — including, to some extent, 
individuals' specific situations — so that his technical knowledge is contextualized in a 
way that is appropriate for the local context. The putatively distinct roles of PRP 
facilitator and expert consultant blend together. The exchange between Onodera and 
Nozaki demonstrates that, at times, PRP experts must manage an apparent tension 
between these two objectives, particularly when their clients demand one without the 
other. This is dangerous territory. Onodera's comments reveal an expectation about 
what an expert is or should be — a technically knowledgeable dispenser of specialized 
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advice — as well as an implicit demand that Nozaki should prove his worth by 
demonstrating this kind of expertise. Contravening such expectations consequently 
risks the diminution of Nozaki's credibility as an expert. Note that "technical experts," 
in the conventional mold, face no such double bind; it is a dilemma uniquely faced by 
those experts who view their "engagement" expertise as continuous with their 
"technical" expertise. Although there is no pat solution, this is a dilemma that such 
experts must occasionally navigate.
Fig. 4-8: The Shishiori District of Kesennuma. This photo shows how the reconstructed road 
is elevated about a meter or so higher than the surrounding land. This area had subsided 
about 80 cm in the earthquake on March 11, 2011. Visible in the background, behind the taxi 
and the telephone poles, is the Kyōtoku Maru No. 18. Photo by author (February 2013).
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Fig. 4-9: Signs resembling paper cutouts in the Shizugawa District of Minami-Sanriku. In this 
area, people had lived in the upper floors of their shops and businesses, and they had hung 
paper cutouts above their doorways that symbolized their businesses or something meaningful 
to them. They erected these signs on the exact locations of their homes and businesses about 
18 months after the tsunami as a memorial, and as a way of reconstructing their townscape in 
their memories. Photo by author (March 2013).
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Fig. 4-10 : The 
Kyōtoku Maru 
No. 18, resting 
in its final berth 
in Shishiori 
District, 
Kesennuma, 
about 800 
meters from 
the shore. The 
sign says 
"Flowers for 
Shishiori." 
There had 
been flowers 
planted here 
the previous 
spring. Photo 
by author 
(February 
2013). 
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Fig. 4-11 : Satellite photo and diagram of damage in Shishiori District, Kesennuma. Source: 
Kesennuma City (2012).
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Fig. 4-12 : 
Diagram of a 
draft 
recovery 
plan for 
Shishiori 
District, 
Kesennuma. 
The blue 
zone is 
industrial 
and fishing. 
Green is a 
park. 
Orange is 
residential. 
Pink is 
commercial. 
The dotted 
ovals mark 
proposed 
locations for 
takadai-iten. 
The Source: 
Kesennuma 
City (2012).
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4.3: Collaborative learning and the lay/expert convergence (née divide)
Arguably one of the most important achievements of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) has been the replacement of a "deficit model" of an irrational and 
technically ignorant public with a theory that cites the contingent nature of rationality 
and the situated character of knowledge to argue that various publics are eminently 
rational and knowledgable within the contexts of their own social life-worlds. Scholars 
have argued that "lay knowledge is not an impoverished or quantitatively inferior 
version of expert knowledge; [rather,] it is qualitatively diﬀerent [and] no less 
sophisticated than specialist expertise."75 By acknowledging the diverse, situated 
character of rationality and expertise, theorists have established a kind of "capacity 
model" of a "lay public" endowed with agency, reflexivity and the ability to make 
shrewd judgments about credibility based on social identity and other markers of 
trustworthiness.76 If the old model was associated with the field of Public 
Understanding of Science (PUS), the newer one has come to be associated with its 
"evolved' form, Public Engagement with Science (PES).77
All forms of rationality and expertise are situated and contingent, including 
those of publics, and technical forms of expertise are no exception. Rather than 
universal, scientific and technical ways of knowing are, in the words of Brian Wynne, 
just as "parochial" as any other culturally, materially and historically bounded way of 
knowing. A consequence of the shift toward a "capacity model" of the public has been 
75. Bucchi (2008), p. 451. Cf. Jasanoﬀ (2003). Note, however, that such a position is hardly 
unanimous within the field of STS, as there remains disagreement about the nature and 
role of "lay" or "local expertise," especially vis-à-vis expert knowledge and expertise. 
Witness, for example, the debate over the "Third Wave" typology or "periodic table' of 
expertise espoused by Collins & Evans (2002, 2003, 2007). E.g., Jasanoﬀ (2003b), Rip 
(2003), Wynne (2003).
76. See, e.g., Michael (1992), Wynne (1992, 1996), Irwin (1995).
77. Cf. Durant (2008), p. 18.
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the concomitant reconceptualization of technical experts who appear "unreflexively" 
and institutionally blind to the situated character of knowledge and the nuances of 
local context.78 Such blindness is not a result of idiosyncratic failures but rather is 
fundamentally constitutive of the scientific enterprise and, indeed, all narrowly 
technical expert institutions and knowledge frameworks.79 In short, it would now 
appear that a "deficit model" of "the public" has been replaced by (what could be 
construed as) a "deficit model" of technical experts.
If this is the case, then PES frameworks implicitly retain the assumption of a 
nearly incommensurable lay/expert divide, carried over and inverted from the old 
PUS model. Like two rivers that never cross, technical and non-technical ways of 
knowing flow in parallel streams.
This dissertation does not pretend to weigh in upon all forms of technical 
expertise. Its focus is post-disaster recovery experts and built-environment 
professionals. As noted in Chapter 1, for STS and PES scholars this is a somewhat 
unusual context in which to study public engagement with technical expertise and 
sociotechnical change. PES studies have typically examined policy-oriented, expert-
guided public deliberation exercises on issues associated with emerging technologies, 
or grassroots responses to environmental and public health threats.80 Yet the newest 
technologies are not necessarily the most relevant or important in people's lives.81 
78. Here, "unreflexive" is taken to mean that such actors are not self-critically aware, do not 
question their own assumptions, framings and perspectives, and do not consider the 
possible validity of alternative perspectives or ways of knowing. But see the discussion in 
Chapter 1 on the critique of the reflexive/unreflexive binary by Lynch (2000). 
79. Picking on Wynne as the standard bearer for this view, such an argument may be found in
much, if not all, of his work. See especially Wynne (1993) for a critique of institutional 
unreflexiveness. Wynne (1991) explicitly argues for the "universal validity" of this critique. 
Also cf. Irwin & Wynne (1996), Jasanoﬀ (2003a).
80. E.g., Wynne (1982, 1989, 1992, 1996), Brown (1992), Irwin (1991, 1995), Jasanoﬀ (1994, 
1997), Sclove (1995), Fischer (2000), Allen (2003).
81. Edgerton (2006).
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Compared to the "high-tech" gadget inventors or software engineers beloved by the 
news media, the built environment professions wield a far more direct and 
fundamental influence over the social and material configurations of our communities, 
cities and societies. This is one of the implications of Harvey's impassioned call for 
activist research toward securing "the right to the city:"
The question of what kind of city we want cannot be divorced from that of what kind 
of social ties, relationship to nature, lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic values we 
desire. The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban 
resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city.82
Are planning processes resistant to local, participatory and alternative modes of
engagement and decision-making? PES frameworks often seem to assert that technical 
expertise is fundamentally un-reflexive and institutionally blind to the situated 
character of knowledge; does this characterization fit experts of recovery planning and 
the built environment?
The descriptions of PRP processes in Kesennuma given in this dissertation thus
far may seem to suggest that inflexibility and resistance to local engagement are more 
due to structural limitations and political, institutional aﬃliations than to the character 
of these forms of expertise. From the outset, the scope of participatory decision-making
was constrained by structures and plans put in place by oﬃcial entities (e.g., the 
national Reconstruction Agency, UR, Miyagi Prefecture's civil engineering 
department, major general contractors), presumably based upon political and ethical 
calculus as well as unquestioned assumptions (e.g., moving residents to high ground 
and building gargantuan seawalls will minimize risk), and rooted in systemically 
ingrained bureaucratic habit (e.g., big engineering is the answer to every problem for 
82. Harvey (2008).
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the "construction state").83
However, this account demonstrates that PRP experts like Nozaki, Takasago 
or Tsukihashi do not appear "unreflexive" or institutionally blind to local conditions. 
Indeed, Nozaki's discussion with Onodera in Shishiori indicates the contrary: these 
experts see it as part and parcel of their expertise to seek out, learn and incorporate 
local knowledge into their work. In Tadakoshi, Nozaki could have pushed his 
proposed plan of collective housing by overlooking the local culture, ignoring the cool 
reception of the residents, and failing to reflexively assess the appropriateness of said 
proposal. Instead, he recognized the feedback and put the proposal on ice. Likewise, 
Takasago could have forged ahead with flower planting; however, after relocating to 
Kesennuma he came to understand the importance of growing vegetables to the 
residents of Karakuwa, and modified his plans accordingly.
The above accounts of the planning process demonstrate that these experts 
consciously design and implement concrete strategies to gain understanding of the 
perspectives of the local residents. Some of these strategies are just as important as they
are obvious: questionnaire surveys, group discussions, and individual (or household-
83. Why does technocratic planning seem to consistently fail to take into consideration local 
knowledge, local conditions, and local people's desires? Why does it seem to consistently 
fail to reflexively question its own assumptions, processes and outcomes? An ocean of 
literature across the social sciences examines (and often impugns) various forms of such 
technocracy, from Jacobs (1961) to Scott (1998) to Wynne (1989, 1992b, 1996a). Though 
some, like Scott, try to draw conclusions about technocratic planning and governance 
generally, there are likely also diverse reasons for technocratic "failure" that are contingent
upon the circumstances of each case. For example, with respect to recovery planning in 
Tōhoku, one obvious explanation for why the authorities have pushed forward with plans 
odious to local residents, such as gargantuan seawalls, is that oﬃcials simply lack a proper 
understanding of local history, culture, or opinion. An alternative explanation could be 
that authorities act strategically to limit competing perspectives, in order to implement 
plans that favor their own interests. I heard both explanations oﬀered as speculation by 
residents of Kesennuma and Minami-Sanriku. Although I do not have enough evidence to
resolve such speculation, it is important to note that a number of "factors" could come into
play to influence "technocratic" planning on the part of government agencies and their 
contractors.
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based) hearings or interviews. Of course, the least reflexive technocrat may employ 
such tools without learning anything of value about local conditions; their eﬀectiveness 
depends upon details of implementation — what questions are asked, and how are the 
answers analyzed — and upon the individuals putting them into practice. In this case, 
key questions — e.g., "What kind of machi do you want to live in?" — are phrased as 
openly as possible so as not to unduly influence the framing of subsequent discussions 
and planning. Individual hearings are given plenty of time so that the discussion is free 
to roam. As Tsukihashi told me, although he is a professor of architecture, he views his
key role as something more akin to an anthropologist. Without using the terms emic 
and etic, he argues that it is paramount for an expert to learn to see from a local 
perspective: 
What my theory is now, regarding the relationship between experts and residents, is 
that residents become experts, and experts become residents…. What I mean is, this 
process — residents becoming experts and experts becoming residents — this is 
actually machi-zukuri itself. That is my assertion.84
PRP experts like Tsukihashi and Nozaki employ other engagement strategies 
that may not be very obvious, or perhaps, may be so obvious as to be easily overlooked
or under-appreciated. For example, simply going to the villages in question and 
interacting with the local people is a crucial "strategy." As Arakawa implies, the 
bureaucrats of the Reconstruction Agency and the engineers from the government 
planning departments and the general contracting firms did not take that simple step 
before codifying plans for residential relocation and intensive levee construction.85 
84. Tsukihashi interview (April 2013).
85. Note that the municipal website of Arakawa's town, Minami-Sanriku, boasts about citizen 
participation in its recovery plan. The government cites survey data and focus group 
discussions as its "participatory" processes. Yet conversations with Arakawa and others in 
the town indicate that few citizens feel that their views have been heard or represented in 
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Likewise, when interacting with the local people, the PRP experts from Kobe employ 
the simple method of listening to them, and, crucially, take deliberate steps to exhibit 
this fact. At meetings, for example, Nozaki's team tries to ensure that each person 
attending is able to express himself or herself at least once, and they pay particular 
attention — and provide special encouragement — to women and younger people, 
who may normally feel less inclined to speak up at such a public venue. Recall 
Morisaki's careful echoing of resident concerns at the machi-zukuri meetings of Takatori
and Noda Hokubu in Kobe, described in Chapter 2. Likewise, through Asami's 
whiteboard notes and periodic summarization, they make sure to demonstrate that 
they have been listening, and that they understand and recognize people's thoughts 
and feelings.
The practice of machi-aruki and the similar use of the townscape model are 
perhaps the most notable and innovative engagement strategies employed by these 
experts. Tsukihashi describes the relationship between the material configuration of a 
town with the life-ways and memories of its residents in the following way: 
There is the landscape and the townscape, and within that there is actually what we 
might call a lifescape. When we talk about "building a town" (, machi o 
tsukuru), that may mean physically building, but when people live there, they create this
kind of lifescape.86 And then the tsunami comes, and the town is destroyed. But even if 
the town is gone, if we make a model like this, a portion of their lifescape will still 
remain. If the townscape is destroyed, then of course we must, with hard work, 
physically rebuild it. However, at that time we also have to salvage as much of this 
landscape remaining in memory as we can. Whether people retain this or not becomes
so important for them when next they make a new townscape. But once they have lost 
the plan. (Sugawara interview, March 2013.) Other Kobe-based experts working in the 
area also report widespread anger among residents. (Kobe University Recovery Seminar, 
April 2013.)
86. Cf. Bourdieu's notion of "habitus."
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their townscape and have been living in temporary housing for a while, as time passes 
they won't be able to recall what they could recall before. So before they forget what 
kind of town they had and what kind of life they had, we want to preserve that 
memory in material form.87
Tsukihashi's description suggests that, as a part of the expert's role in gathering 
local knowledge and learning to see a problem from a local perspective, one eﬀective 
strategy is to evoke and elicit memories, information, and aﬀective expressions that 
inform the entire collective — not only the experts, but the locals themselves. The 
group discussions at meetings, in conjunction with Asami's notes and recap 
performances, the practice of machi-aruki, and the townscape/lifescape model all seem 
to perform this function.
Certainly, these experts can also be seen performing the more conventional 
role of "communicating" or "translating" technical information for the residents. 
Before Nozaki's team built the scale model of the Tadakoshi hama with the proposed 
seawall and levees, everyone — expert and non-expert — understood that the 
structures would be very large and would take up considerable space. Everyone had 
seen the numbers. However, evidently the experts' comprehension was qualitatively 
diﬀerent from the residents' initial understanding. It was not until after the locals saw 
the scale model that they fully, viscerally grasped the scale of the proposed 
constructions, as evidenced by their shock and emotional response. This suggests that 
the model became a touchstone of mutual understanding between the two groups in a 
way that topographic maps, diagrams and verbal descriptions could not.88 Note, 
87. Tsukihashi interview (April 2013). Cf. Mayumi Kudō's remarks in Chapter 5: "50 years 
passed, and they forgot, and they started thinking about their town as if it had always 
existed in its current form" (Kudō interview, March 2013).
88. Cf. the "boundary objects" of Star & Griesemer (1989). I cannot say definitively why the 
model was a more eﬀective vehicle for mutual comprehension than other methods — 
whether, for example, this was due to the materiality of the three-dimensional model, or 
whether it had to do with the timing of its display (and whether this was instead of — or in 
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furthermore, the crucial first step undertaken by the team of experts: merely to 
recognize that while the residents' mild initial reaction showed a formal 
comprehension of the data (the dimensions of the levees, etc.), it also indicated a 
qualitative gap in their understanding vis-à-vis that of the experts themselves. This 
step, and the next one — to build the model — show how these experts proactively 
employ strategies to close this gap. This incident demonstrates that, in participatory 
planning projects or public engagement exercises in general, there is still an important 
role for experts to communicate technical information in a way that non-experts can 
understand within the frame of their local context and their own way of knowing.89
Of course, there remain points of slippage and friction between these non-local 
experts and non-expert locals, such as the minor kerfuﬄe over the collective housing 
proposal. The PRP experts from Kobe had not fully appreciated the importance of 
spacious houses to people in this honke-bunke culture. Likewise, the importance of the 
endemic local practice of growing one's own vegetables seemed to escape the ken of 
the experts from Kobe — for a while. At least initially, even if they were aware of this 
practice, they did not appear to appreciate its importance in people's lives, both as a 
source of food and as an activity whose mundane rhythms helped to shape the 
structure of seasonal and daily life. Indeed, working in the garden also furnished a 
addition to — its eﬀectiveness as a physical model), or whether it was related to the fact 
that the model was simply the nth attempt in a series by Nozaki's group to convey a 
particular message to the residents. Regardless of the specific reason(s), its deployment by 
the Kobe team demonstrated their awareness of a "comprehension gap," their 
determination to close it, and their creativity in attempting to do so.
89. Michael Lynch observes perceptively that a significant diﬀerence between these PRP 
meetings and the policy-oriented, deliberative engagement "exercises" often described in 
PES literature (typically with a focus on emerging technologies) is that these PRP meetings 
"are not abstracted from the immediate, lived situations of the residents. They have a stake
in the game." (Personal communication with author, October 2013.) In that sense, 
Tōhoku's residents are closer to Wynne's sheep farmers or Epstein's AIDS patient-activists 
than to participants in consensus conferences or other deliberative exercises. Cf. Horst & 
Irwin (2010).
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"natural" form of outdoor physical exercise for the many elderly residents, as well as 
providing opportunities for socialization with neighbors and passersby. At first, the 
PRP experts from Kobe did not appear to consider this practice at all. For example, in
March 2012, Takasago was working on a flower-planting project as one of his 
residential support activities, but he had not considered incorporating the planting of 
vegetables in his project. During Kobe's recovery from the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake, flower planting had brought color and hope, and opportunities for 
socialization, to the lives of local people,90 and Takasago was applying his Kobe 
experience to his volunteer activities in Tōhoku. Although a laudable project, had 
Takasago been more aware of the local culture, he might have reasonably been 
expected to modify his project to include growing vegetables as well as flowers. 
Furthermore, the initial plans for the new subdivision for residential relocation 
included no provision for vegetable plots. 
Now, however, current plans do call for the acquisition of an additional parcel 
of land expressly for the purpose of growing vegetables. Furthermore, by the summer 
of 2012, Takasago had indeed modified his flower-growing project to include 
vegetables. What prompted these revisions? I would suggest that these changes point to
the value of yet another strategy employed by these PRP experts: local residency and 
immersion. Takasago himself had moved his residence from Kobe to Kesennuma in 
late 2011. While experts like Nozaki were doing the long commute back and forth 
between Kobe and Tōhoku once or twice per month, Takasago was living in the 
disaster zone, becoming increasingly familiar with local conditions, people and culture.
The changes in his volunteer activities as well as the group relocation plans reflect this 
gradually increasing local familiarity.91
90. Edgington (2010), Amakawa interview (February 2012).
91. Takasago interview (February 2013).
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If Kobe's recovery represents a kind of ideal case in which the consulting 
experts are already locals through and through, then a reasonable strategy for 
simulating this condition is by having the consulting experts physically relocate to the 
recovering region. Indeed, scholars have written about the value of this strategy in 
other contexts. For example, Tetsu Sato, of Japan's national Research Institute for 
Humanity and Nature (RIHN), has extensively investigated the use of this strategy for 
local environmental management.92 In his Integrated Local Environmental Knowledge
(ILEK) project, he has embedded "residential experts" in various communities around 
Japan, each dealing with its own unique set of environmental issues. The experts reside
within those communities for an extended period of time — two or three years, or 
even longer. Sato has found that, compared with occasional visits, such experts are, 
unsurprisingly, able to form much stronger social bonds with local residents and, 
crucially, establish mutually trusting relationships.93 Furthermore, Sato says that they 
are able to achieve a deeper understanding of the "technical" issues facing the 
community (that is, the "biological ecology" or "environmental science" aspects) and 
how these issues interrelate with the of local culture and the social fabric of the 
community, which in turn provides opportunities for innovative and sustainable 
solutions rooted in (or at least compatible with) local ways of living and knowing.94 In 
the context of post-disaster recovery in Kesennuma, Takasago has become one such 
"residential expert." 
In conclusion, this discussion of the process of participatory recovery planning 
in Tadakoshi and other districts of Karakuwa and Kesennuma, with a particular focus 
upon the roles and strategies of non-local recovery planning experts from Kobe, 
92. Sato (2012), Sato interview (September 2012).
93. Cf. Chapter 5, on trust-work.
94. Sato interview (September 2012).
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portrays less a "lay/expert divide" than a convergence — a site of interaction and 
cooperation between reflexive actors who are aware of their knowledge gaps and who 
earnestly engage in mutual, collaborative learning to address those gaps and 
accomplish collective goals. In short, in the context of participatory recovery planning, 
the streams of local and expert knowledge are not parallel; they converge and mix. 
The important question for STS and PES scholars, then, is not why this group can't 
understand that group's form of knowledge, but rather: through what practices and 
strategies does knowledge move, merge, circulate and transform among diﬀerent social
and epistemic communities?95
This dissertation has described a number of such concrete practices in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 5 will continue by focusing in more depth upon the 
nature of the role played by facilitating PRP expert-consultants; borrowing from recent
scholarship in STS and PES, I will call this the role of "engagement agent."
95. And further: how do these communities, characterized by diverse interests, positions, 
social identities, and embodied experiences interpret and hash out their diﬀerences?
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5: ENGAGING ENGAGEMENT AGENTS
We [experts] probably know better than regular people about building towns, because 
even if each community is only rebuilt every 100 years, say we build 100 communities,
that means once a year, so we have a lot of experience dealing with diﬀerent choices 
and unexpected incidents. But that does not necessarily mean we can get consensus 
[from citizens]. After all, the important point for them is not whether or not a plan is 
good, but rather their impression of the person who presents the plan. For example, if 
the person truly cares about the residents or not, if the person doesn't listen to others, 
or just gives orders. Residents often object to plans for those reasons.... If we do 
something without the confidence of the people, then even if it is "technically correct" 
based on planning principles or theory, it is totally pointless if they are unhappy with 
it.
— Ikuo Kobayashi1
5.1: Constructivist concepts and liminal liaisons: introducing "engagement 
agents"
In a sense, the field of STS has been concerned with the interface between 
experts and nonexperts from its Kuhnian beginning. Some of the foundational studies 
in the field argued persuasively that new knowledge and expertise are coproduced.2 In 
this view, propositions only become "fact," or accepted knowledge, through a social 
process in which their "facticity" is authorized by key constituencies of people, 
including those previously recognized as experts, as well as perhaps ultimately by the 
public at large. As a crucial part of this process, the proposition's sponsor must 
persuade these groups to recognize his or her own expertise. Here, "expertise" is 
understood to be not just a synonym for knowledge itself, nor an actor's imperfect 
possession of said knowledge, but also a socially ascribed quality of epistemic authority. In this 
1. Kobayashi interview (February 2012).
2. E.g., Latour & Woolgar (1979), Shapin & Schaﬀer (1986), Latour (1988).
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sense, accreditation of "expertise" — that is, being recognized as a credible claimant to the 
mantle of "expert" — resembles being extended a line of credit by key constituencies, 
including, in some cases, putatively nonexpert publics. In a nutshell, the social 
ascription of expertise is the product of social adjudication of a claimant's credibility.3 As
with knowledge, theories of the social construction of technology (SCOT) also posit a 
similar social shaping of technological systems and artifacts (and their concomitant 
social infrastructures) influenced by processes of contestation among key constituencies
or "relevant social groups."4 Note that not all STS scholars subscribe to the notion of 
"expertise" as socially ascribed status; some treat it as synonymous with "knowledge 
and skills."5
The strain of STS literature associated with "public understanding of science" 
(PUS) and "public engagement with science" (PES) is largely defined by its concern 
with interactions between nonexperts and experts, as well as between experts of 
various disciplines, and how knowledge circulates among them. One theory regarding 
this inter-disciplinary realm draws upon the concept of "boundary work"6 and 
particularly so-called "boundary objects," to explore how members of diﬀerent 
epistemic communities communicate and manage to collaborate, despite each other's 
distinct forms of knowledge, through their interactions with mutually experienced but 
diﬀerently understood objects of inquiry.7 In this framework, actors are more-or-less 
ensconced in their own socio-epistemic worlds,8 and are able to glean partial but 
3. See also the discussion of "expertise" in Chapter 1 and the discussion of "credibility" in this
chapter, below. Cf. Latour & Woolgar (1979), Shapin & Schaﬀer (1986), Shapin (1995a, 
1995b).
4. Pinch & Bijker (1984), Kline & Pinch (1996), Bijker (1997), Bijker & Bijsterveld (2000).
5. Collins & Evans (2002, 2003, 2007), Collins et al (2010). See discussion below.
6. Gieryn (1983).
7. Star & Griesemer (1989), Fujimura (1992), Bowker & Star (1999), Star (2010).
8. Fujimura (1988), Clarke (1991, 1997), Clarke & Star (2008).
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workable comprehension of more-or-less incommensurable regimes (i.e., other ways of 
knowing) through their mutual interactions with these boundary objects.9 A boundary 
object "resides between social worlds... where it is ill-structured.... Groups that are 
operating without consensus tack back-and-forth between... [hermeneutic] forms of the
object."10 
According to this definition, the oﬃcial plan for reconstruction of the 
Tadakoshi District, with its proposed levees, seawalls and elevated roadways, might be 
analyzed as such a boundary object. Nozaki's scale model of the plan, with its 
proposed massive construction set in glorious foamcore, crystalized consensus — a 
decisive "tack" toward a particular interpretation — by eliciting aﬀective as well as 
cognitive harmony between the groups of PRP experts and non-expert residents. In 
many scholars' analyses, boundary objects are often used in conjunction with two other
frameworks for analyzing "lay-expert" or inter-expertise communication and 
collaboration: "interactional expertise" and "trading zones."11
As part of their so-called "Third Wave of science studies," Collins & Evans 
describe how an actor from one epistemic realm is able to gain access to a diﬀerent one
by spending the eﬀort to gain a higher level of the relevant subject knowledge.12 In the 
Ur-example inspired by Collins's own work, a sociologist of science, who has 
"contributory expertise" in his own field, is able to achieve "interactional expertise" in 
the field of gravitational wave physics, enabling him to discuss the topic intelligently 
with professional physicists, and to understand it well enough to analyze that particular
scientific community. Unlike many STS scholars, Collins & Evans "studiously bypass" 
9. Here, too, a debt is owed to Kuhn (1962, 1969), who first discussed the problem of 
incommensurability between diﬀerent scientific "paradigms" or "disciplinary matrices."
10. Star (2010), p. 604-605.
11. E.g., Gorman (2010), Balducci & Mäntysalo (2013).
12. Collins & Evans (2002, 2003, 2007), Collins et al (2010).
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the notion of expertise as ascribed status, instead using the term somewhat 
synonymously with "knowledge and skill" or "know-how."13 Their typology might be 
described as socio-instrumentalist: it categorizes expertise not just according to an 
abstract standard of measurement, but by the kinds of work that its possessor can do 
with it, vis-à-vis groups defined (somewhat circularly) by shared expertise. Thus, 
"interactional expertise" allows one to interact competently with members of a field, 
while "contributory expertise" enables an actor to contribute new knowledge to 
another field. While the framework does not proscribe an actor from achieving 
contributory expertise in more than one specialty, it generally presupposes that each 
actor remains anchored to his or her "home" discipline. 
It is possible to interpret the sharing and mutual learning by diﬀerent groups of
actors in Tōhoku as a collective eﬀort to raise everyone's "interactional expertise" in 
fields of knowledge formerly unfamiliar to them — non-local PRP experts "gain 
expertise" in local knowledge, while non-expert locals "gain expertise" in PRP. In fact, 
since their collaboration has (literally) concrete consequences for the townscape and 
the future lifescapes of the residents — as well as the careers and legacies of the 
experts — it could be argued that everyone has attained "contributory expertise" of 
some kind. Yet this interpretation seems somehow unfaithful to the vision of Collins & 
Evans. Surely, the "Third Wave" framework could be adapted to the present case.  
However, it is unclear to me precisely how the present case would fit into that 
framework, or where exactly each group of actors would fall on the "periodic table of 
expertise." More to the point, a great deal of the qualitative diﬀerences between 
13. Thanks to Michael Lynch for calling my attention to this point. "Studiously bypass" is his 
phrase. The irony is that the ascribed social status/constructed credibility aspect of 
expertise seems to be implicit in the concept of "interactional expertise"; if established 
experts in a technical field to which an actor aspires to gain purchase judge that actor as 
incompetent, then by definition he or she cannot be said to have "achieved" interactional 
expertise.
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diﬀerent kinds of experts and forms of expertise are elided by that system of 
categorization, which, as noted, focuses upon a narrow conception of expertise as 
knowledge and skill. For example, diﬀerent experts may exhibit distinct forms of 
reflexivity, or use diﬀerent strategies for constructing credibility. Such diﬀerences are 
disregarded by the Third Wave framework. Thus, while it is probably possible to 
describe the present case in terms of that framework, it is unclear what would be 
gained, while qualitative traits would be lost from the account. Moreover, the need 
would remain for a more detailed and specific explication of how the processes of 
mutual learning and knowledge exchange actually take place, and how to characterize 
the distinct role(s) of each group of actors.
Galison's theory of "trading zones" compares sites of interdisciplinary exchange
to those bazaars and outposts at which representatives of diverse cultures, markets, and
commercial concerns have historically come together to engage in commerce and 
cultural interchange. In such locales, linguistically heterogeneous traders develop a 
shared language — "first a shared jargon, then a pidgin, and finally a creole"14 — in 
order to facilitate translation and communication so that they may conduct their 
business.15 In the context of inter-disciplinary interaction, eventually a new discipline 
may emerge from the trading activity carried on in a particular locale, along with its 
corresponding creole.16 Evidence from machi-zukuri and PRP activities in Tōhoku 
provides some support for the "trading zone" thesis. Though new grammars or 
lexicons are not being generated, each group seems to be learning the others' 
vocabularies, resulting in a post-disaster recovery patois more frequently laced with 
14. Galison (2010), p. 80.
15. Galison (1997, 1999). Collins, Evans and Gorman (2007, 2010) have further developed 
Galison's "trading zones" in conjunction with their own notion of interactional expertise. 
Cf. Gorman (2002, 2010), Gorman et al (2009).
16. Galison (1997, 1999, 2010).
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terms related to the human and socio-technical aspects of recovery than standard 
Japanese speech — such as kokoro-keah ("heart-care"), takadai-iten ("relocation to high 
ground"), or bōsai shūdan-iten ("group relocation for disaster risk reduction"). At the 
same time, the scope of the recovery, and the impact of the events of 3.11 on Japanese 
society as a whole have been so profound that some of these terms have become a not-
infrequent topic of conversation across the archipelago. On the other hand, is this 
activity giving birth to a new discipline analogous to the scientific disciplines Galison 
describes? Galison's framework implicitly postulates a kind of symmetry among each of
the "traders" — they all contribute to — and gain from — the constitution of the new 
discipline roughly equally. While both residents and Kobe-based experts contribute to 
PRP processes in Tōhoku, it would be inaccurate to say that all of them are becoming 
experts in a new form of PRP. Residents and PRP experts are engaged in mutual, 
collective learning and collaboration, but for the residents this is largely a "one-oﬀ" 
experience, whereas the experts are using the experience to augment and consolidate 
their existing "expertise" (qua both "know-how" and credibility status) in participatory 
recovery planning.
Would it be possible to analyze PRP in Tōhoku (and indeed elsewhere) as a 
kind of "trading zone" wherein collaboration coalesces around "boundary objects" and
diﬀerent groups of non-local experts and non-expert residents accomplish this 
collaborative work through the achievement of interactional expertise and the use of ad
hoc pidgins and other forms of "translation"? Perhaps a more fruitful question would be
to ask what would be gained through such an analysis. Undoubtedly, the answer to this
latter question will vary with each analyst's case and particular objectives. Although 
this trio of approaches oﬀer intuitively sensible ways of understanding the overall 
process of collaboration in general, they do not oﬀer the analyst much traction or 
guidance for diﬀerentiating the roles of particular actors vis-à-vis their counterparts in 
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particular cases. For example, in spite of Collins & Evans's eﬀorts to deal with "the 
contents of expert knowledge,"17 conceptually their "Third Wave" framework is 
heavily abstracted from existential issues such as social identity and the situated 
character of interaction among embodied and socio-historically embedded actors, the 
crucial relevance of which, for the case of PRP in Tōhoku, I have tried to emphasize 
throughout this dissertation. Moreover, it begs questions that it leaves unanswered. For
example, how do actors achieve interactional expertise aside from the idiosyncratic 
application of individually cultivated skill, pluck and luck? The framework leaves open 
questions about how procedures for institutionalizing (the achievement of) 
interactional expertise might be created — as Kobe's PRP experts appear to have 
done — and what those procedures might look like. Do the STS and PES literatures 
oﬀer any other alternative conceptual frameworks for gaining insight into the PRP 
process in Tōhoku, and the specific role(s) of Kobe's PRP experts in particular?
As it happens, in the tradition of theoretical constructs that inhabit inter-
disciplinary and liminal epistemic spaces, several scholars have recently proposed a 
new concept for understanding certain kinds of guided interactions between experts 
and nonexperts:18 engagement agents (EA's).19 This was first mentioned somewhat briefly 
by te Kulve & Rip as they tried to articulate the function of a particular role within 
their Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) framework for guided, policy-
oriented, multi-stakeholder deliberation of science and technology. They describe 
engagement agents as "individuals and organizations orchestrating engagement 
activities, who are not immediate stakeholders or [are] otherwise seen as impartial."20 
17. Collins & Evans (2002). 
18. It bears repeating that who counts as an expert and who as "lay" depends upon context 
and the form of expertise, or rather know-how, in question.
19. te Kulve & Rip (2011), Conley (2011).
20. te Kulve & Rip (2011), p. 701.
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In a response piece in the same journal, Conley seized upon the term and immediately
began to exploit it as a concept that could be productive beyond the context of CTA. 
She describes EA's as actors who are "able to move between multiple dimensions, or 
'levels' of research, innovation, and policy processes," and "possess the knowledge and 
capacities to forge 'novel linkages' between the oftentimes disparate terrains of science, 
politics, and policy."21 These authors further emphasize that a crucial EA role is 
instigating and guiding the reflexivity of other actors, be they scientists and engineers 
working in the lab, or an array of stakeholders participating in "engagement activities."
Broadly, as it is presented in these two papers, an "engagement agent" is an individual 
actor who commands "interactional expertise" in several epistemic realms, including 
one or more technical disciplines, as well as familiarity with relevant social contexts 
(e.g., knowledge of the communities within which a particular technology will be 
deployed). In addition, the engagement agent should be able to "orchestrate" the 
process of engagement itself, including conducting "pre-engagement preparation" 
prior to the commencement of "engagement activities." In short, the peculiar expertise
(i.e., special know-how) of engagement agents is in the facilitation of engagement itself, 
including the encouragement of reflexivity by all participants (where "engagement" is 
understood to include exchange between diﬀerent kinds of experts and knowledges, or 
between experts and non-experts, and "reflexivity" is understood roughly to comprise 
critical self-awareness and interrogation of one's own partial perspective and 
circumscribed way of knowing).22
The concept of the "engagement agent" thus provides a useful term for 
describing a particular kind of actor playing a crucial intermediary role in inter-
disciplinary and expert/nonexpert spaces of interaction. Whereas "boundary objects" 
21. Conley (2011), p. 715.
22. Though in Conley's version, this interaction may be indirect, as will be described shortly.
201
are material or symbolic artifacts at the edges of — and held in common by — 
diﬀerent epistemic regimes, and whereas actors with "interactional expertise" belong to
one such regime but are able to purchase access to others through enhanced 
knowledge, engagement agents are expressly and primarily liminal liaisons — actors whose
primary function is to occupy the intermediary spaces and facilitate communication 
across borders. Though perhaps not "obligatory," they function as human "passage 
points."23 They are translators, or perhaps more precisely, interpreters of knowledge from
one epistemic regime to another, as well as practical "orchestrators" of engagement 
activities involving diverse stakeholders.
In te Kulve & Rip's account, such agents are mainly understood to be STS and
PES scholars like the authors themselves. They focus their discussion on the roles of 
EA's within the CTA context, wherein their primary goal is "to enhance actors' 
reflexivity within the overall development of technology.... Thus, processes of 
technology development and their embedding in society will become more reflexive."24
The authors note that for EA's to achieve this goal eﬀectively, they must prepare for 
engagement exercises in a crucial "pre-engagement" phase. The authors outline four 
"requirements for pre-engagement activities."
1. "[U]nderstanding... the emerging science and technology and its dynamics, 
especially the various expectations and emerging/partial path dependencies...."
2. "[T]o assess actor's [sic] propensities to anticipate future societal embedding of 
new technologies... and to coordinate their activities with those of other actors."
3. "[T]o select and locate actors, which is linked to the envisaged orchestration of 
interactions during the engagement."
23. Cf. Callon (1986).
24. te Kulve & Rip (2011), p. 701.
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4. "[B]roader developments that may not always be visible to the various actors 
have to be taken into account," including "the role of parties which are not 
directly involved in technological developments and their embedding in 
society, but which may still exert influence."
With an eye toward adapting the concept of engagement agents for 
understanding the peculiar roles of a class of experts specializing in the facilitation of 
participatory processes, epitomized by Japan's PRP experts, I interpret these 
requirements broadly (although not with a 1-to-1 correspondence) as entailing the 
following characteristics:
1. EA's understand ("have some expertise in," vernacularly speaking) both the 
"technical aspects" and the potential sociotechnical "impacts" of the 
technoscience under consideration.
2. EA's learn and make judgments about the capacities and "propensities" of 
relevant actors. 
3. EA's coordinate the engagement-related activities of disparate actors.
4. EA's perceive which actors are "relevant" to the engagement process — as real 
or potential influencers, or as potentially aﬀected by the process or by the 
technoscience under discussion — and make attempts to enroll as many of 
them in the process as possible.
5. EA's proactively seek awareness of the broader socio-historical context of the 
engagement exercise and the technoscience at issue.
Although te Kulve & Rip summarize the social identities of EA's as those "who 
are not immediate stakeholders or [are] otherwise seen as impartial," I interpret this to 
be an implicit requirement for credibility and trustworthiness rather than impartiality per se.
The focus of te Kulve & Rip's exposition is upon the practice of "pre-
engagement" preparation; they conceptualize "engagement agents" as those actors 
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who perform this preparation and subsequently "orchestrate" engagement exercises. 
They employ the metaphor of "upstream" engagement and emphasize the need for 
"early engagement, which is full of unknowns," rather than "late engagement, when 
socio-technical developments are already entrenched."25 The function of "pre-
engagement," then, is to "mitigate" the potentially deleterious eﬀects of the 
uncertainties around putatively inchoate technoscience in the engagement process. 
However, the notion of "pre-engagement preparation" performed solely by specialists 
(EA's) raises a critical question. The pre-emptive timing of "pre-engagement" before 
"early engagement" oﬀers the opportunity for EA's to exert undue influence on the 
framing of the engagement exercise, its process and ultimately its outcomes, potentially
undermining its very purpose. Although the authors fail to address this question 
explicitly, the care with which they describe the requirements for EA's and for 
preparatory activities may, perhaps, be taken as an implicit response to the 
conundrum. 
In her commentary on te Kulve & Rip, Conley might well have pressed them 
on this point. Instead, however, she seizes upon the "engagement agent" concept as an 
analytically powerful category, applying it to the framework of Socio-Technical 
Integration Research (STIR) developed at Arizona State University. In the STIR 
context, engagement agents play ostensibly a rather diﬀerent role than in the context 
of CTA deliberation exercises. In Conley's account, EA's are "embedded humanists" 
working alongside scientists and engineers in the laboratory, exchanging information 
and prompting mutual reflexivity through quotidian close contact and in-depth 
discussion.26 As in te Kulve & Rip's conceptualization, Conley's EA's are also primarily 
STS scholars like the author. The basic idea of the STIR approach is to encourage the
25. te Kulve & Rip (2011), p. 700.
26. Conley (2011), p. 718. Cf. Fisher & Mahajan (2010).
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producers of new knowledge and new technologies to reflexively consider and discuss 
potential social and ethical ramifications of their work, including users and other actors
who may ultimately be aﬀected by their technoscientific products. Thus, whereas te 
Kulve & Rip's EA's function as orchestrators, facilitators and liaisons between technical
experts and non-expert CTA participants, Conley's EA's function more as proxies or 
representatives of stakeholders who otherwise cannot access the laboratory. As 
instigators and facilitators of "endogenous reflexivity,"27 they eﬀectively become 
liaisons between scientists and engineers, on the one hand, and various stakeholders, 
publics, and society at large, on the other.
Neither Conley nor te Kulve & Rip go so far as to expressly prescribe or 
proscribe which actors can play the engagement agent role. Both papers present the 
role as being played primarily by STS and PES scholar-practitioners like the authors 
themselves; STS and PES (née "humanist") "expertise" is positioned as especially, 
perhaps uniquely, capable of liaising between "technoscience" and "society." On the 
face of it, this is an interesting move, for proponents of "public engagement" to 
advocate for scholars like themselves to become intermediaries, of sorts, between the 
public and the scientific and technological experts with whom they are to engage. As 
liaisons and promiscuous representatives (i.e., willing representatives of any and all 
relevant social groups), the EA's presented by Conley and te Kulve & Rip may give 
voice to certain concerns and constituencies that otherwise might struggle to be heard; 
still, a re-presented voice is a captured, mediated voice.28 
27. Both papers appear to subscribe to the notion of an internal/external divide between 
technoscience and "society."
28. If the target of interventions such as CTA and STIR is a kind of technocratic process of 
research and development and public policy-making, should we call the scholar-
practitioners of CTA, STIR and related programs sociocrats — or, perhaps, anthrocrats? In 
fact, whereas early PES scholarship comprised primarily critique, since the late 1990s a 
number of PES scholars, particularly in Europe and the UK, have, with oﬃcial support, 
pursued a kind of participatory action research (PAR) by experimenting with new (and 
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Regardless, te Kulve, Rip and Conley argue that EA's fundamentally catalyze 
the engagement process, enhancing its value and eﬀectiveness and helping to ensure 
that all participants of "engagement exercises" — be they consensus conferences, CTA
exercises, or discussion at the lab bench — cultivate reflexivity and contextual 
awareness, the better to understand the stakes involved for multiple stakeholders as 
well as the full range of perspectives, expert or lay, of relevant constituencies. 
Thus, in spite of some diﬀerences between Conley's "embedded humanists," te 
Kulve & Rip's engagement-orchestrating actors, and the PRP experts described in this 
dissertation, I argue that, when appropriately construed and conscientiously adapted, 
the engagement agent concept provides a uniquely apropos category for conceptualizing 
the commonalities between these otherwise disparate groups of actors.29 My argument 
is not simply that the rubric of "engagement agent" may be used to describe the work 
old) forms of engagement and deliberation, and then analyzing and critiquing these 
experiments. As Fisher (2011) notes, "engaged scholars in science studies have sought to 
design and conduct exercises aimed at better attuning science to its public contexts," 
thereby increasing "the prospects for insights from science studies to contribute to policy 
agendas and institutional capabilities." In addition to CTA, its derivatives, and STIR, 
these interventions have included, for example, interactive public kiosks for science 
communication (Horst, 2011; Lewenstein, 2011), participatory mapping exercises 
(Yearley, 2000, 2006), consensus conferences, and guided public deliberation (Irwin, 2006,
2012; Horst & Irwin, 2010). On the one hand, proceeding beyond critique to material 
action appears to be a logical and positive step for a field that has always been fueled, to a 
degree, by normative concerns for just and democratic governance of technoscience. On 
the other hand, when this kind of "engaged scholarship" is staked upon a notion that 
privileges STS "experts" as uniquely qualified to mediate "lay-expert" interactions and to 
facilitate "public engagement" endeavors through "preparatory" decision making, framing 
questions, or representing publics, scholars are treading upon dangerous ground; such 
activities and rationales start to resemble the practices and justifications that have received 
the brunt of their criticisms for decades. Cf. Lynch (2009).
29. Here is an additional, important diﬀerence. The STS scholar-EA's described by Conley, te
Kulve & Rip seem able to play their role in a variety of circumstances, provided they 
"achieve" interactional expertise in the relevant field of technoscience. Their "expertise" 
vis-á-vis "society" or various publics seems to be largely universal and portable — a 
function of their training as scholars in STS. PRP experts, on the other hand, are not likely
able to function as EA's in realms beyond participatory interventions in the built 
environment. Their know-how qua engagement agents is rooted to their specific training 
and experience, and probably, to some degree, to place and culture as well. 
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of the Kobe-based PRP experts facilitating machi-zukuri processes in Tōhoku. Rather, 
by exploiting the analysis of PRP experts as an exemplary "use-case," I argue that this 
category describes an entire class of putatively "technical" specialists, largely 
downplayed by the dominant PES narrative of congenitally context-blind experts, 
whose peculiar expertise comprises the "reflexive" and context-sensitive facilitation of 
participatory processes, multi-stakeholder deliberation, and public engagement. PRP 
experts may epitomize this class, but are by no means its only members. By giving 
them a name, assigning them to a category flexible and adaptable enough to be 
fruitfully applied in a variety of contexts yet specific enough to capture their essential 
skills, norms and practices, I hope to encourage further analysis of engagement 
agents — and further cultivation of EA's themselves, and the participatory processes 
they shepherd.
Toward that end, this chapter re-examines the practices of PRP experts qua 
engagement agents within the context of participatory recovery planning, revisiting some 
practices described in previous chapters and considering additional examples. The 
chapter aims to make two specific contributions to building a deeper understanding of 
engagement agents, how they work, and who they are (or can be). First, it suggests that
interpersonal trust is absolutely crucial to credibility for an EA, especially in the PRP 
context. Thus, PRP experts who are EA's assiduously work to establish trust through a 
set of practices that I gather under the rubric of trust-work. These practices include the 
selective and judicious sharing or withholding of information, the management of 
social identity,30 and "face-work," in the sociological senses of both Giddens and 
Goﬀman. Second, in contrast to the work of Conley and te Kulve & Rip, this chapter 
refocuses attention on the roles and knowledges of non-expert publics in participatory 
30. Social identity is most forcefully articulated by Wynne (1996) as critical to expert 
credibility (or lack thereof) in the eyes of "lay" publics.
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engagement, expanding the pool of actors able to play the role of engagement agent 
beyond STS scholars and reflexive technical experts to also include non-expert, local 
residents themselves.
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5.2: Trust-work, expertise, and the social politics of engagement
The issue of trust is a significant, constantly resurfacing theme of STS and PES 
literature, particularly in studies concerned with the social construction of expert 
authority, the democratic governance of technoscience, and the relationship between 
technical experts and the non-expert public. Nevertheless, I was still struck, in the 
course of my fieldwork, by the degree of concern and the amount of attention given by
PRP experts to establishing and sustaining trusting relationships with patrons (i.e., 
oﬃcials) and, especially, clients (i.e., residents), and by the frequency with which the 
issues of trust and credibility arose in general.31 In chapter 1, for example, Nozaki 
pointed out the diﬃculties he encountered in Kobe because his group's lack of oﬃcial 
accreditation became a barrier to trust with potential clients. Likewise, residents 
expressed skepticism about the motivations of PRP experts (q.v., Ch. 3: "for them, this 
is a business") and oﬃcial planners (q.v., Ch. 4: "this is about their vested interests"). 
Though such remarks were fleeting, taken as a whole, and considering some of the 
breakdowns in trust even between diﬀerent groups of hisaisha, the overall pattern 
indicated actors' constant running assessments of other actors' trustworthiness and 
credibility, perhaps heightened in their relatively vulnerable post-disaster state.
 Meanwhile, PRP experts' activities often seemed aimed, at least partially, at 
cultivating residents' trust. Nomi-nication, for example, helped to strengthen 
interpersonal relationships while also providing a safe space for sharing information 
and learning about local customs, culture and social gossip. Indeed, many practices 
seemed to do "double duty" in a similar fashion, such as Nozaki's private "hearings" 
with individual couples or Takasago's decision to relocate to Kesennuma, both 
31. Most likely I was sensitized to this issue because, as a researcher coming in from a foreign 
place, with foreign academic training and a foreign linguistic tradition, I, too, was often 
consciously concerned about cultivating trusting relationships with actors.
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described in Chapter 4.
The praxis of cultivating trustworthiness and credibility — trust-work — is 
crucial to PRP experts for three reasons.  First, it is essential to establishing and 
sustaining their credibility as "technical" experts — that is, those who provide guidance 
for recovery planning by sharing and enacting their specialized knowledge of such 
fields as the built environment, legal and institutional requirements for reconstruction, 
or specific procedures for conducting machi-zukuri processes. This is the "expertise" 
sought by Onodera in Chapter 4. Second, trust-work is equally essential to establishing
and sustaining their credibility as engagement agents — that is, experts who facilitate 
participatory planning processes (machi-zukuri), liaise with various relevant stakeholders 
(such as residents and oﬃcials), and help to contextualize the technical and local 
knowledge implicated in these processes.32 I suggest that both of these reasons 
generally apply to all engagement agents. Third, because EA's operate as moral agents 
on behalf of their clients, who must trust that they will act in good faith for the benefit 
of their community, eliciting favorable judgments of their moral trustworthiness and 
ethical responsibility is crucial. For this reason, trust-work is especially important for 
EA's dealing with particularly risky products of technoscience or with particularly 
vulnerable publics. The post-disaster context is one in which hisaisha, especially, are in 
a state of heightened vulnerability and sensitivity to risk. 
Note that the following discussion of specific trust-work practices is not intended 
to be exhaustive. I cannot express the reasons for this better than Shapin: 
32. I argued in Chapter 4 that, for PRP experts such as Nozaki, there is little meaningful 
distinction between the first two forms of expertise described above. However, others, like 
Onodera or engineers and planners working for government agencies and general 
contractors, do see them as distinct. 
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The procedures for establishing truthfulness are inchoate; they are not formalized; 
and, perhaps, they are not formalizable.... In principle, there is no limit to the 
considerations that might be relevant to securing credibility, and therefore, no limit to 
the considerations to which the analyst... might give attention.... Any aspect of the 
scene in which credibility is accomplished may prove to be relevant, and the relevance
of nothing can be ruled out in advance of empirical inquiry.... [Therefore,] the 
description or explanation of credibility has got to specify the credibility of what and for 
whom.33
To that I would add the possibility of specifying the credibility of whom and for what. 
Thus, the following account of concrete practices will rely upon empirical details to 
satisfy these conditions of specifying the particular uses of credibility and trust-work.
5.2.1: Trust, credibility, and the construction of expert authority
STS scholars have argued that "[s]olutions to the problem of knowledge are 
solutions to the problem of social order."34 Thus, "a matter of fact" is eﬀectively "both 
an epistemological and a social category."35 That is, the facticity of knowledge and the 
epistemic authority of experts are not, in practice, established through an objective and
epistemologically privileged "scientific method," nor through an unambiguous and 
irrefutable "logic of scientific reason," nor through a uniquely self-correcting and ever-
improving system of peer review, with expert checks and balances on specific 
knowledge claims. Rather, knowledge and epistemic authority are "constructed" 
through processes that are thoroughly social in nature, entailing contestation, 
negotiation, persuasion, and multiple instances of contextualized human judgment.36 
33. Shapin (1995b), p.259-261; italics in the original.
34. Shapin & Schaﬀer (1986), p. 332.
35. ibid., p. 25.
36. Although the character and boundaries of "the social" are a matter of some debate. The 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) school, for example, is leery of the term "social" because of 
its assumed reference to human society, and essentially argues for the inclusion of "non-
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Scholars have argued that foremost among these judgments are appraisals of credibility: 
"The individual's belief [does] not become collective — and so part of knowledge — 
until and unless it [has] won credibility. No credibility, no knowledge.... So... insofar as
we are concerned with scientific knowledge, credibility should not be referred to as a 
'fundamental' or 'central' topic — from a pertinent point of view it is the only topic."37 
As for how credibility is "won," scholars have described a number of processes of 
"social construction" and numerous frameworks for understanding them. As 
mentioned previously, a concept often invoked in such accounts is the notion that key 
constituencies (or "relevant social groups") arbitrate knowledge claims, judge the 
credibility of claims to "expertise," and shape the forms, uses and meanings of 
technologies.38 Of course, such constituencies do not themselves have access to 
anything like an objective "answer key" regarding the absolute truth (or falsity) of a 
particular knowledge claim or the expertise of a particular claimant. Instead, they 
make judgments about the credibility of both knowledge claims and their claimants. 
They appraise "the worth of knowledge by taking into consideration the moral 
constitution and known probity of its producers."39 In other words, when scientists or 
technical specialists are recognized as experts — are invested with that particular 
brand of authority called "expertise" — it is because certain constituencies have 
decided to trust them and their respective judgments about the credibility of knowledge
claims and expertise.
For example, the pioneering scientist and experimentalist Robert Boyle and his
colleagues in the nascent Royal Society established "matters of fact," in part, through 
humans" (including technologies and "natural" entities) in an expanded notion of a 
"collective" (Latour, 2004).
37. Shapin (1995b), p. 258-259.
38. E.g., Pinch & Bijker (1984).
39. Shapin & Schaﬀer (1986), p. 130.
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the strategic deployment of "a social technology that incorporated the conventions 
experimental philosophers should use in dealing with each other and considering 
knowledge-claims."40 Such conventions included conducting oneself with sobriety and 
modesty; reporting experimental failures as well as successes; communicating in a 
simple, straightforward, workman-like style; and eschewing the petty and polemical 
pursuits of ideology, dogma and personal animosity. In short, Boyle presented his 
arguments and evidence in the manner of a trustworthy gentleman in 17th Century 
England. This contributed crucially to his success in establishing his claims about the 
physics of vacuums (among other phenomena) as credible, and concomitantly 
establishing himself as a credible knowledge claim-maker — what we might now call 
an "expert" in his field.41  
As a negative example, four centuries later the unconventional media strategy 
of "cold fusion" pioneers Pons and Fleischman — announcing spectacular findings 
through multiple channels, not only through a peer-reviewed journal but through 
mainstream media as well — damaged their credibility in the eyes of their physicist 
peers. Pons and Fleischman's seemingly hasty, attention-seeking behavior was 
unbecoming of credible scientists, and it raised questions about their motivations as 
well as the thoroughness of their methodology.42 For some time subsequently, their 
case (like Boyle's) produced uncertainty and contention around what counted as 
credible evidence for natural phenomena such as cold fusion. Ultimately, they lost 
credibility in the eyes of most of the public, and their "discovery" was subsequently 
relegated to the dust bin of so-called "pathological science."  
In the aftermath of Chernobyl, some UK government-aligned soil radiation 
40. ibid., p. 25. Italics in the original.
41. ibid.
42. Lewenstein (1995).
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physicists lost credibility with the sheep farmers of Cumbria, Wales, in part because 
they failed to make any attempt to tap into local knowledge, and they did not interact 
with the locals on anything other than a superficial level. This failure did more than 
limit their knowledge of local conditions and thereby cause their predictions to be 
inaccurate and their advice ill-suited to the farmers' lives; it also rendered them 
untrustworthy characters in the judgment of the local residents, who already viewed 
them skeptically as members of an urban, technocratic class willfully ignorant of the 
upland ways of life. This undercut the scientists' authority as "experts;" at least in 
Cumbria, the sheep farmers whose lives were most directly aﬀected by their decisions 
refused to recognize them as competent and knowledgeable in their field — at least "in
the field," outside of the laboratory and in real-world conditions, where, for the 
farmers, it really mattered.43 
In short, STS scholarship demonstrates that even in relatively esoteric fields of 
science, establishing credible authority as an "expert" hinges crucially upon relatively 
mundane yet sophisticated judgments of reliability and trustworthiness by key 
constituencies, including previously established experts as well as publics, based on 
such putatively "non-technical" factors as social identity, norms of behavioral etiquette,
and earnestness of purpose. The behaviors and practices of engagement agents (née 
PRP experts) in Tōhoku demonstrate that they are aware of such judgments, and they 
go to great lengths to manage the presentation of these factors appropriately. 
Inasmuch as they claim technical expertise in fields of specialized knowledge such as 
planning, architecture, or the legalities and procedures of recovery, their trust-work 
does "double-duty," establishing them as credibly authoritative experts as well as 
trustworthy liaisons and facilitators of participatory processes of engagement.
43. Wynne (1989, 1992, 1996).
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5.2.2: Risk, trust-work and "face-work"
Both Luhmann and Giddens argue that trust is inextricably linked to 
conditions of risk.44 That is, one chooses to "trust" another person (or, say, a 
technology) only in circumstances in which one stands to lose something of value — 
and in which one is somewhat aware of that very possibly. Without the risk of loss, 
there is simply no need for "trust." When things are functioning "normally" and 
assumed to be dependable without a second thought, or even a first doubt, Luhmann 
describes this as a state of "confidence," which is more automatic, less deliberate and 
less anxious than the risky state of entrusting one's assets (life, career, money, 
afternoon) to another entity, human or non-human. For example, a person walking 
across a bridge trusts the structure to hold, whereas when she reaches the other side 
and proceeds along the road, paved upon the earth, she has confidence that it will not 
fall away beneath her. This does not mean that there is no danger whatsoever — it is 
not inconceivable that a sinkhole could unexpectedly open under her feet — but that 
at least the perception of risk is vanishingly small. Capturing this association of trust 
with risk, Sztompka defines trust as "a bet about the future contingent actions of 
others."45 Similarly, Garfinkel describes trust in terms of the expected actions of others,
wherein those expectations are guided by social norms and game-like rules of proper 
behavior.46
Sztompka notes that targets of trust may include not only individual people 
(real as well as imagined) and technological systems, but also social roles, institutions 
44. Luhmann (1979), Giddens (1990, 1991).
45. Sztompka (1999), p. 25.
46. Garfinkel (1963). Cf. Shapin on credibility, which "arises in part from actors' judgments of 
risk and rewards, and from actors' beliefs about the credibility-economy into which claims 
will enter." (Shapin, 1995b, p. 266; italics in original.)
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and organizations, and the social order as a whole.47 Thus, an engagement agent may 
be trusted both as an individual and as an "expert in recovery planning," and may 
derive further trustworthiness from institutional aﬃliation — or suﬀer damaged 
credibility from the lack of such an aﬃliation. Sztompka, however, emphasizes that 
even trust in abstractions is fundamentally grounded in "the primordial form of 
trust — in people, and their actions."48 Likewise, Giddens argues that public trust in 
the faceless, socially "disembedded" institutions of "modernity", including "expert 
systems" of knowledge and authority, depend — perhaps more than ever — upon 
face-to-face interactions, or "face-work," which he describes as a "re-embedded 
context of action."49 Thus, while the actual practice of "face-work" itself may be nothing 
more than the mundane work of directly establishing and sustaining interpersonal 
relationships, as old as the social nature of homo sapiens, critically it "does the work" of 
establishing relationships between individuals, institutions, and systems of knowledge 
and authority.
Consider Nozaki. The Kobe Machi-zukuri Research Institute is his home 
institution, and he receives funding from Hyōgo Prefecture and the oﬃcial blessing of 
Miyagi Prefecture to conduct his activities in Kesennuma. When he meets with local 
residents, he implicitly becomes the "face" for each of these entities. (And he implicitly 
derives some measure of credibility from their imprimatur.) By the same token, when 
he meets with government oﬃcials or with engineers from general contracting 
companies working with municipal planning departments, his role as a trusted 
facilitator of participatory machi-zukuri meetings with local residents implicitly positions 
him as a legitimate representative of the residents. I accompanied Nozaki and his team
47. ibid.
48. ibid., p. 46.
49. Giddens (1990), p. 80
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to a number of these meetings. In some cases, particularly when meeting 
Reconstruction Agency bureaucrats at Kesennuma City Hall, little substantive was 
accomplished other than "face work." That is, discussions remained fairly superficial, 
on the level of basic status reports, and there was no real movement on solutions to 
problems. However, these meetings gave Nozaki and his team — and through them, 
the residents of the districts they represented — a regular presence in the oﬃces of the 
oﬃcials. If nothing else, they made it known to the oﬃcials that the takadai-iten and 
machi-zukuri groups in those districts were moving forward with their projects, and the 
oﬃcials would need to take those eﬀorts into consideration in their own decisions and 
policies. Engagement agents like Nozaki link citizens and individual communities to 
the larger project of recovery planning, to the various institutions involved in planning 
and reconstruction, to the class of PRP experts from Kobe, and to the body of 
knowledge and the ways of knowing and practicing espoused by those experts. "Face-
work," in the Giddens sense, may thus appear mundane and ordinary, but, particularly
as an essential strategy of engagement agents qua liaisons, a great deal of consequence 
hinges upon it.
Likewise, simply going to the hisaichi on a regular basis and interacting with 
people face-to-face at machi-zukuri meetings and elsewhere constituted face-work. 
Especially in this conservative, peripheral region of Japan with relatively unreliable 
transportation and communication infrastructure, just showing up, talking to people 
directly, and looking them in the eye served to sustain relationships; visiting regularly 
and reliably every month, regardless of the state of the recovery, demonstrated 
commitment. One resident told me, "[Nozaki and his colleagues] come here every 
month and talk to us directly. They are trying to help us and deeply understand us 
from our own point of view. I trust them completely. We are so grateful for their 
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eﬀorts."50
Furthermore, a portion of engagement agents' trust-work comprises "face-
work" in a diﬀerent sense — that described by Goﬀman. His theory of "face-work" 
pertains to the notion of "face" in social interactions: saving it, keeping it, and the risk 
of losing it. It is "the positive social value a person eﬀectively claims for himself by the 
line others assume he has taken during a particular contact."51 Cultural scholars of East
Asia have written extensively about the importance of face in Confucian societies. In 
Japanese, it is called menboku (). Ho, who asserts that "the concept of face is, of 
course, Chinese in origin,"52 defines it as "the respectability and/or deference which a 
person can claim for himself from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies 
in his social network and the degree to which he is judged to have functioned 
adequately in that position as well as acceptably in his general conduct."53 This 
definition is beginning to verge on the notion of trustworthiness, in the sense that it 
relates to expectations accorded to an individual or a social position.
I need not delve into the rich details of Goﬀman's theory of "face"and "line" in 
order to make my point with respect to engagement agents. Rather, given that 
concerns for maintaining face inflect most human interpersonal interactions, and 
perhaps especially in East Asian cultures such as Japan, I want to argue that these 
concerns also manifest themselves — as Goﬀman's "face-work" — within the "re-
embedding face-work," described by Giddens, as it is practiced by EA's as a key 
component of trust-work. In this context, the consequences of "losing face" potentially 
include a crippling loss of trust and credibility — as a technical expert knowledgeable 
50. Kikuta interview (May 2012).
51. Goﬀman (1955), p. 213. Cf. Goﬀman (1967).
52. Ho (1976), p. 867.
53. ibid., p. 883.
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about the built environment, machi-zukuri procedures, and disaster recovery; as a liaison
and representative in participatory processes; or as a moral agent entrusted to do what 
is best for the local community.
Because the post-disaster state of incipient recovery is redolent with risk and 
loss, both realized and potential, trust is a particularly important and valuable coin. 
Survivors of a major disaster have already lost a great deal, and many of them live in a 
precarious situation for years afterwards. In Chapter 3, I noted that Karakuwa 
villagers accustomed to growing their own vegetables and catching their own fish are 
now forced to buy food with cash at the very moment that many of them have lost 
their jobs and income. Resources in the hisaichi ("disaster zone") are scarce, and 
hisaisha, stuck in a kind of chronic "survival mode," are exquisitely sensitive to 
competition and other pressures (recall Katō's fears of the "vacuum" on the region's 
economy), as well as the potential for outsiders to exploit their situation by praying 
upon them or by aggressively competing for the torrent of reconstruction funds. 
Financially, socially and emotionally shattered, many hisaisha remain fragile and prone 
to personal tragedy. Kodokushi ("lonely death;" see Chapter 2) was a phenomenon born 
and named in the aftermath of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.54 As occurred in 
Kobe, in Tōhoku recently marriages and businesses have been failing, while 
alcoholism and suicides have been spiking.55 
Returning to PRP experts' concerns with "keeping face," another example will 
serve to illustrate this issue. When I first began my research trips from my base in 
Kobe to Tōhoku, I always accompanied Nozaki's team or another group. By March 
and April of 2012 I was ready to interview residents directly, without the assistance or 
54. Otani (2010), Edgington (2010).
55. Otani (2010), Segawa (2012). This is especially the case with current and former residents 
of Fukushima Prefecture.
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imprimatur of Nozaki or others. I had established relationships with some residents, 
who had given me their business cards with their direct contact information. Thus, I 
began to set up interviews on my own. Shortly after my first calls to individual 
residents, I was contacted by Takasago, the member of Nozaki's team who had 
relocated to Kesennuma. He was somewhat agitated that I was acting alone, without 
first coordinating with him or Nozaki. He insisted that I clear any interviews through 
them first. His primary argument was that this would mitigate any risks of upsetting 
the delicate relationship of trust between their team and the residents. He further 
argued that it would be advantageous to my research because they would be able to 
assist in selecting and setting up interviews with especially cooperative residents. I later 
discovered that he had spoken with one of the residents I was planning to interview, 
and the resident had told Takasago that he was somewhat nervous about talking to an 
American, as he had no confidence in his English and was unsure about my 
competence in Japanese. (Once I informed this individual that Michiyo would assist 
during the interview, he relaxed considerably.) Because I had been aﬃliated with 
Nozaki's group, and because I had knowledge of multiple districts with which they 
were working, Takasago was concerned that I might unintentionally cause them to 
"lose face" (Goﬀman) and thereby damage the relationship of trust with residents. This
incident highlights the degree of concern exhibited by Nozaki, Takasago, and their 
colleagues for maintaining "face" with the residents who are eﬀectively their clients. 
On the one hand, I was basically an outsider, beyond the control of the group. On the 
other hand, I had been treated as an insider at machi-zukuri meetings.56 Therefore, 
residents might view me as a member of Nozaki's group. If I were to reveal  
56. E.g., Nozaki often asked me to make comments or give advice, as part of his approach of 
inviting each participant to contribute to the meeting. Later, I became oﬃcially aﬃliated 
with Kobe Machiken.
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information inappropriately from other districts or residents, or if I were to act 
impolitely, or merely appear incompetent, I could damage the group's reputation and 
credibility.57 Thus, my actions as a pseudo-independent researcher were viewed as a 
potential threat to their "face," to be managed. A loss of face would damage their 
trustworthiness and credibility, endangering the integrity of their relationships with 
residents. Without establishing and maintaining a foundation of trust, there could be 
no "professional" relationship and no recognition of their expertise. Indeed, in this 
context, "expertise" without trust is meaningless.
In short, trust-work is particularly important for engagement agents in a risky 
environment such as a post-disaster context, and two indispensable trust-work 
practices include the "face-work" of Giddens and Goﬀman, respectively.
5.2.3: The trust-value of shared experience and social identity
In February 2012, I accompanied Nozaki's team for the first time to a meeting 
of residents from a district of Kesennuma called Minami-Saichikawara. Although 
located in the southern part of the municipality, this is a fishing-centric village, like 
those on the Karakuwa Peninsula. The meeting I attended was held in the small 
community center of the temporary housing complex, a space about the size of (or 
even smaller than) the living rooms in many American homes.58 About 15 people 
participated, almost half of whom were members of Nozaki's team. At the beginning of
the meeting I introduced myself as a researcher from Cornell University, as usual. And
as usual, I was welcomed with cordial respect and gratitude. In the course of the 
discussion during the latter part of the meeting, I mentioned that New Orleans is my 
furusato (, "hometown"), the place where I was raised for most of my childhood. 
57. Q.v., the discussion on strategic management of secrets and information, below.
58. Q.v., Fig. 4-5 for a photo of this meeting.
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Instantly, the room transformed. A wave of appreciative and understanding 
exclamations swept through the group. The residents smiled and nodded, and I heard 
remarks such as "Ah, so that's it!" and "So you understand." Their posture and body 
language visibly relaxed, and from that point on, the tone and atmosphere of the 
meeting shifted to one that was warmer, more open and intimate. Up to that point, my
comments had been received with respect (and patience for my sputtering Japanese); 
when I spoke afterwards, the residents leaned forward in their chairs, evidently eager 
to hear my opinions.
Many times in my meetings and discussions with residents of Tōhoku I 
witnessed similar, if not quite as dramatic, reactions when I revealed my hometown, or
when Michiyo revealed hers (Kobe). Although I was actually living in Kobe when 
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, by simple virtue of the fact that New 
Orleans — a hisaichi — was my furusato, my interlocutors perceived a shared 
experience of trauma and loss in a disaster. Even if I had not directly experienced the 
hurricane and subsequent flooding myself, people and places dear to me had been 
damaged and lost. This perception of shared experience as a hisaisha eﬀectively made 
me part of an in-group with the local residents, and often made interactions easier and 
less formal than they probably would have been otherwise. 
When I asked actors (residents, experts, EA's) how important is a shared history
of disaster experience to a trusting, collaborative relationship, most said that, while it is
a factor, it is just one of many. "At least, when I say I come from Kobe, they 
understand," said one PRP expert, about residents of Tōhoku.59 They did not see it as 
suﬃcient to establish trust, and possibly not even especially significant. Nevertheless, 
my observations suggest that a perception of shared experience can be an important 
59. Tsuji interview (April 2012).
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part of establishing trust. Whenever I witnessed Nozaki or other experts introduced to 
local residents as being from Kobe, the residents' body posture and facial expression 
visibly relaxed, a subtle change in body language that suggested a shift from cordial 
respect for an outsider to something more like an openly receptive attitude for a 
member of the same disaster-survivor "tribe."  In this way, the perception of shared 
experience transmuted into a kind of shared social identity.
In contrast, when I have seen other outsiders introduce themselves (tourists, 
volunteers, or experts from elsewhere), they are often asked about their reasons for 
coming to Tōhoku. After all, because of its relative remoteness, this is not a region that
one visits without conscious intention. However, visitors from Kobe are assumed to be 
involved in the region's recovery. Indeed, whether it was a sushi restaurant in April 
2013 in Minami-Sanriku or a cake shop the following month in Kesennuma, for 
example, on more than one occasion when I told a new acquaintance that I had come 
from Kobe, my interlocutor followed up with a question along the lines of, "Are you 
here to support the recovery?"
Arakawa, the tea seller from Minami-Sanriku, told me about Ito, a small 
business owner from the Shin-Nagata district of Kobe, who came to Minami-Sanriku 
to share the lessons of his experience in revitalizing the businesses of his district after 
Kobe's earthquake. Shin-Nagata was one of the hardest-hit districts in Kobe, a 
relatively low income area near Takatori and Noda Hokubu that, like them, 
experienced extensive destruction due to fire. Like much of Tōhoku, Shin-Nagata had 
been undergoing gradual economic decline for some time prior to the earthquake. 
Kobe's City Hall saw the disaster as an opportunity to invest in revitalizing the area's 
businesses. However, as Ito told Arakawa, the city's planners made some critical 
mistakes that ultimately crippled the recovery of many businesses, especially in the 
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retail sector.60 For example, they built multi-story shopping streets in which many 
shops were on the second or third floor of buildings; shops on the ground floor did 
fine, but most of the elevated shops failed to attract enough customers. Formerly, shops
and residences in Arakawa's Shizugawa district were conjoined in the same buildings, 
with shops on the first floor and residences above. It was a pleasant area in which to 
walk about. The current plan in Minami-Sanriku separates the residences from the 
commercial area. Moreover, it would place retail shops such as Arakawa's well below 
the level of the highly elevated trunk roads, and Arakawa is convinced that their 
businesses will suﬀer as a result, not unlike Shin-Nagata's second and third floor shops. 
People on the roads will simply drive by.
All of this makes intuitive sense and may not require specialist knowledge or 
certain kinds of experience to understand in principle. However, Arakawa's trust for 
Ito, as a fellow shop owner who also struggled to reestablish his business in the 
aftermath of a devastating disaster, transformed Ito's warnings from an outsider's 
information about risk to an insider's knowledge of certain struggle. Their shared 
identity as shop-owning hisaisha gave Ito substantial credibility as a knowledge claim-
maker.61
Shōgoro Hagiwara, a Kobe-based "business continuity" expert who has been 
advising small businesses in Karakuwa to aid their recovery, said that his experience of
coming through the earthquake and long recovery of Kobe not influenced his career 
path but became the crucible of his in particular expertise. It also gave him confidence 
that, even with the considerable diﬀerences between Kobe and Tōhoku, this 
experience is something valuable that he can oﬀer to his clients in Karakuwa. 
Moreover, he noted that his clients are receptive to his advice because of his 
60. Cf. Edgington (2010).
61. Arakawa interview (March 2012).
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experience in Kobe and his shared social identity as hisaisha.62
The notion that considerations of social identity play an important role in 
actors' judgments of trustworthiness and credibility is not a new one for STS scholars, 
who have established that "trust and credibility are themselves analytically derivative 
of social relations and identity negotiation.... Beliefs and values are functions of social 
relationships and patterns of moral and social identification."63 PRP experts and 
engagement agents also implicitly understand these principles, and manage their self 
presentation so as to maximize their benefits.
5.2.4: Kizuna, bundan, and the dangerous trust-work of navigating inter-
group politics
A discursive movement that swept Japan in the aftermath of the disaster was an
emphasis on the importance of kizuna (), "bonds" or social ties. Along with ganbarō! 
("fight!" or "carry on!" or "hang in there!"), kizuna became one of the key watchwords 
of post-disaster Japan throughout 2011 and 2012, almost to the point of cliché.64 It has 
been used as a rallying cry for volunteer groups and services, invoked in various news 
stories on recovery projects, and frequently attached to special recovery-related events,
including those designed specifically to connect Tōhoku's hisasha with survivors of other
disasters such as Kobe's earthquake. 
Every January 17, the anniversary of Kobe's earthquake, a number of 
memorial services are held throughout the city, including a major one in a public park 
next to the City Hall. Each year people gather in the wee hours of the morning, 
constructing the giant numerals "1.17" from candles set in bamboo holders, and then 
62. Hagiwara interviews (May 2012, October 2012).
63. Wynne (1992), p. 300.
64. A word with similar meaning, tsunagi (), had often been invoked after the earthquake 
in Kobe.
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fall silent at 5:46 AM, the time that the earthquake struck. Beginning in 2012, that 
large "1.17" has been accompanied by a smaller "3.11." Likewise, in similar memorial 
services held on March 11 throughout Tōhoku, the date of Kobe's earthquake is also 
so inscribed. In short, a veritable cultural movement to bring together the hisaisha of 
Tōhoku with their fellow hisaisha from around Japan — but especially Kobe — 
manifested itself broadly in media, public events and public discourse, under the 
popular banner of kizuna.
Also in January of 2012, I attended a public panel discussion on disaster 
recovery organized by Ikuo Kobayashi and Yoshimi Amakawa, held simultaneously in
Kobe and Minami-Sanriku, linked by teleconference. Kizuna between the people of 
Kobe and Tōhoku was the explicit theme of the event. Several days later, the Kobe 
Machi-zukuri Research Institute conducted its annual "Kobe Ai Walk" (ai or , 
meaning "love," although spelled with Roman letters in this case), a kind of memorial 
machi-aruki through the Noda Hokubu, Takatori, and Shin-Nagata districts of Kobe. 
Participants this year included a number of guests of honor from Kesennuma, 
Minami-Sanriku and Ishinomaki, who gave speeches alongside Machiken's leaders 
Nozaki, Komori and Kobayashi — all featuring the theme of kizuna. Additional 
participants included local residents and machi-zukuri leaders, city and prefectural 
oﬃcials, journalists from major Japanese news outlets, and journalists from other 
countries. This event served much the same function for Kobe's PRP experts as the 
fukkō juku described in Chapter 2. By walking through the now-recovered districts and 
pointing out the fruits of their collaboration with local machi-zukuri groups, Machiken's 
PRP experts were able to perform for their patrons, clients and peers, and to make a 
public case for the eﬀectiveness of their methods and the credibility of their expertise. 
By connecting their work in Kobe's recovered neighborhoods to their ongoing 
activities in Tōhoku, they could emphasize the importance of the hisaichi-to-hisaichi 
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connection of kizuna and the contemporary relevance of their work.
Some scholars have already critiqued this pervasive discourse of kizuna. For 
example, Akira Takagi, of Fukushima University, argues that while the ideal of the 
recovery has been kizuna (i.e., powering resilience by strengthening social ties and a 
sense of community), the reality has also been one of bundan (; division, 
separation). He argues that this is especially true in Fukushima prefecture, where 
whole towns or neighborhoods have been cordoned oﬀ from public access, due to the 
arbitrary whims of the wind direction in the days following March 11, 2011. Because 
of this, the prefecture’s population is probably the most scattered of any of the other 
prefectures in the disaster zone. On top of that, there are those in the prefecture who 
were directly aﬀected by the tsunami only, by radiation only, by neither, or by both. 
These diﬀerences, he argues, further amplify the considerable diversity that already 
existed across one of Japan’s geographically largest prefectures.65 
Journalists and other scholars have also reported on rising tensions among 
hisaisha, particularly along generational lines, that have emerged in machi-zukuri and 
recovery planning processes.66 In Onagawa, for example, younger residents, along with
the mayor, wanted to seize the "opportunity for creativity"67 and change the structure 
of the town. However, the older generation managed to replace that mayor with a new
one more supportive of the recovery plan they favored (i.e., returning the town to its 
previous layout).68 Several of my informants have complained that too many decisions 
in the recovery are being made by "the old guard" of old men, and that women and 
younger generations have too little say.69
65. Takagi (2013).
66. Manoliu (2013).
67. Katō interview (March 2013), also cited in Chapter 4.
68. Ōnishi (2012).
69. Katō interview (March 2013), Kudō interview (March 2013). Cf. also Komori's comments 
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As the discussion at the fukkō-juku in Chapter 2 indicated, the distinction — 
somewhat arbitrary, shifting, and diﬃcult to discern — between hisai-shita hito (	
, "disaster-struck people," a synonym for hisaisha) and hisai-shiteinai hito (	
!, "people who have not been struck by disaster") has been a source of tension
among Tōhoku residents at times, as well as a source of ethical concern for outsiders 
involved in the recovery, such as Kobe-based experts and engagement agents. The 
feud between the Shibitachi District's neighborhood association and its machi-zukuri 
association which Takasago defused was related to tensions between these groups. Not 
surprisingly, Tōhoku residents display awareness of their own, and each other's, status 
as "disaster-struck people." Those who did not lose their home or business, when 
informing me of this fact, often seemed apologetic, or they sheepishly proclaimed 
gratitude for their fortunes. Those who lost their home but not their business, or who 
have been able to reestablish their business, nearly universally express a conviction of 
personal responsibility to helping their communities through their businesses. For 
example, a resident of Karakuwa used his refuse-disposal company to help clean up 
debris, and Shishiori's Katō cited the need to house volunteers and construction 
workers as one of the reasons for maintaining his hotel and charging below-market 
rates for rooms.
Other tensions and rivalries between diﬀerent groups of hisaisha do, of course, 
exist, and occasionally aﬀect recovery-related activities. For example, in the previous 
chapter, Neguchi expressed his concern that his Tadkoshi District was falling behind 
neighboring Osawa and other districts. Although he was unaware, there were actually 
substantial tensions within two distinct groups of Osawa hisaisha at the time, which 
contributed to diﬃculties for Nozaki to establish a trusting, working relationship within
in Chapter 2.
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that district. 
By mid-2011, the hisaisha of Osawa district were placed in two temporary 
housing clusters, one built in the playground of an elementary school, and the other in 
the playground of a nearby junior high school. Despite being within a few minutes' 
walking distance, the two groups began drifting apart socially. Nozaki's team visited 
the junior high school cluster in October, giving a proposal to form a machi-zukuri 
association for recovery planning. Unaware of any division between the two clusters, 
they neither visited the elementary school cluster nor sought to invite its residents to 
the meeting at the junior high school. Soon after, Nozaki's group began working with 
Neguchi's Tadakoshi District, where they presented a report on their meeting with 
residents at the elementary school of Osawa. These two actions — meeting residents at
only one of the clusters, and then showing a report to residents of another district — 
poisoned the relationship between Nozaki's team and the residents of Osawa, 
eﬀectively precluding any subsequent cooperation.
According to one of the experts who subsequently began working with Osawa, 
the district's leader complained that Nozaki's actions exacerbated growing tensions 
between the two clusters of residents and caused them to question Nozaki's motives.70 
Because they knew that Nozaki and colleagues received some financial support for 
their activities from Hyōgo Prefecture, residents questioned the degree to which their 
motives were altruistic. (In fact, the amount of money provided just barely covers their 
travel expenses, to the point that they usually stay with friends in the area instead of 
hotels.) Given the degree of care that I witnessed Nozaki's team generally give to 
controlling the flow of information, especially between diﬀerent groups and districts, I 
would suggest that they learned quickly from these experiences the fact that Tōhoku's 
70. Tsukihashi interview (April 2012).
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groups of hisaisha appeared to be more sensitive to such issues than the recovering 
residents of Kobe had been.
In fact, this was not the only such early setback for Nozaki's group. As I 
described in the previous chapter, a facilitation technique that Nozaki and his 
colleagues use during machi-zukuri meetings is exhaustively recording and summarizing 
the contents of the discussion on a whiteboard. They take photos of the resulting board
covered with inscriptions, and sometimes print copies of the photos and distribute 
them at the next meeting, for the sake of continuity. After one such meeting in 2011 
with leaders of Shishiori District in Kesennuma, a member of Nozaki's team posted 
these photos on his Facebook page. Soon after, Nozaki and his colleagues began 
receiving bitter complaints via email and Facebook comments, to the eﬀect that the 
proceedings of the meeting were sensitive and should be kept private.71 In fact, other 
experts from Kobe unaﬃliated with Nozaki also received some of these complaints, as 
local residents sometimes lumped all Kobe-based experts together, assuming some 
mutual association between them.72 Because much of this fracas occurred in the semi-
public forum of Facebook, news spread to other districts. Although the leaders of 
Shishiori continued to work with Nozaki's team, in Osawa, where residents were 
already predisposed to skepticism of the group, the residue of ill will from these 
incidents was so rank that when I began seeking access to Osawa's meetings and 
residents, I had to clarify the nature of my relationship to Nozaki's team and 
emphasize my identity as an outside researcher and observer.
These events demonstrate just how critical social etiquette and inter-group 
politics can be to establishing a trusting relationship between EA's and their 
prospective clients. A comment that I have heard from a range of academics, 
71. Hatakeyama interview (March 2013).
72. Tsukihashi interview (April 2012).
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volunteers, and local residents is that people in Tōhoku, especially the older generation
which comprise the largest demographic of hisaisha, are relatively conservative in their 
approaches to personal and professional relationships. In contrast, people from the 
Kansai region, of which Kobe is a part (along with Osaka and Kyoto), tend to be 
much more casual in their interactions with strangers and new acquaintances.73 Thus, 
it is possible that such cultural diﬀerences contributed to some of these early missteps 
and misunderstandings. For engagement agents, it is all the more necessary to 
familiarize themselves with local customs and culture, while also learning to chart the 
local social landscape, its territories, borders, conflicts and disputes.
5.2.5: Strategic management of secrets and information as trust-work
If the inappropriate leaking of one group's information to another can damage 
trust, the careful management of sensitive information may enhance trust and 
credibility.74 Thus, trust-work also comprises the judicious collection, keeping, and 
strategic revealing or hiding of certain pieces of information. Although, like face-work, 
this is something that human beings do as a matter of course in living out their social 
lives, it is especially important for engagement agents to pay diligent attention to this 
practice. They liaise with so many diﬀerent actors (individual and collective) and are 
privy to so much information that it is critical for them to keep track of all of the bits, 
73. The Japanese language famously has distinct registers of politeness used for diﬀerent 
situations, based on considerations of the social identity of interlocutors and other listeners 
as well as on the subject or content of each utterance. Basically, "humble-polite" speech is 
used when speaking about oneself or one's in-group to an out-group listener, while 
"honorific-polite" speech is used when speaking to and referring to out-groups. A social 
norm that applies to nearly all of Japan except Kansai is the assumption that one will use 
polite registers of speech upon first meeting a person, whether in a casual or professional 
context. For those used to the norms of Tokyo, for example, it can be shocking to share a 
cab, as I did, with a fellow rider from Kobe and a driver from Osaka, and to hear them 
immediately begin chatting in a casual register, as if they had known each other for years. 
74. Cf. Hilgartner (2000) for the seminal work on the importance of strategic information 
control to expert credibility.
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their owners, originators, and appropriate audiences. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Nozaki had learned from Komori to make sure that 
husbands and wives participated together in their private "hearings" with Nozaki. As 
noted, these private, somewhat free-ranging interviews yielded a great deal of 
knowledge about the situations of individual households and the opinions that they — 
especially the wives — might otherwise be averse to expressing in a public forum. In 
addition, they provided an opportunity for a concerned and carefully listening Nozaki 
to build a face-to-face relationship with each family member and to demonstrate his 
trustworthiness. These hearings continued to pay trust-value dividends afterwards, as 
Nozaki could be seen in the group context working towards couples' private goals 
(many shared by other couples, of course) without revealing their private information 
to other members of the group. By acting on that information while simultaneously 
protecting it, Nozaki is able to demonstrate his trustworthiness. On the other hand, as 
a strategy, this is a risky one. If Nozaki were to expose such information to others, his 
reputation as a trustworthy moral agent would be severely damaged. Thus, EA's are 
doubly incentivized to take special care with sensitive information.
A similar example is the government's decision to raise the entire hama of 
Kamegawa village. Only the local leaders and PRP experts are aware of this plan. The
district leaders and to government oﬃcials had to have previously trusted the PRP 
experts in order to entrust them with this information in the first place. By keeping the 
information close, the experts confirm the wisdom of their judgment of their 
trustworthiness.
 I witnessed many examples like this in my fieldwork. Especially early on, 
Nozaki and his colleagues would often admonish me, as we drove from one machi-
zukuri meeting to another, not to divulge the proceedings of the one to the other. At 
other times, meetings with government oﬃcials would yield provisional decisions 
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which the oﬃcials planned to share with residents at a later date. We then had to 
conduct the machi-zukuri meeting as if we had no knowledge of these decisions. For 
example, when Tadakoshi's first choice for takadai-iten didn't work out, this was known 
as early as mid-February, 2012. However, oﬃcials wanted to announce this fact later, 
along with additional sites for possible relocation. At the next machi-zukuri meeting, 
when the residents' discussion focused on the original site, we had to avoid letting on 
that we had any inside information regarding its status. In sum, the management of 
secrets and information, and the strategic timing of revealing said information, is an 
important practice of trust-work for engagement agents. 
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5.3: Rescuing the role of engagement agent from the "experts" and 
"sociocrats"
As described by Conley and te Kulve & Rip, engagement agents are usually 
actors not unlike Conley, te Kulve, and Rip: scholars of STS and PES who become 
practitioners through their activities as EA's. These authors also mention that scientists
and engineers may, with the guidance of "embedded humanists," develop the capacity 
to act as EA's by cultivating reflexivity about the broader social ramifications of their 
work and by engaging in dialogue with representatives of the public or society at large.
The engagement agents in my narrative thus far have been somewhat analogous to 
such reflexively engaged technical specialists. Stated crudely, people like Nozaki are 
built-environment experts by training, who also have "expertise" in facilitating 
participatory recovery planning processes. Their status as recognized "technical 
experts" distinguishes them from "embedded humanists" playing the role of EA, while 
their latter qualification distinguishes them from those "unreflexive" built-environment
experts who practice their craft largely without interacting with the citizens whose lives 
their work will aﬀect. Many of these less engaged specialists work for UR, municipal 
and prefectural planning agencies, and major engineering, design and construction 
firms such as Hasshu or Pacific Consultants.75 
Though limited, the above accounts do provide glimpses of some scope for the 
non-expert residents of Tōhoku to exercise agency. Many of my interviewees have 
expressed the opinion that proactive, capable local leadership is necessary to ensure 
75. This is not to say conclusively that all planners, architects and engineers working for these 
organizations conform to the PES "deficit model of experts," nor that these specialists are 
institutionally incapable of developing the peculiar know-how of EA's à la Kobe's PRP 
experts. However, the evidence certainly suggests that these organizations habitually 
pursue institutionally routinized practices (e.g., minimal public engagement) and solutions 
(e.g., massive construction), without reflexively questioning their methods or considering 
how to conduct their work in a way that is appropriate to local conditions.
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the success of participatory recovery planning processes. It was Neguchi himself who 
compiled the initial survey of Tadakoshi residents. Kumagai was instrumental in 
securing expert aid for Osawa District. Not just leaders but other residents have also 
played important roles. Tsukihashi's machi-aruki model of Osawa began as a white 
tabula rasa of blank foam-core topography; the residents themselves painted the model 
with colors and memories. Through Nozaki's proxy as liaison and champion, 
Tadakoshi residents were able to convince oﬃcial planners to alter their plans for the 
district's elevation. In addition, residents engage in a full range of recovery-related 
activities outside of the formal processes of planning meetings, as a matter of course. 
Their decisions about whether or not to continue their businesses, whether to move 
their residency, where to purchase goods, with whom to spend time, etc., all implicitly 
shape some part of their community's recovery. For example, about 5000 people have 
left Kesennuma since the tsunami (out of a former population of approximately 
78,000).76 Personal decisions to stay or to emigrate (willingly or not) and other such 
actions will, collectively, influence the direction of the region's recovery, both short-
term and long-term. Thus, local residents in my account thus far have exhibited some 
agency, albeit somewhat limited. However, I want to go beyond these small examples 
to discuss the possibility of aﬀording much greater agency to "lay" members of the 
public. 
Specifically, I want to interrogate the notion that the crucial role of 
engagement agent is one to be played only by the so-called "experts" — be they STS 
scholars or enlightened scientists and engineers. In fact, non-expert members of the 
public can also play this role — indeed, with some distinct advantages over "expert" 
EA's — as demonstrated by an energetic and diminutive Shintō priestess from 
76. City of Kesennuma (2012).
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Minami-Sanriku.
Shintō is one of Japan's two main religions, and its oldest, with historical 
records as early as 712 CE and archaeological evidence dating back further than 
that.77 It is a pantheistic religion of nature gods and spirits, with the Japanese Emperor 
as the titular head of the temporal institution. It is practiced syncretically along with 
Buddhism. Often Shintō shrines are paired with adjacent Buddhist temples. Although 
the primary deity is generally regarded as Amaterasu, the sun goddess, and although 
female shamans are said to have played significant roles in Shintō practices prior to the
establishment of shogunal military dictatorships 800 years ago, today it is extremely 
rare for a woman to be the head priestess of a shrine. Despite the fact that Japanese 
people often describe themselves as secular or otherwise not particularly religious in 
surveys,78 Shintō shrines traditionally play a significant role in people's lives on special 
occasions and holidays (e.g., weddings, annual New Years celebrations) and for specific
purposes (e.g., praying for success in business, acquiring charms for safe travels, etc.).79 
Few people claim to "believe in" the Shintō gods, yet the religion, its rituals, and its 
practitioners are generally respected as occupying important positions in Japanese 
daily life, history and culture.
Mayumi Kudō grew up in her family's shrine in the Shizugawa District of 
Minami-Sanriku, inheriting it from her father. She and her husband operate the shrine
as a team. As with many shrines, theirs is located on a hill overlooking the village. 
When the tsunami came, they fled with their young son, to the elementary school 
higher up on the hill, although ultimately the tsunami spared their shrine and home. 
77. Kojiki (, Record of Ancient Matters).
78. Roemer (2009).
79. Toshio et al (1981). In Japanese syncretic tradition, weddings are performed at Shintō 
shrines while funerals are performed at Buddhist temples.
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Kudō has published several books of original art, poetry and photography; after the 
tsunami she published a children's book called Tsunami no Ehon (", "A 
Picturebook of the Tsunami") which tells the story of her family's escape from her four-
year-old son's point of view. She also began performing the book for audiences, first at 
her shrine and then around Japan, through the traditional narrative art of kami-shibai 
(
, "paper theater," where kami means "paper" and shibai indicates a theatrical 
performance). In kami-shibai, the narrator tells a story with the visual aid of paper 
drawings, somewhat similar to slides. Kudō's book and kami-shibai gained national 
attention, and she has appeared on NHK television and in other news media. In 
addition to her artistic, cultural endeavors and her priestly duties, Kudō has become 
deeply involved in recovery planning activities within her district of Shizugawa, as an 
organizer and facilitator of meetings and as a liaison between oﬃcials, residents, and 
diﬀerent groups of experts (including PRP experts from Kobe as well as engineers and 
planners from UR, planning agencies, and major contractors). 
When Kudō first joined a machi-zukuri meeting, she initially doubted the degree 
to which she would be able to participate, influence, or even understand the 
proceedings.80 Now, through her own eﬀorts and deep involvement in recovery 
planning since the disaster, Kudō has become something of a respected expert herself. 
For example, Kudō sometimes helps to run machi-zukuri training workshops intended 
to help local leaders and other residents gain the skills, knowledge and confidence to 
facilitate or participate in their own machi-zukuri endeavors. In addition to his work 
with residents in various districts of Kesennuma, Nozaki periodically puts together 
such training workshops with fellow experts and academics from Tokyo, the Tōhoku 
80. Kudō interview (October 2012). This is something she frequently tells other residents, as a 
way of reassuring them that non-experts can understand and contribute meaningfully to 
participatory planning processes.
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region, and elsewhere. There is an open invitation for anyone to attend in order to 
learn more about the process of running and participating in machi-zukuri. In one such 
workshop I attended in January 2013, the participants included some Neighborhood 
Association leaders as well as other residents from nearby districts. The workshop 
trainers included Nozaki, his team, several university professors, and Kudō.81 
In September 2012, Kobe Machiken organized a panel of experts on disaster 
recovery, urban planning, and gender, attended by several dozen academics, 
journalists, volunteers, and others involved or interested in Tōhoku's recovery. The 
event was held in Kobe. Among the local discussion panelists were Nozaki, Kobayashi,
and Machiken researcher Kumiko Yamaji. It was a somewhat formal aﬀair held in a 
large public auditorium in Kobe's swank Kitano district. Invited panelists included 
Hiroshima University professor of urban planning Carolyn Funck, American 
sociologist of gender and disaster Elaine Enarson, and Kudō.82
Not only has Kudō developed specialized knowledge and skills, she has earned 
the respect and trust of non-expert citizens and established experts alike. Based on my 
interviews, observations, and casual communication with oﬃcials, residents, PRP 
experts, and non-PRP experts of the built environment, Kudō appears to command 
respect from all of these relevant social groups. Indeed, she has been instrumental in 
persuading oﬃcials and the contracted planners and engineers from Pacific 
Consultants (known colloquially as "Paci-Con") to consider modifications in their plans
for Minami-Sanriku.
Kudō attends nearly every recovery planning meeting in the Shizugawa 
district, as well as meetings for the town of Minami-Sanriku more broadly. She has 
81. Q.v., Fig. 5-6, for a photo of this meeting.
82. Fieldnotes (September 2012).
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also organized machi-zukuri meetings for kids and young adults, orchestrating their 
involvement in participatory recovery planning. Two points that she repeatedly 
emphasizes are, first, that even young children are quite capable of understanding and 
deliberating issues of disaster recovery and planning; and second, because recovery 
planning is fundamentally about shaping the future of the community, it is critically 
important to include voices of the young in the recovery planning process.83 Here, "the
young" indicates children, teenagers, young adults, and anyone under 50 or 60 years 
old. As Kudō and others have noted, and as I have mentioned elsewhere in this 
dissertation, residents under 60 years old are consistently underrepresented in most of 
Tōhoku's PRP initiatives. In addition to her youth work, Kudō has initiated some of 
her own projects and organized meetings to discuss her ideas with fellow residents. For
example, one such project is a plan to "construct" tsunami evacuation routes by 
planting rows of flowering camellia trees, which have a special place in local lore.
Several prominent shrines and other locations with reputations as natural and 
spiritual "power spots" in the area are strongly associated with camellias. Kudō noticed
that connecting these locations on a map resulted in a line drawn straight through her 
district and her own shrine, proceeding up the hill to high ground.84 With fellow 
residents, oﬃcials, and planners, she began discussing the idea of planting rows of 
camellia trees to mark tsunami evacuation routes. Not only would this "natural" (her 
word) solution to disaster risk reduction be beautiful and appropriately embedded in 
local culture, but the practice of planting the trees would also function as a bonding, 
community-strengthening activity. Moreover, in the aftermath of a "natural" disaster, 
it would serve as an expression of a newer, wiser vision of this community's renewed —
and less antagonistic — relationship with nature.
83. Kudō interview (October 2012).
84. Kudō interview (February 2013). Q.v., Fig. 5-4, for Kudō's map and notes.
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I attended a meeting that Kudō organized with residents to discuss this plan in 
March, 2013. The "Valentine Team," a recovery support volunteer group from Kobe, 
helped to run the meeting and provide refreshments.85 In addition, an engineer and 
planning consultant from Paci-Con also attended and spoke to the residents about the 
current state of the oﬃcial recovery plan. At this meeting the engineer as well as the 
residents expressed enthusiastic support for Kudō's camellia plan.
Granted, the tree-lined evacuation routes might implicitly critique the oﬃcial 
recovery plan's underlying principles and approach, but they would not substantively 
alter the oﬃcial plan as laid out by Paci-Con and the municipal planning department, 
making it easy for Paci-Con engineers to support. In contrast, Kudō has been working 
on other ideas that would necessitate modifications to that plan, relating to the 
implementation of the levees and bridges along the district's river as well as the use of 
the low-lying land near the sea. 
Recall that Shizugawa is the home district of Arakawa, the tea seller. To recap 
the issues and controversies in this district, the current oﬃcial plans would establish a 
seawall of 8 to 11 meters in height along the current beachfront, as well as an 8 meter-
high levee along the district's stream (the Shizu Gawa or River). The district would be 
zoned such that the majority of the hama would become a green park, with a dedicated 
commercial zone around the base of the hill upon which stands Kudō's shrine. Trunk 
roads would be elevated to the same height as the seawall to act as additional bulwarks
against a tsunami, raising them far above the ground floor of shops in the commercial 
zone. Residents would be relocated to three separate parcels of high ground farther 
from the water. Prior to the tsunami, most residents lived in the mixed-use hama. Many
had shops or businesses on the first floor of their houses, and lived on the second floor. 
85. Shizugawa meeting notes (March 2013).
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Thus, as with plans in Tadakoshi and many other districts throughout the region, 
Shizugawa's new plan would require intensive, large-scale construction, and would 
separate the residents from the sea, from each other, and from their own places of 
business.
Like Arakawa, Kudō criticizes many aspects of the plan. She says that she 
would prefer not to have the seawall and levees, and that she sees no need to expand 
or even return to the pre-tsunami tax base. She'd like to see a plan that provides for a 
town of realistic size (smaller than before), but which lives in harmony with nature 
rather than trying to fight it and keep it out.86
We have to manage by ourselves, after all. We have to do something we can manage 
with a population of 10,000.  So then the solution has to be simple. Things should not 
be as they were before. I believe that if we don't rebuild our town using the power of 
nature, if that power doesn't become a part of our town, then we simply won't have 
the strength to rebuild.
Kudō's vision is one of a town that has recovered a long-lost sense of intimacy 
with nature, and a local culture in which knowledge of nature — including tsunamis 
and how to escape them — is deeply ingrained and frequently applied in daily 
practices.87 In her vision, the children of Shizugawa will grow up in a safe and resilient 
town, engaged with their natural surroundings. In addition to her focus on 
strengthening a sense of community, these are the two great callings of her work: to 
embrace nature and to include children and youth in the life of the community. For 
Kudō, "the community" is not an exclusive club to which children gain entrance only 
after they graduate to adulthood; they are already integral and important citizens, 
86. Kudō interview (February 2013).
87. Kudō interview (March 2013).
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capable of intelligent, sometimes even profoundly wise decisions and actions. As 
citizens, they too have rights and responsibilities, like their adult counterparts.88 
Likewise, any notion that nature is entirely outside the realm of human society is 
delusional; it too is an integral part of the community, in its way.89 
Yet, despite her fundamentally diﬀerent approach from that of the oﬃcial plan,
Kudō stresses the practical necessity of working with, rather than against, those in the 
municipal government and engineering firms who are drawing up the oﬃcial plans. 
When discussing recovery planning in Shizugawa, her speech includes a mixture of 
critique, optimistic hope for transformation and rebirth, and practical reasoning. 
While critiquing authorities for failing to engage fully with residents, she also 
frequently expresses appreciation for their eﬀorts, and emphasizes the need for 
compromise and cooperation. 
If there is no way for us to make them stop [building the seawalls], our compromise is 
to give them some ideas. For example, to try to build a seawall which is harmonious 
with natural scenery, or to build it in a way that won’t destroy the ecosystem. 
Ajinomoto90 has worked with university researchers on a kind of concrete which 
stimulates the environment. Fish tend to gather around that new concrete more than 
normal concrete. So instead of fighting the government strongly, I think it's probably 
better to cooperate with them and, if the seawall is definitely going to be built, at least 
to build it with better ideas.91
Kudō's plans also include provisions to lower bridges from their originally 
planned height and to build relatively low platforms on the river levees, so that 
88. Kudō interview (October 2012).
89. Kudō interview (February 2013, March 2013).
90. A large Japanese food products corporation, built upon the original invention of MSG-
based additives.
91. Kudō interview (March 2013).
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children (as well as adults) can safely watch or catch fish. Salmon swim up the 
Shizugawa each year, and catching them or just watching them is a popular pastime. 
In the original plans, this could only have been practiced from high bridges and the 
tops of towering levees, generating the same risks of drowning discussed in the context 
of Tadakoshi's planning in previous chapters. Kudō's plan would not eliminate the 
levees, but it would mitigate some of the additional risks associated with them.92
Another of Kudō's proposed modifications would alter the implementation of 
the park area near the sea, with substantial ramifications for the planned seawall.93 
Kudō points out that the current plans would erect a massive seawall along the current
beachfront, behind which would stretch a green park. An elevated highway would 
bifurcate the park and eﬀectively serve as a secondary seawall. Kudō questions the 
need for both the seawall and the elevated highway. She argues that the highway could
function as a primary bulwark and that the resources for building the seawall itself 
could be redirected elsewhere. A somewhat smaller green park would still lie behind 
the elevated roadway. A portion of lowland now between the road and the beach had 
been "reclaimed" in recent decades; previously it had been a wetlands area and a 
prolific breeding ground for thousands of migratory waterfowl. Kudō suggests that, if 
that land were returned to its previous state, the birds and other wildlife, such as 
shallow-water shellfish, would also return. She notes that elderly residents still fondly 
recall playing by the seaside and watching the birds as one of the highlights of their 
youth. Thus, Kudō argues that it would be a boon for the community as a whole, and 
perhaps especially for its children, if they were to embrace that bit of nature back into 
92. Compare Kudō's lowering of too-high bridges to the too-low, Robert Moses-designed 
bridges described in Winner (1980). Both support Winner's thesis.
93. Q.v., Fig. 5-5, for Kudō's drawing of her modifications to Shizugawa's recovery plan.
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their village.94
As for the prospects for Kudō's proposals to become implemented in wood, 
earth and concrete, negotiations and deliberations are ongoing. Her fellow residents 
appear to support her ideas,95 albeit with a little prodding: 
They do support [my plan], but many people just don't consider such ideas unless 
someone else says it first. When they are told, "we should return this area to the sea," 
they understand and sympathize. Then they remember that they used to swim there 
naked. 50 years ago they did. But then 50 years passed, and they forgot, and they 
started thinking about their town as if it had always existed in its current form.96
At the same time, Kudō told me that she is encouraged by initial responses from 
oﬃcials and Paci-Con engineers, and that she is optimistic. But she acknowledged the 
challenges, particularly those facing her proposal to modify the seawall plan.
They have been working extremely hard on these plans for us, and for us to propose 
changing everything would be too much to ask, so we're trying to persuade them to 
make this area a tideland again, or [at least] to plant some greenery along the seawall. 
But even this is quite diﬃcult for authorities to accept.97 
Regardless of whether or not Kudō's proposals are ultimately integrated into the 
recovery plan and the physical and cultural configurations of Shizugawa, she is 
remarkable for the fact that, as a local resident with deep roots and familiarity with her
community, and with no formal technical training, she has proactively constructed a 
94. Kudō interview (March 2013).
95. As confirmed by independent discussions with residents such as Arakawa, and by 
observations of workshops such as the one described below.
96. Kudō interview (March 2013). Sometimes opening the "black box" of a closed "artifact," 
such as a townscape, begins  simply by recalling memories and history.
97. ibid.
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role for herself as an engagement agent in the recovery planning process. 
Like non-local, expert EA's such as Nozaki, Kudō accomplishes these 
functions, in part, through trust-work. Her status as a local resident does not obviate 
the need for her to perform trust-work, although certainly her shared social identity 
aﬀords her a substantial advantage. To illustrate, I will describe in greater detail the 
meeting I mentioned above, in which Kudō, the Paci-Con engineer, and Kobe's 
Valentine Team met with residents to discuss her plan for planting camellia trees along
tsunami evacuation routes. 
Although Shizugawa is not a large district and Kudō is fairly well known even 
beyond her own community, it is not necessarily the case that she knows everyone in 
the local population (of about 10,000), or vice-versa. This particular meeting, which 
Kudō and the Valentine Team had advertised through fliers and word-of-mouth, was 
attended by about a dozen residents, all women, most over the age of 60. The meeting 
was held in the community center of a temporary housing facility erected in the field of
the local junior high school. For some of the participants, it was their first time to meet 
Kudō. 
Kudō introduced herself to them as "the daughter of the shrine."98 On the face 
of it, such an introduction is unremarkable, since her "day job" is running the shrine 
(with her husband), and since she has lived at the shrine and been associated with it 
her entire life. On the other hand, Kudō has built a recognizable role as a facilitator of 
machi-zukuri and recovery planning since the tsunami, and in the context of this 
meeting it would not have been inappropriate to introduce herself in that specific 
capacity. Indeed, such an introduction might reasonably be assumed to be a more 
direct route to establishing her credibility as a kind of expert in this context. However, 
98. She used the term miko (, "shrine maiden"). Generally, miko are functionaries, not 
shrine heads. Thus, by using this term she was modestly humbling her social position.
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just as invoking Kobe instantly establishes commonality — and thereby a foundation 
for trust — with tsunami survivors for expert EA's like Nozaki, so emphasizing her 
roots and her primary identity as "the daughter of the local shrine" does important 
trust-work for Kudō. 
By pointing out the trust-value of these introductions, I do not argue that these 
are necessarily conscious strategies by the actors involved. Rather, I suggest that, 
whether consciously or intuitively or just haphazardly, actors have developed 
communication strategies that do productive work for them. To further illustrate 
Kudō's methods of performing trust-work and fulfilling the three functions of EA's, it is
particularly instructive to note the contrast in communication styles and strategies 
between her and Masaaki Chibata, the engineer from Paci-Con who participated in 
the meeting.
The residents were sitting in a semicircle, most on chairs. Chibata stood at the 
front of the room next to a whiteboard to which he aﬃxed a map displaying the oﬃcial
recovery plan.99 Standing stiﬄy near a board before the residents, he presented the 
plan to them, explaining the main features, as shown on the map, in a short, 15-
minute lecture. While he spoke, the residents listened quietly and attentively. 
Frequently using technical terms, he made sure to stop and explain the meaning of 
each term. This fact, combined with his soft-spoken style, indicated that he very much 
wanted to communicate clearly, and that he was sensitive to residents' presumed lack 
of technical vocabulary. Note that this was a clear demonstration of a kind of 
reflexivity regarding the respective social and epistemological positions of himself and 
the residents. Chibata exhibited communicatory self-awareness: he edited and 
modified his speech patterns in a way that he believed was appropriate for 
99. Q.v., Fig. 5-2.
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communicating technical information to a lay audience. The overall impression was 
one of a kind and well-intentioned, but somewhat condescending, social superior 
speaking down to subordinates who (he assumes) lack the capacity to fully understand 
his explanation. At the end of his presentation, Chibata asked if there were any 
questions, but there were none.
Kudō spoke next. She sat on the floor close to the residents and, using colorful 
pictures she had drawn, began explaining her ideas for the camellia-lined evacuation 
route as well as her other proposed modifications to the plan as described by 
Chibata.100 What ensued for the rest of the meeting was not so much a presentation as 
a discussion, with all of the residents actively participating. While Kudō also used some
technical terms, she did not hasten to append translations in lay-speak; rather, she 
integrated the terms seamlessly into her speech such that their practical meaning could
be easily inferred, regardless of training or background. In some respects, such a 
communicative style appeared to be "less reflexive" than the engineer, as Kudō did not
appear to monitor or modify her speech patterns. Furthermore, whereas Chibata had 
used passive voice extensively in explaining what would be done to implement the 
plans, Kudō repeatedly spoke of collective action in the first person, active voice, using 
phrases like, "We can make this together," or "Let's do this."101 Here is an abridged 
transcription of part of the discussion:102
Kudō: Now I have joined the sectional planning meeting for the park. We told the 
[municipal] administration that we want this area to become a kind of tideland, like a 
100. Q.v., Fig. 5-3.
101. Japanese does have a passive voice/active voice distinction similar to English. It can be
used in such a way as to convey the subtext that the speaker was harmed by the doer of the
action, but in this case Chibata was using it in a neutral, formal sense, similar to the way 
passive is often used in English-language academic texts such as this one.
102. Shizugawa meeting notes (March 2013).
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park for sea birds, and to return it to nature. Long ago, there was a beach and pine 
groves…. 
Resident A: Right now we have no places to do things like going shellfish gathering. I
was wondering if we could have that kind of life.
Resident B: It is probably impossible, but personally I also feel that way.
Kudō: Yeah, we really should give this back to nature.
Resident C: When you mentioned the tideland, I was also wondering if perhaps I 
might be able to go shellfish gathering again.
Kudō: We should do it. If local people want it and speak up, we can do it.
Resident D: When you say it like that…. It's actually what I'm always thinking, 
but….
Kudō: Yeah, in the past many people did go shellfish gathering, and children played 
naked. With just a little work for nature, we can save Shizugawa itself, even though 
our town may be surrounded by a high seawall or elevated national highway.
Resident A: If we have a resting place in the park, we can build something so we can 
enjoy nature, and children can catch little crabs. That kind of thing would be good.
Kudō: I will tell oﬃcials what you said now, as your advocate. [scattered laughter 
throughout the room.] I hope more such voices will be raised. Not just one portion of the 
residents, but if everyone speaks up….
Chibata: Yes, you are right. Speaking of projects for the park that I mentioned 
before… if you can bring more ideas to the administration, such as the tideland, sea 
bird park, going shellfish gathering, getting many people to gather at the park, then 
the purpose of having this park will be stronger.
Kudō: If everyone tries to make it real, not just put plans on paper, then our town will
become a place which gets a little closer to what we want to have. Then we can do 
things like build camellia paths, which will make our town easy to evacuate for 
children and seniors and visitors.
The exchange between Kudō and the residents is clearly one between peers 
and neighbors. There is an open, mutual give-and-take quality to the conversation. 
Kudō notably speaks of "our town" and exhorts her fellow residents with clauses like 
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"we should do it" and "we can do it." In contrast, Chibata addresses the group as "you."
Furthermore, Kudō's hallmark concerns for community unity, nature and children are
on display here, as is her forward-looking "can-do" optimism (whereas the residents 
seem somewhat resigned or pessimistic with regard to what can actually be 
accomplished).
Emphasizing her status as a peer, neighbor, and fellow hisaisha with the 
residents does trust-work for Kudō. As noted earlier, at this particular meeting all of 
the participants were women, giving Kudō an additional social identity in common 
with them. During the meeting, the Valentine Team handed out tea and sweets to the 
women, helping them to relax and feel comfortable. Acting as a good host can also 
function as trust-work. Finally, in course of the conversation, Kudō mentions her 
participation in planning meetings and her direct communications with oﬃcials, and 
she talks about the plans in a way that demonstrates her detailed understanding of 
them, all of which allows the participants to infer her technical competence. Thus, by 
the end of the meeting she has established herself as a local native with technical 
expertise; relationships with recovery volunteers from Kobe, engineers from Paci-Con,
and oﬃcials in the municipal administration; and as a polite, caring, trustworthy peer.
It is diﬃcult to meet Kudō without coming to the conclusion that she is an 
extraordinary person, a quiet yet persistent force of nature to be reckoned with. 
Nevertheless, her example demonstrates that even people with no formal technical 
training can, given the right circumstances, transform themselves into "experts" and 
engagement agents.
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Fig. 5-1: Kudō performs Boku no Furusato ("#$ , "My Hometown") a kamishibai based 
on her children's book A Picture Book of the Tsunami. Photo by author (March 2012).
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Fig. 5-2: Chibata, an engineer for Pacific Consultants, presents the oﬃcial recovery plan for 
the Shizugawa District of Minami-Sanriku to a group of residents in the community center of 
a temporary housing facility. The three yellow zones toward the top of the map are the three 
separate locations for takadai-iten. Green represents parkland, pink commercial/retail, and blue
industrial/fishing. Photo by author (March 2013).
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Fig. 5-3: Kudō presents her plan for making a tsunami evacuation route lined with flowering 
camellia trees to fellow residents. Note the diﬀerence in presentation style, compared to 
Chibata in the previous photo. Kudō's writing on the board behind her shows her title for the 
event: " 'Let's make a machi [where] Camellia flowers bloom' Discussion/Tea-drinking 
Meeting." Photo by author (March 2013).
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Fig. 5-4: This document shows the rationale behind Kudō's plan for the camellia-lined 
evacuation path. The red line on the map, on the left, is a line drawn through several locally 
known "power spots" — places of great spiritual significance to local people — all famous for 
their camellia trees. The upper left endpoint of the line is Kudō's shrine in the Shizugawa 
District. Source: Kudō (2013).
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Fig. 5-5: Kudō's modified version of the recovery plan shown being presented by Chibata in 
Fig. 5-2. It retains the three separate areas for takadai-iten, but does away with a dedicated 
commercial/retail zone and re-converts part of the proposed park into the wetland that had 
last existed there several decades ago. Source: Kudō (2013).
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Fig. 5-6: A panel on gender and disasters in Kobe, arranged by the Kobe Machi-zukuri 
Research Institute. On the right are three local machi-zukuri experts, including Nozaki (third 
from end). On the far left is the event's primary organizer and emcee. Two distinguished, 
invited speakers sit in the center: Kudō and Hiroshima University professor Carolin Funck. 
Kudō's prominence in such events, and her invitation to participate by established experts, 
attest to her achieved authority on machi-zukuri and recovery planning; she is recognized by 
established experts as a kind of colleague and expert in her own right. Photo by author 
(September, 2012).
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Fig. 5-7: Kudō, on the left, helps to run a workshop in Kesennuma, aimed at local leaders and 
residents, on how to lead and facilitate machi-zukuri groups. The card she is holding says, "How 
do you gather residents together? How do you proceed?" This workshop was organized by 
Nozaki. Kudō's facilitation of such workshops, at the invitation of established experts such as 
Nozaki, indicates her achieved status as an expert. Photo by author (October, 2012).
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5.4: Engagement agent praxis and core functions
I have argued that a set of practices that do trust-work constitute a key praxis 
for engagement agents. I have further argued that the role of EA need not be reserved 
only for "sociocrats" or for technical experts who have cultivated know-how for 
"orchestrating engagement;" putatively non-expert citizens may also acquire both the 
"technical expertise" and the "engagement expertise" necessary for fulfilling the 
engagement agent role.  In the final section of this chapter, I want to briefly review the 
range of practices and activities performed by EA's, including local EA's such as Kudō 
as well as the PRP experts from Kobe, and use them to consider the key characteristics
or core functions of engagement agents in general.
For example, the strategic management of secrets and information is an 
important form of trust-work for EA's. Perhaps more than their other practices, this is 
perhaps less critical for their credibility as "technical experts" but crucial for 
demonstrating their worth as moral agents who may be trusted to protect the best 
interests of their clients. It does carry the risk of damaging their trustworthiness, should
sensitive information leak from one constituency to another. But provided it is 
managed carefully, this practice helps to avoid antagonism and social discord among 
participants, while reaping considerable trust-rewards. 
Most trust-work practices do "double-duty:" they build credibility and 
trustworthiness while helping the EA's to accomplish another goal such as 
contextualizing technical and local knowledge. In fact, many of the PRP experts' 
practices described in this and previous chapters fit this description. I have already 
mentioned nomi-nication, Nozaki's private "hearings" with both spouses of each 
household, and Takasago's relocation to Kesennuma, all described in Chapter 4. 
Critically, the very contextualization of local knowledge, so important to the 
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"engagement" work of EA's, also does trust-work for them, by showing their care and 
consideration for the residents' perspectives and local context. Thus, even when 
Nozaki mildly rebuﬀs Onodera, by evincing the fact that he does not subscribe to the 
conventions Onodera expects of technical experts, he demonstrates his trustworthiness.
Likewise, the care and concern shown to listening to and considering the opinions of 
each and every participant at a planning meeting not only helps EA's to gather this 
information and ensure its relevance to the planning process; it is also an important 
form of trust-work. Recall Asami's diligent note-taking and periodic summarizing 
during meetings (described in Ch. 4), as well as Morisaki's echoing and careful 
rephrasing of resident concerns (Ch. 2). Finally, the practice of machi-aruki, whether 
literal or virtual, similarly performs trust-work on top of its other virtues (discussed in 
Ch. 4).
Considering the range of practices described in this dissertation, I would 
summarize the core, distinctive functions of EA's as follows: 
1. Integrating diverse sources and forms of knowledge, including local, cultural, 
historical, and technical.
2. Liaising between disparate groups, including non-expert local citizens, non-
local experts, and various government oﬃcials.
3. Facilitating participation and deliberation by all parties, but with a particular 
focus on soliciting and listening to the voices of local residents.
4. Facilitating full engagement. E.g., non-expert locals are to engage with non-
local experts and their specialized ways of knowing, and vice-versa: non-local 
experts are to engage with non-expert locals and their particular ways of 
knowing.
5. Encouraging and guiding "reflexivity" by all parties, including technical 
experts, regarding the situated circumstances and socio-technical consequences
of policies, actions, and technologies.
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6. Cultivating the recognition by key constituencies of their own credibility as 
"experts" and engagement agents, and of their own trustworthiness as moral 
agents, through trust-work.
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6. CONCLUSION: RECONSTRUCTING COMMUNITIES
Experts can also get knowledge from regular people. Experts excel at knowledge and 
techniques. Regular people might not have those, but they can think. Even if they 
don't understand something, in the midst of doing it they may find some hints and 
come to a realization [on their own]. Because lay people don't understand specialized 
knowledge, it is good if they can get advice from experts based on their own situation. 
That kind of exchange is important. Perhaps, just [relying solely upon] experts is not 
good. If local people who don't have knowledge but have wisdom work with experts 
who have knowledge, [together] they can do superior things. I want experts to show us
what steps we need to take to recover, or some foundation for recovery, which regular 
people can't picture. Then, pouring our culture into it, we can think carefully about it, 
and we can improve things. If experts don't pour our history and culture into it, the 
solution will be wrong.
— Mayumi Kudō1
6.1: Review
This dissertation argues that PRP is a site of public engagement in 
sociotechnical change, where non-expert publics interact with technical experts (who 
are often non-local, as in Tōhoku). It reveals a diversity of recovery experiences from 
disaster to disaster, community to community, expert to expert. Though disaster 
recovery diﬀers from classic PES sites of inquiry such as environmental and public 
health crises or governance of risky and emerging technologies, this dissertation 
demonstrates the fruitfulness of interrogating PES frameworks in the context of 
participatory recovery planning (and vice-versa). It indicates that some PES concepts 
(deficit models of experts and the public, the lay/expert divide) need revision, or at 
1. Kudō interview (October 2012).
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least more thoughtful theorizing and more careful consideration when deployed for 
analysis. Others show promise as potentially even more fruitful analytical tools 
(engagement agents), if appropriately adapted and conscientiously expanded. In the 
analyses of STS and PES scholars, the diversity of experts as well as publics and other 
actor classes needs to be given due consideration, not merely token 
acknowledgement — especially the key distinction between those experts who are 
institutionally and disciplinarily aligned with authorities versus those who cultivate the 
skills of EA's. This dissertation identifies a new category of praxis (or rather, newly 
categorizes an old set of practices) by which EA's construct and maintain the trust and 
credibility essential to all of their duties: trust-work. Before commencing a more wide-
ranging discussion of important questions raised by this work, I oﬀer a brief recap of 
the main narrative.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, which devastated Kobe in 1995, was 
Japan's most destructive disaster since the Fukui Earthquake of 1948, prompting its 
first exercise in large-scale urban reconstruction since World War II. A peculiar set of 
social and historical conditions set the stage for Kobe's recovery. On the one hand, the
city's history of industry-oriented technocratic city planning and development had 
earned it the nickname "Kobe Inc." On the other hand, it had nurtured an active 
grass-roots planning movement of neighborhood-based machi-zukuri ("community 
building") organizations. At the same time, the city's "built environment" specialists 
were a single, socially cohesive community of professionals and academics who shared 
a commitment to public participation and whose leaders had formally institutionalized 
the group into a coordinated network (CO-PLAN). 
Recovery planning after the earthquake was thus characterized by a 
combination of technocratic, centralized city planning and community-based 
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participatory recovery planning (PRP) through machi-zukuri organizations. CO-PLAN-
aﬃliated expert consultants facilitated the PRP process, guiding the machi-zukuri groups
(more than 100 across the city) and helping the groups to communicate and negotiate 
with city planning oﬃcials — a relationship described by these consultants as a 
"triangle," characteristic of what they call the "Kobe System" of PRP. These specialists
were assigned to districts based on their familiarity or knowledge of the areas — in 
many cases their own neighborhoods. Throughout the recovery process, the 
consultants coordinated their activities, meeting regularly and publishing monthly 
Kinmokusei newsletters as well as quarterly anthologies of districts' machi-zukuri 
newsletters, in order to share information, discuss issues, document challenges and 
progress, and, importantly, to learn from each other. Because technoscientific expertise
is classically considered an esoteric and rarefied form of know-how beyond the ken of 
untrained non-experts, it seems peculiar or even ironic for any such field of expertise to
be defined, in large part, by its integration of non-experts and their unruly, putatively 
non-technical knowledges in the (re-)construction of technoscientific products (e.g., 
built environments, sociotechnical infrastructures and institutions). Nevertheless, 
through the collaborative process of re-constructing Kobe, the consultants and other 
machi-zukuri participants constructed PRP as a particular field of expertise while 
establishing the consultants themselves as experts in that field — a field of expertise 
ironically staked upon the reflexive consideration and incorporation of local 
knowledge, alternative perspectives, and engagement of non-experts. 
Since their involvement in Kobe's recovery, these PRP experts have sustained 
their status through, in part, their involvement in subsequent post-disaster recoveries. 
Today, they are attempting to aid tsunami survivors and influence the post-tsunami 
recovery process in communities throughout Tōhoku, with the imprimatur and fiscal 
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backing of Hyogo Prefecture, universities and NGO's. They have quite consciously 
enrolled a younger generation in their current activities, while coordinating their 
eﬀorts and continuing their project of collective learning at the semi-public fukkō juku. 
By systematically training their successors and organizing the fukkō juku, which is 
performed before an audience of peers and patrons (and, to a lesser degree, clients), 
they are now using the ongoing experience of Tōhoku as an opportunity to 
reconsolidate their expertise, reconstruct their own community, and insure their 
legacy.
The story of Kobe's PRP experts sheds light on two classic questions in STS. 
First, how do "experts" establish their "expertise" in the first place? How is it 
constructed? And second, how do expert communities reproduce themselves? At the 
same time, the story complicates these questions by demonstrating that PRP expertise 
is crucially constituted through the facilitation of public engagement and the 
integration and contextualization of diverse knowledges, "technical" and "non-
technical." The construction (and re-construction) of this peculiar expertise is thus only
one part of a larger process of cultivating public participation in community recovery 
planning, begun in Kobe and now continuing in Tōhoku.
The tsunami-devastated towns and villages along the Sanriku coast are far 
from Kobe geographically, historically, culturally, and institutionally. Always a kind of 
"internal colony" on the periphery of Japan's Imperial regime, the fishing villages of 
Karakuwa, for example, have recently suﬀered from decades of social and 
environmental disintegration due to progressive entanglement in globalized flows of 
capital, knowledge and technology. The population has been aging and declining 
rapidly — processes that have accelerated since the tsunami. Now, oﬃcial recovery 
plans produced with minimal public input by government agencies and major 
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engineering and design firms threaten to further damage the local economy and to 
deal a "final blow" to the old ways of life, by separating residents from each other, 
from their places of business, and from the natural and cultural resources upon which 
they have traditionally built their social identities. Although post-disaster recovery is 
often portrayed as an "opportunity" by actors as well as scholars, in Tōhoku's case it is 
diﬃcult to responsibly characterize its recovery planning as an "opportunity" without 
heavily qualifying such a statement. 
My fieldwork in Tōhoku revealed that, while the planners, engineers, 
architects, and other "built environment" experts of government agencies and major 
contracting firms have indeed exhibited the ignorance and indiﬀerence to local 
knowledge generally ascribed to technical experts in PES literature, the PRP experts 
from Kobe have displayed far more "reflexive" self-critical awareness and sensitivity to 
local knowledge and local conditions than the literature had led me to expect. In fact, 
my observations of these experts' collaborations with local residents led me to question 
the "lay/expert divide" implied by both the PUS-style "deficit model" of an ignorant 
and irrational public and the PES-style deficit model of technical experts who are 
constitutionally blind to local nuance and alternative ways of knowing. At least for 
those experts whose very expertise is staked upon public engagement itself, both they 
and the non-expert members of the public with whom they mutually engage are aware
of each other's roles and of their own knowledge gaps, and both groups employ 
multiple strategies in order to address these gaps and collaborate productively. Such 
gaps derive not only from their positions vis-á-vis "lay" vs. "expert" but also from their 
social and geo-cultural positions (e.g., urban Kobe professional vs. "inaka" Karakuwa 
fisherman). In any case, these gaps are not incommensurable, as the groups engage in 
mutual, goal-oriented, collaborative learning.
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If "PRP experts" are distinct from UR planners, Hasshu engineers, soil 
radiation physicists, or other "technical experts," what are we to make of them? To 
answer this question, I turn once again to the rich conceptual resources of STS and 
PES. However, instead of critiquing classic PES constructs such as the "lay/expert" 
divides at the heart of mutual "deficit models," this time I wish to argue for the 
usefulness of a relatively new concept recently introduced by te Kulve & Rip (2011) 
and Conley (2011): engagement agents (EA's). Although these authors define roles for EA's 
within the specific milieux of Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) workshops 
and Socio-Technical Integration Research (STIR), respectively, they fundamentally 
describe engagement agents' peculiar expertise as engagement itself, much like PRP 
experts, who also specialize in an expertise of engagement or participation. Although 
there are diﬀerences in the definitions and contexts of usage between these authors' 
work and mine, the commonalities are suﬃciently numerous that I wish to adapt and 
extend the EA concept to PRP experts, and beyond. 
In the context of PRP, successful EA's must negotiate the inherent tension in 
the role of the consulting expert between dispensing advice and specialized knowledge 
versus taking into account local, non-expert people's values and desires. Contrary to 
what might be expected, non-experts do not always or exclusively wish to be 
profoundly understood by experts; nor do they always prefer that experts integrate and
contextualize esoteric technical knowledge with local knowledge. Rather, they 
sometimes want what they perceive themselves to lack and experts to possess: 
technical, practical knowledge that can be usefully applied to their situation, 
contextualized by themselves as necessary. However, EA's demonstrate that they 
understand that "merely providing expertise" is, in fact, a powerful move that can 
significantly influence the framing, and thus the direction and shape, of the subsequent
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proceedings. For them, the distinction between their role as technical advisors and 
their role as "orchestrators of engagement" has ceased to be meaningful.
A core component of EA practice is what I call trust-work. EA's understand that 
they must earn the trust of their clients and collaborators in order to establish their 
credibility as experts, liaisons and facilitators. Such trust is not only a prerequisite for 
building the rapport for a functional working relationship within which to enact one's 
expertise; it is constitutive of expert credibility itself. The critical importance of trust-work is 
evident in the work of EA's in Tōhoku, in both their successes and failures. Trust-work 
itself involves a number of practices, including "face-work" in both the Giddens and 
Goﬀman senses, as well as strategic exploitation of shared experiences and negotiation 
of social identities, charting and navigating the local socio-political landscape, and 
diligent management of secrets and sensitive information. Many EA practices do 
"double-duty" — they do credibility-building trust-work while simultaneously helping 
EA's to fulfill their distinctive roles as liaisons and knowledge contextualizers. For 
example, these include physically relocating to their clients' locale in order to immerse 
themselves in local culture and daily life (not unlike an ethnographer) as well as the 
practice of machi-aruki, whereby EA's walk with their clients through the latter's 
physical and mental memory spaces in order to soak up local knowledge of place, 
practice and "lifescape."
In this narrative thus far, PRP experts, and EA's more broadly, have all been 
described roughly as kinds of technical experts that additionally develop the peculiar 
expertise of engagement and integrate their "technical" knowledge and competence 
with that "engagement" know-how. However, at least one prominent case in Tōhoku 
demonstrates powerfully that a technical specialty, conventionally conceived, need not 
be a prerequisite to becoming an engagement agent. Untrained "non-experts," too, 
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can pro-actively learn and gain fluency in technical, legal and institutional frameworks 
and knowledge, as well as practice and gain competence in the know-how of 
engagement, all while retaining the perspectives and knowledge of their local, non-
expert peers. The trust-value of their shared knowledge and social identity 
automatically gives them a credibility advantage with those peers, although this does 
not obviate the need for them to perform trust-work with local peers as well as oﬃcials 
and (other) experts. The Shintō priestess Mayumi Kudō is an exemplar of such a 
"homegrown" EA, who has earned widespread credibility as a PRP and machi-zukuri 
expert in her own right, while "orchestrating" a variety of engagement exercises and 
leading innovative local planning initiatives rooted in the local history, culture, and 
environment of Minami-Sanriku. As a kind of self-made machi-zukuri expert and 
engagement agent, Kudō is a model of proactive citizen engagement in sociotechnical 
change.2
To briefly summarize this summary of the dissertation, Kobe's recovery from a 
devastating earthquake in 1995 saw the construction of a new kind of expert field in 
participatory recovery planning, combining conventionally "technical" expertise with a
peculiar expertise in "public engagement." Its practitioners are currently performing 
crucial roles in facilitating PRP through machi-zukuri and similar organizations in post-
tsunami Tōhoku. Observations of this work cast doubt on "deficit models" of both 
experts and non-expert members of the public, as well as the "lay/expert divide" 
implicated by the "mutual deficit disorder"3 collectively implied by the PUS and PES 
literatures — at least with respect to a certain category of expert, epitomized by PRP 
2. Although I would not want to push the "self-made" label too far. Kudō has built her 
expertise, in part, by learning from her experiences and her relationships with established 
PRP experts. Whether or not they intended to teach her, she has learned from them.
3. Thanks to Bruce Lewenstein for this phrasing.
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experts. Drawing upon recent scholarship, I argue that it is fruitful to dub this category
of experts engagement agents — experts who "orchestrate" participatory engagement 
exercises, integrate and contextualize diverse knowledges, and liaise with diverse 
stakeholders and key constituencies. Among the core practices of engagement agents is
the praxis of trust-work, through which they construct and maintain their credibility as 
experts and trustworthiness as moral agents, integrating their several roles. Putatively 
"non-expert" individuals without formal training may, through practice and informal 
study, learn and enact the know-how of EA's, while retaining the social and 
epistemological advantages of "locals."
To reiterate, my point is not to argue merely that "PRP experts equate to 
engagement agents," but rather to suggest that a peculiar class of experts, exemplified 
by PRP experts and crucially concerned with public engagement as a core constitutive 
component of their very expertise, deserves greater recognition and consideration from
scholars of STS and PES. Their work poses interesting ramifications for studies of 
expertise, lay-expert interaction, expert communities, public engagement and broadly 
participatory processes far beyond the realms of urban and recovery planning.
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6.2: Reflection: engagement agents
Advocates of public participation and engagement can take some comfort in 
the emergence of engagement agents in Japan's PRP context, perhaps especially the 
example of Kudō, the Shintō priestess and "homegrown" EA from Minami-Sanriku.4 
But this narrative begs the question: beyond those already described by Conley and te 
Kulve & Rip, what other examples of such EA's can be found elsewhere? This section 
examines possible alternative examples from the current project as well as from 
existing literature, presented roughly in the form of a list  — one which is not remotely 
exhaustive, of course. The point is not to draw hard boundaries around the category 
or to definitively identify which actors "are" or "are not" engagement agents, but 
rather to indicate cases, worthy of consideration and discussion, which might seem to 
fit the EA category in certain significant ways, thereby illustrating the portability of the 
concept and gesturing toward important questions raised by its articulation (discussed 
in further detail in the following section).
For example, Neguchi, the local leader of Tadakoshi District in Karakuwa, 
may appear to be fulfilling the role of engagement agent. Neguchi conducted his own 
recovery planning survey, arranged for the participation of Nozaki's team, helps to 
"orchestrate" engagement activities by planning, gathering and helping to run takadai-
iten meetings, and liaises with residents, PRP experts, and oﬃcials. As a participant and
part-time leader of those meetings, Neguchi has picked up much of the grammar and 
4. Kudō is a powerful case for illustrating my argument. Admittedly, my narrative relies 
heavily upon her as the prime exemplar. She is an extraordinary individual in many ways, 
and it may reasonably be asked to what degree is Kudō an outlying exception rather than 
a representative case. Below, I consider other actors who could be analyzed analogously as
"homegrown" engagement agents. Not having conducted a broader survey of more 
communities and actors, I cannot say definitively how representative (or not) Kudō's case 
is. Nevertheless, even a single clear-cut case such as Kudō's proves the possibility for such 
cases to exist. The very existence of that possibility is the key point.
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vocabulary of recovery, pertaining, e.g., to the built environment, legalities and 
political institutions involved. On the other hand, if Neguchi performs any particular 
trust-work, it is less obvious than that conducted by Nozaki, for example. He is already
relatively secure in his position as a respected leader within his district. On the other 
hand, Nozaki's alliance with Neguchi may do a kind of mutually reinforcing trust-work
for both of them — Neguchi's imprimatur gives Nozaki credibility with other residents 
of the district, while Neguchi's success in recruiting an experienced expert such as 
Nozaki for the residents' recovery planning fortifies his position as a leader and 
caretaker of the district. Likewise, Neguchi's acts of leadership, such as arranging for 
nomi-nication dinner parties, as well as mediating (along with Nozaki) PRP meetings, 
reinforce his credibility and trustworthiness. Though he, like other participants in the 
planning meetings, has learned a great deal about the technicalities of recovery 
planning, he is not recognized as a PRP expert in his own right (as opposed to Kudō, 
for example). His activities are relatively limited to supporting the reconstruction 
eﬀorts of his own district. Thus, he exhibits many traits of EA's, but is less of a clear-cut
example than Kudō.
Kuniaki Baba, of the Baba District in Karakuwa (named for his family), 
represents another possible "homegrown" EA. Baba runs a small waste-disposal 
company. Nearly retired, he lost his house due to damage from the tsunami and now 
lives in the small cottage that had previously served as his storage shed. From there he 
runs a small empire, coordinating the eﬀorts of a network of young volunteers, mostly 
college students, from Tokyo and other parts of Japan. He counts more than two 
thousand volunteers who have passed through his network and tiny home. A key 
aspect of Baba's mission has been to ensure that the volunteers' work is properly 
contextualized and informed by a historical and cultural understanding of Karakuwa. 
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Their work began as body-searching and debris-clearing, progressed through cleaning 
and reconstruction work, and has evolved into arts and business stimulation projects as
well as kokoro-keah, or psychosocial recovery through social work. Baba asserts that 
none of this can be done properly without a grounding in the local history and culture,
an understanding of local religious beliefs and shrine and temple sites, and experience 
of local rituals and life practices. 
I think that volunteer work which is close to local people will not last long if the 
volunteers don't know about the history of the area they are helping. One of the ways 
they can learn about the history of the area is to go to the shrines and listen to the 
Shintō priests. Listening to stories about the origins of those shrines is a starting point 
for knowing the history of the area. There is a history which you cannot discover in 
history books. 5
Thus, Baba takes it upon himself to provide this grounding in local knowledge 
to the volunteers who stream through his home every few weeks. Baba thus liaises with
multiple groups (volunteers, shrine priests, residents) and proactively seeks to help the 
volunteers contextualize their own knowledge with local knowledge. As with Neguchi 
and Nozaki, Baba's sponsorship of an army of volunteers fortifies his position as a 
leader and caretaker of his community, while the volunteers gain local credibility from 
their association with him. How much of the volunteers' work or "expertise" would be 
considered "technoscientific" is an open question.6
If Baba may be considered an EA, what about other local coordinators of the 
vast range of activities that comprise the work of "recovery"? Tadae Kikuta, for 
5. K. Baba interview (April 2012).
6. What counts as "technical" or "non-technical" is a heavy question, beyond the scope of 
this discussion. Yet, it crucially underlies judgments about diﬀerent types of know-how and
"expertise."
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example, works at the Kesennuma Volunteer Station, where Takasago also worked. In
a nutshell, his duties comprise connecting needy residents with appropriate 
resources — introducing them to individuals, companies, or agencies that can provide 
services such as financial support, debris clearance, construction, legal advice, and so 
on. At the same time, he helps to direct volunteers from outside Kesennuma to the 
locations and tasks most appropriate for their skills, where they are most needed. His 
work requires extensive knowledge of local conditions throughout Kesennuma, and he 
coordinates collaborations between various actors. In addition, he has toured other 
disaster sites in Japan (Kobe, Chūetsu) to study the process of recovery in those areas. 
However, while some of his collaborators deal with quite esoteric knowledge, he 
himself is not recognized as a technical expert of any kind. He is primarily a connector 
of people with other people and resources. Moreover, it is unclear if he engages in any 
critical trust-work beyond that common to all humans qua social actors.7 Because I 
argue that EA's are a peculiar kind of technical expert, and because I further argue 
that trust-work is a constitutive practice of engagement agents' construction of 
expertise, I would be disinclined to describe Kikuta as an EA.
In the STS and PES literatures, there are numerous examples of candidates for
the category of engagement agent. Perhaps the most obviously germane example is the
"VAC women" of the Dutch Women's Advisory Committees on Housing (abbreviated 
as "VAC" in the Dutch language), described by Bijker & Bijsterveld. They write that, 
just as Kobe had been uniquely fertile ground for the cultivation of machi-zukuri 
associations and their use as the practical and institutional locale for participatory 
recovery planning, heavily devastated, postwar Rotterdam was uniquely fertile ground 
7. Q.v., the discussion in the following section about the "mundane" practices of reflexivity 
and trust-work.
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for the germination of the VAC's.8 As with the pre-disaster roots of PRP, the historical 
roots of the advisory committees began before the devastation of Rotterdam, but the 
first VAC was established just after the war in 1946. Since the vast quantities of public 
housing then being designed and constructed were drafted and built by men, and since
housewives were considered "the most important users of [the] new dwellings," the 
purpose of the VAC's was to provide a vehicle for these users, untrained female 
citizens, to oﬀer opinions and advice on the layout and construction of these homes. 
Working with architects and planners, the women integrated their experience and 
"local" knowledge (as housewives, mothers, workers etc.) into plans, as exemplified in a
parable-like "story... often told in VAC circles," that reads like an object lesson about 
the value of local knowledge: 
During a meeting with an architect, a VAC woman in Terneuzen resolved the 
problem of a drafty outside gallery in an apartment building for the elderly by taking a
pair of scissors (the woman was a tailor by profession), cutting up the architect's plan, 
and rearranging it so that the gallery ended up on the inside. The architect followed 
the advice.9  
Over time, the advisory committees have become increasingly organized and 
institutionalized, their oﬃcers and members more formally knowledgeable about 
architecture and assessment, and their practices increasingly standardized and 
formalized:
Since 1967 the advisory committees have carried out comprehensive "housing quality 
inquiries".... They advise on housing in city plans as early in the process of planning, 
8. Bijker & Bijsterveld (2000), p. 492.
9. ibid., p. 501.
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designing, and building as possible. The committees evaluate plans according to 
specific checklists, visit building sites..., and sometimes participate in building teams, 
together with commissioners, architects, and contractors. Some enter into contracts 
with municipalities and housing corporations to specify the occasions on which they 
will seek the committee's advice. The committees always produce written reports and 
also sometimes meet with architects and designers, commissioners, and municipal 
services to discuss plans. Two years after the completion of a housing project, VAC 
members visit the project again, evaluating the quality of their own suggestions and 
checking the extent to which they were implemented. The VACs use these visits to 
revise the checklists that used to evaluate new housing projects.10
In 1997, they "dropped all modesty and presented a comprehensive guide to checking 
the quality of housing plans."11 In addition, Bijker & Bijsterveld note that the VAC's 
have played significant roles in larger policy discussions around public housing in the 
Netherlands, including involvement in the drafting of government guidelines. 
Bijker & Bijsterveld further note that "the advisory committees employ a 
spectrum of micro-political strategies" that amount to what I've described as trust-
work: "presenting comments in a positive rather than a critical sense; declining to 
boast of successes; ... not stressing a feminist perspective; focusing on small, concrete, 
technical improvements; and emphasizing the functional and eﬃcient rather than the 
aesthetic and the grandiose."12
Bijker & Bijsterveld describe a range of roles for women in individual advisory 
committees and their umbrella organization, such that it would be impossible to say 
that all participants in this large-scale enterprise "are engagement agents" (or not). 
However, it seems clear that at least some of them meet a number of the criteria that I 
10. ibid., p. 499-500.
11. ibid., p. 503.
12. ibid., p. 506.
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have noted characterize engagement agents: they integrate local and technical 
knowledge; they liaise between diﬀerent groups, including non-expert residents and 
established, expert planners and architects; and they engage in trust-work that is 
crucial to the eﬀectiveness of these tasks. 
Other examples of possible EA's can be found in classic studies of STS and 
PES literature. For example, Brown's work on "lay epidemiology" portrays the 
strategies, both systematic and ad hoc, used by non-expert members of a community to 
identify and come to grips with toxic waste contamination.13 These strategies include 
assembling knowledge of the local environment and public health issues in the 
community; liaising with government oﬃcials and certified scientific experts about the 
issue; studying and learning the relevant medical, ecological and legal fields; working 
with scientists to conduct their own research; litigating claims in court; and pushing 
oﬃcial experts and agencies to publicly recognize the nature of the problem and, 
ultimately, make appropriate policy changes. 
Lee & Roth describe a not dissimilar process by which communities collectively
learn about local environmental issues, by interacting with each other and with 
scientific experts, as well as directly with their environment through a machi-aruki-like 
process of walking together through their local woods or watershed.14 In the accounts 
of both Brown and Lee & Roth, communities of lay people are seen integrating their 
knowledge of local conditions with technoscientific knowledge and organizing 
collective "engagement" exercises (e.g., deliberating technical issues with each other 
and with scientists, litigating claims, walking through their environment). Also in both 
accounts, the citizens of these communities do substantial trust-work in order to 
13. Brown (1987, 1990, 1992).
14. Lee & Roth (2003), Roth (2004).
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construct their credibility with certified experts, oﬃcial agencies, and the wider non-
expert public.
Like them, the protagonists in Epstein's studies of AIDS activists performed 
extensive trust-work.15 Not only did they learn about the content of the science of 
AIDS, they learned to speak in the idioms and use the "body language"16 of the 
relevant fields of virology and micro-immunobiology, so that they could directly and 
credibly engage researchers and policy-makers, while simultaneously leveraging their 
existing know-how and mobilizing political power in order to influence policy 
decisions. On the other hand, the price of their hard-won credibility with the 
establishment was a perception that they had "sold out" or "crossed to the dark 
side" — a kind of betrayal of their social identity as lay activists, the consequence of 
which was an erosion of trustworthiness among their (former) "lay" colleagues. Thus, 
they subsequently had to work to reassure their (erstwhile) peers of their sincerity and 
trustworthiness. This is a reminder that trust-work is context- and audience-
dependent; moreover, credibility and trustworthiness are not always synonymous, nor 
always constructed in parallel. These activists' eﬀorts successfully influenced the 
production of knowledge about the disease — particularly its etiology — and changed 
the way in which patients were treated or selected for clinical trials. Indeed, they 
exhibited many of the traits I have described as characteristic of engagement agents.
All of these groups just described — untrained or informally trained 
"laypeople" who organized, deliberated, interacted with experts and oﬃcials, increased
their know-how, integrated local with technical knowledge, and conducted trust-work 
to build their credibility and legitimize their ways of knowing — make good candidates
15. Epstein (1995, 1996).
16. Wynne (1992, 1996).
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for the "engagement agent" category. It seems that "homegrown" EA's are prominent 
in PES literature. What about "technical experts" such as scientists and engineers?
The majority of such experts described in the literature, such as Wynne's 
"bureaucrats and experts," are portrayed as "unreflexive" anti-engagement agents. 
However, there are some exceptions. For example, Wilma Subra is an environmental 
chemist and toxicologist in Louisiana who helps small communities to learn about 
their local environmental conditions and to make decisions about whether to fight 
existing or proposed industrial installations.17 She goes to each community once or 
twice a month, gathers the residents and teaches them about "the science," while the 
residents themselves collectively produce local knowledge about key sites (wells, bodies 
of water, schools) and neighbors' health conditions. Subra visits these sites with 
residents, and they gather chemical and environmental data together. Like Brown's 
and Epstein's actors, over time the residents are able to confront oﬃcials and industrial
representatives "on their own turf," using the data, language, and forms of presentation
of the dominant technical ways of knowing. Subra works to gain the community's trust 
as both a credible scientific expert and a moral agent, and then helps the residents 
themselves to build their own credibility other experts and the public at large.
Like Subra, the "residential experts" in Sato's Integrated Local Environmental 
Knowledge (ILEK) project, described in Chapter 4, help their communities to 
integrate local and technical knowledge of their environment. By relocating into their 
communities for long-term research projects, engaging with local residents daily, and 
unhurriedly learning about the local history, culture and social landscape, these 
"residential researchers" recruit and contextualize knowledge while also cultivating the 
17. Allen (1999, 2003).
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community's trust.18
Focusing upon the "liminal liaison" aspect of engagement agents, we might ask 
whether the Federal Aviation Authority's Designated Engineering Representatives 
(DER's), or their advisors, "count" as EA's. Downer argues that the increasing 
sophistication of aviation technology and complexity of aircraft over the past several 
decades has left the FAA woefully understaﬀed and incapable of conducting aviation 
safety testing itself; therefore, it designates DER's from among senior engineers at 
aircraft manufacturers to oversee these tests and communicate the results back to the 
FAA. The DER's themselves are managed by "a cadre of specialist DER advisors."19 
Thus, the DER's and their advisors are liaisons in a system that abstracts engineering 
knowledge from the esoteric know-how of thousands of engineers, each working on a 
highly specific part of an aircraft, to the mid-level systems engineers, to higher level 
engineering managers, the DER's and their advisors, and on up to bureaucrats at the 
FAA. The DER's and their advisors must integrate highly technical, esoteric 
knowledge of engineering and aviation safety testing with the standards, procedures, 
and idioms of the federal regulatory bureaucracy. Rather than "orchestrating 
engagement" and integrating "local" knowledge with "technical" knowledge, they seem
to be mediating between diﬀerent forms of specialized know-how. Hence, although 
there is some overlap, they seem to lack a number of the qualities constitutive of 
engagement agents as I have defined them.
Might the participants in so-called "citizen science" projects — perhaps more 
accurately described as public participation in scientific research (PPSR)20 — be 
18. Sato (2012).
19. Downer (2006), p. 131.
20. Bonney et al (2009).
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considered engagement agents? In many of these initiatives, a team of scientists 
conceives and organizes a research project in which relatively large numbers of 
untrained, non-expert people help to perform some of the research tasks — akin to 
"crowdsourced" scientific research. Depending on the range of agency allowed to the 
"lay" participants, these are classified by Bonney et al. as either "contributory" or 
"collaborative" project models.21 In 2006 there were 150-200 such "citizen science" 
projects accessible on the Internet (most of them "contributory"),22 and that number 
has exploded to multiple thousands of projects in 2013. There is tremendous diversity 
among projects — even, to some degree, within indivdual projects. Thus, definitive 
consideration of either "citizen" participants or scientist organizers as possible 
"engagement agents" must be conducted case by case. Nevertheless, some general 
observations are possible. In the crowdsourced "contributory projects", for example, 
the scientists who design and manage the project try to do the reverse of integrating 
participants' local knowledge into the projects' research results; that is, they devise 
protocols designed specifically to excise any non-standard knowledge and to exclude 
alternative ways of knowing from "polluting" their data. Ironically, this requires a 
certain understanding of what kinds of local knowledge or alternative ways of knowing 
might impinge upon the collection and flow of clean data. In other words, the scientists
orchestrating PPSR projects must manage their "lay" data collectors or collaborators 
in order to manage their data by proxy. To put it yet another way, the "citizens" are a 
collective instrument, to be calibrated by "social and literary technologies."23 Such 
calibration requires feedback, which may be collected through surveys or interviews 
21. A third class, "co-created," is described below.
22. Vaughan (2006, 2009).
23. Cf. Shapin (1984), Shapin & Schaﬀer (1985).
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with project participants. As with any scientific instrument, the better that scientists 
understand their instrument, the more eﬀectively they can calibrate and manage it for 
their research. Thus, the scientists managing these projects have become increasingly 
interested in, and sophisticated at, studying the "citizen" participants in their research. 
This is why I have previously argued that, regardless of whether they are 
astrophysicists or ornithologists by training, many organizing scientists have, in eﬀect, 
become social scientists in order to conduct their research on birds or on galaxies24. 
Still, the range of knowledge they work with is relatively narrow, and the depth of 
interaction with lay participants is relatively shallow. Moreover, they do not appear to 
engage in any crucial trust-work, as they simply allow willing participants to sign up, 
typically on a website. Thus, I would hesitate to classify these scientists as engagement 
agents. 
A third class of "co-created" projects entails much greater public involvement. 
In these projects, "citizens" work side-by-side with scientists on all aspects of the 
project, including the formulation of the research question or issue to be investigated. 
The "co-created" category may also include participatory action research. In at least 
some of these projects, might both the scientists and the "lay" participants be 
considered engagement agents? After all, they engage in mutual learning, mutual trust-
work, and they "orchestrate engagement," even if the ambit of that engagement may 
be somewhat confined to specific scientific questions. Nevertheless, to answer those 
questions sometimes requires knowledge of, for example, the intricacies of local 
habitats, ecology, or other local knowledge that might aﬀect, say, the mobility and 
behavior of certain animal species. In that sense, "lay citizens" work together with 
scientists to "co-create" research projects that integrate this local knowledge with more 
24. Vaughan (2009).
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esoteric technoscientific know-how in order to produce credible scientific knowledge. 
In such projects, the two groups engage in collaborative learning — "lay citizens" learn
scientific knowledge and specialized techniques for conducting scientific research, 
while scientists learn some of the local knowledge of their lay collaborators. It is 
unclear what is the specific role of trust-work within such projects; thus, it is diﬃcult to 
call their coordinators engagement agents, although some characteristics do appear to 
overlap.
The examples considered here are just a few of the numerous possibilities that 
could be considered as candidates for the engagement agent category or role. The 
reader may surely think of others. Professional facilitators, focus group moderators, 
and community organizers, for example, all liaise with multiple individuals, groups and
stakeholders, "orchestrate" mutual engagement, and attempt to bring diﬀerent 
perspectives and knowledges into dialogue with each other. Other social movement 
activists may share many traits with those described by Brown, Epstein, or others, and 
may appear to be prime candidates — particularly those whose focus relates to 
environment, health, technological infrastructure, or other technoscientific fields. Are 
such groups examples of engagement agents? How should interested scholars proceed 
when considering analyzing such groups as EA's? What kinds of traits or practices 
should they look for? Engagement agents integrate multiple knowledges, including 
"local" and "technical"; liaise and facilitate "engagement" between diﬀerent groups, 
including non-experts and established experts; and they engage in trust-work that is 
crucial to the eﬀectiveness of these tasks. Bracketing the diﬃcult question of precisely 
how to recognize "technical" knowledge, such recognition is nevertheless important for
identifying engagement agents as I have described them. Thus, it is important to note 
whether or not a particular group of community organizers, say, deals with technical 
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issues and integrates technical knowledge with local community knowledge. While the 
liaison and engagement facilitation roles seem relatively straightforward, identifying 
and analyzing trust-work may not seem so. On the one hand, I have acknowledged 
that, as with reflexivity, all humans engage in some form of trust-work as a constitutive 
practice of their social nature. On the other hand, I have appealed to Shapin's 
description of infinite potentiality and variety of practices for constructing credibility. 
So, how are scholars to identify what practices of trust-work are analytically interesting
or important?
I will answer this question in two ways: first, by proposing a rule of thumb; 
second, by briefly reviewing some specific examples of trust-work strategies employed 
by the actors in this dissertation. Here is the rule: a particular practice becomes 
analytically significant qua trust-work simply when it contributes substantially to 
constructing the credibility or trustworthiness of an actor in a way that is instrumental 
to the actor's specific role in a given context.25 Of course, many of these practices may 
apply to an array of actors in a wide variety of situations. Hence the necessity for 
specifying exactly in what way the practice in question does work for a particular actor
in a particular situation (trust-work of whom and for what, to echo Shapin). For example, 
"face-work" in Goﬀman's sense is fundamental to interpersonal communication; in the 
sense described by Giddens, it is crucial for mediating trust relations between 
individuals and institutions. Likewise, it will behoove any actor entering a social 
landscape in which tensions and rivalries exist among diﬀerent local groups to read 
and navigate that landscape as conscientiously as possible. Many actors may find 
themselves in a position in which it will be necessary to manage secrets and sensitive 
25. Note that, while I argue that trust-work is crucial to engagement agents in particular, other
actors may also perform trust-work for their own purposes. This concept is not restricted 
to the engagement agent role or context.
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information. And strategically forging alliances as well as exploiting social identity, 
background or institutional aﬃliation are also common ways to inspire trust and 
quickly strengthen bonds with new contacts — as is enjoying food, drink, and a 
conversation together. Similarly, it may make sense to display ostentatiously that one is
paying close attention to the needs of clients and patrons by vocally acknowledging 
and echoing their sentiments. I have described all of these practices, and more, on the 
part of engagement agents in this dissertation. One could, without much diﬃculty, 
point to similar work on the part of certain professional facilitators or focus group 
moderators in their own spheres. However, as noted, the crucial analytical move is to 
specify exactly how and why any of these practices do work for the facilitators or 
moderators enacting them, and why they are especially important for their particular 
work as engagement agents. For example, I have noted that the post-disaster context is
redolent with loss and the risk of additional loss, as well as competition for resources 
that are either unusually scarce or unusually abundant for a very limited time. These 
conditions lead to a widespread sense of vulnerability and threat, as well as tensions 
among diﬀerent groups, even within the same communities. For these reasons, certain 
kinds of trust-work are especially important, and particularly eﬀective, for the 
engagement agents working with hisaisha and other residents of the disaster zone. For 
instance, conveying their shared experience and social identities as fellow hisaisha who 
successfully lived through their own disaster recovery demonstrates that they 
profoundly understand the locals' concerns and anxieties and that they know how to 
address their vulnerabilities. That may include handling sensitive information with 
special care, and maintaining their own "face" as well as that of local collaborators (per
Goﬀman). And the post-disaster tensions among local groups makes navigating local 
politics essential to establishing the space within which they have freedom to perform 
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their work as liaisons. Though here briefly summarized, these are the kinds of 
empirical specificities that scholars need to describe in order to analyze the work of one
group of engagement agents or another.
284
6.3: Reflexivities: the varieties of expertise
The foregoing selective catalog of actors and their eligibility for consideration 
as engagement agents serves to illustrate both the power of the category to draw 
analogies between disparate actors in diverse cases as well as the conceptual challenges
in doing so, as is always the case in the construction and use of such categories in 
qualitative analysis. These challenges do not (necessarily) undermine the analytical 
usefulness of the concept so much as they productively serve to illustrate dilemmas 
inherent in any consideration of "expertise," particularly vis-á-vis "engagement" with 
"lay publics." In this section, I want to discuss these challenges, dilemmas and 
questions, and their consequences for this analysis and for studies of expertise more 
broadly.
 I have claimed PRP experts as exemplars of engagement agents, a special kind
of "technical expert" who integrates diverse knowledges, liaises among diverse 
constituencies, and constantly constructs and reconstructs "expertise" through trust-
work. Had I simply stopped my analysis with the portrayal of Kobe's PRP experts and 
concocted my own label for them, the resulting picture would have been relatively 
unambiguous. These experts had begun their careers with training and experience in, 
mostly, specialized fields of built-environment design and engineering, and had later 
acquired know-how and experience in various aspects of "public engagement," thereby
becoming "a new breed of specialists." However, by adapting te Kulve & Rip's concept
of engagement agents as "orchestrators of engagement," plus Conley's concept of EA's 
as representative, reflexivity-catalyzing "embedded humanists," and arguing that 
Kobe's PRP experts exemplify this peculiar kind of expert, I highlighted important 
connections and expanded the category of these new specialists in a way that makes 
the category both more broadly applicable as an analytic and, perhaps, somewhat less 
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plainly defined. Nevertheless, I went still further, and argued that not all EA's begin 
their life cycle as technical specialists in the pupae phase, only growing their colorful 
wings of "engagement expertise" through a subsequent process of metaphorphosis; 
rather, some EA's develop their colors early and only later become recognized as 
"technical experts" as well, à la Shintō priestess Mayumi Kudō. The narrative arc of 
argumentation in this dissertation has thus been one of progressive, centrifugal 
expansion (and thus, to some degree, complication) of the conceptualization of this 
"new breed of specialists." Now I have added the brief case descriptions in the previous
section, which raise questions about the specific mix of characteristics that are 
important for experts in general, technical experts in particular, and especially for 
engagement agents and perhaps other kinds of experts with similar know-how and 
experience for public engagement. 
For example, of the several characteristics of engagement agents that I have 
described, are all of them necessary for inclusion in the category? Are just some of 
them suﬃcient? If so, which ones? For example, to what extent is "technical expertise" 
important for EA's? Further, to break that interrogative molecule into its constituent 
atoms, how important is specialized, "technical" know-how versus recognition as an 
expert? Some of the actors I've described seem to be more "expert" than others; some 
more attuned to local conditions than others; some more prolific "orchestrators" than 
others; some more active trust-workers than others. For example, while Kudō is widely
recognized as an expert on machi-zukuri and recovery planning, her knowledge of 
planning and architecture may be less detailed than that of the trained PRP experts 
from Kobe. Does this indicate that there is still a place within all this for a conception 
of know-how akin to the "Third Wave" of Collins & Evans? According to that 
conception of expertise-as-productive-knowledge, Kudō would be classified as 
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"having" contributory expertise like Nozaki or Kobayashi, because her work is 
substantially aﬀecting the recovery planning processes — including deliberations by 
the public, by other PRP experts, by government oﬃcials, by major contractors like 
Pacific Consultants — and will likely influence the outcomes of those processes, 
including the material form of her town. Yet there is something qualitatively diﬀerent 
about the nature of her expertise and her work compared to that of, say, Nozaki or 
Chibata. Indeed, the same could be said of the local residents participating in PRP 
meetings, even the least superficially "expert" among them: their participation is 
having a material influence on the process and its outcomes (even if these are 
ultimately circumscribed by political or institutional constraints). Thus, by the 
definition of Collins & Evans, they can be said to have achieved "contributory 
expertise," even though their own particular contribution clearly diﬀers from that of 
Kudō or from Kobe's built-environment specialists. The cases described in the 
previous section present an even more qualitatively diverse set of ways of enacting 
expertise. Thus, the "Third Wave" conception of expertise seems useful to an extent, 
but limited; it does not tell the whole story about what "expertise" is, nor how to 
understand its role in processes of sociotechnical change involving public engagement.
Furthermore, analyzing "expertise" as a singular entity that can be grandly 
theorized tacks toward an essentialist perspective that I eschew, and belies what is 
perhaps the most evident conclusion to draw from the foregoing cases: there are simply
a variety of ways of being an "expert" or enacting "expertise." In this, that abstract 
something called "expertise" reflects its constituent quality of "truthfulness" or 
credibility. I invoke Shapin once again:
The procedures for establishing truthfulness are inchoate; they are not formalized; 
and, perhaps, they are not formalizable.... In principle, there is no limit to the 
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considerations that might be relevant to securing credibility, and therefore, no limit to 
the considerations to which the analyst... might give attention.... Any aspect of the 
scene in which credibility is accomplished may prove to be relevant, and the relevance
of nothing can be ruled out in advance of empirical inquiry.... [Therefore,] the 
description or explanation of credibility has got to specify the credibility of what and for 
whom.26
If "expertise" broadly comprises, as I have argued, a mix of knowledge, 
practice and — crucially — socially ascribed authority, with the latter fundamentally 
built upon a foundation of credibility, then just as "there is no limit to" the variety of 
ways of constructing credibility, there must also be "no limit to" the variety of ways of 
enacting expertise or being an expert. Therefore, "the description or explanation of 
[expertise] has got to specify the [expertise] of what and for whom" — or of whom and for 
what. This has been the aim of the empirical study of Kudō and Kobe's PRP experts 
throughout this dissertation.
A strength of the engagement agent concept as described in this dissertation is 
that it characterizes EA's, a special class of experts, in terms of their peculiar way of 
constructing their credibility, their trust-work. Because of the nature of the work of 
"engagement" — including representing residents, eliciting broad participation, 
liaising with authorities, and so on — establishing trustworthiness as moral agents is, 
for them, just as critical as establishing their credibility as authoritatively 
knowledgeable and practically capable specialists.
As with credibility, another characteristic that has been central to discussions in
PES literature vis-á-vis "expertise" is reflexivity. Wynne has described an inverse law of
"reflexivity" and power: the more powerful the actor or institution, the less reflexive he
26. Shapin (1995b), p.259-261; italics in the original.
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or she or it tends to be.27 However, as noted in Chapter 1, Lynch argues cogently that 
there simply is no such thing as an unreflexive social actor, as some form of reflexivity 
is necessarily implicit in all human communication.28 Moreover, "reflexivity" seems 
implicit in human understanding as well, in that learning through analogical processes 
enatils a kind of reflexivity. Thus, one might say that diﬀerent ways of knowing entail 
diﬀerent "ways of reflexivizing."29 Lynch describes a veritable menagerie of diﬀerent 
"kinds" of reflexivity, or rather, diﬀerent interpretations of the concept, depending 
upon context.  An analytically significant implication of Lynch's argument is that the 
("unreflexive") PES portrayal of "reflexive" lay people and "unreflexive" experts might 
fruitfully be replaced with more nuanced considerations of the specific, situated ways 
in which diﬀerent groups practice, or fail to practice, distinct forms of reflexive 
discourse and action. 
Accordingly, the distinction between engagement agents and other, more 
conventionally construed (often state-aligned) experts appears to comprise, in part, 
diﬀerences between their respective ways of being reflexive, rather than between being 
reflexive vs. being UN-reflexive.30 For example, the engineer Chibata, as described in 
Chapter 5, exhibits simple reflexivity in the sense of communicatory self-awareness — 
he edits and modifies his speech patterns in a way that he believes is appropriate for 
communicating technical ideas to a lay audience. Kudō actually does not appear to 
27. Wynne (1993), p. 337: "simple law of reflexivity — reflexivity is inversely proportional to 
power." Cf. Wynne (2008), p. 24.
28. Lynch (2000).
29. If one were inclined toward such tortured locutions.
30. In a sense, this echoes Shapin's call for specificity in analyses of credibility construction 
(roughly, trust-work, in my lingo): because trust and belief are crucial to any social 
relationship, trying to establish or sustain one's credibility with our interlocutors, partners, 
companions, allies, enemies, etc., is a project in which we are all mundanely but crucially 
engaged ad infinitum, to some degree.
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modify her speech much at all, so in this instance and in this particular sense 
of "reflexivity," the engineer may actually appear to be "more" reflexive.31 Kudō 
exhibits a diﬀerent kind of reflexivity in the way that she considers multiple sources of 
knowledge (from oﬃcial engineers, PRP experts, local lore, and so on) and integrates 
them into her proposals, and in the way that she monitors her own proposals vis-à-vis 
the likely receptiveness of diﬀerent audiences (oﬃcials, fellow residents). The transcript 
of the discussion among Nozaki, Komori, and other participants of the fukkō juku in 
Chapter 2 demonstrates other kinds of reflexivity, as the discussants consider the value 
of their Kobe experience vis-á-vis Tōhoku, as well as the most appropriate way to 
apply it or communicate it. Further, they openly question the nature of their mission 
and their methods, musing about the purposes of the fukkō juku and even machi-zukuri 
more broadly. The discussion thus concretely demonstrates "reflexivity" as a 
collaborative practice, enacted by a group. Something similar occurs during PRP 
meetings in Tōhoku when, for example, local residents wonder aloud about the 
additional risks incurred by the policy of takadai-iten (relocation to high ground) or by 
the raising of huge levees far above the water level of local streams. (In that case, such 
reflexive ponderings are quickly suppressed or dismissed as unproductive or even 
absurd in the given climate of general expectations and the institutionalized 
predilections of authorities.)
The bottom line is that, as Lynch argues, there are multiple ways of enacting 
"reflexivity." Likewise, there are multiple varieties of "expertise." A core argument of 
this dissertation has been a critique against the deficit model of "unreflexive" and 
contextually insensitive experts. At least one class of "expert," engagement agents, 
31. While it is not inconceivable that Kudō's more direct, "natural" style of communication 
may be the result of a reflexively strategic choice, it was completely consistent with her 
communicative style in all of my interactions with her.
290
contravene this model by demonstrating precisely the opposite — they exhibit multiple
forms of self-critical reflexivity while expressly seeking to integrate local contextual 
information with their work. The broader lesson is that, just as there is diversity among
lay publics, neither is it the case that all experts are the same — nor all forms of 
"expertise." If STS and PES are to move beyond the ground-breaking studies of 
experts and expertise that have helped to establish them as vital fields of inquiry, 
scholars in these fields must return to closely observed studies of the local, of empirical 
cases, while avoiding the temptation to generate grand, just-so theories about the 
nature of their objects (and actors) of inquiry. While theories such as the "Third Wave"
of Collins & Evans may usefully capture some aspect of "expertise," they are not — 
and cannot be — comprehensive. "Expertise" is not, for example, solely about the 
production, use, or communication of "knowledge." There are, additionally, as many 
ways of "being an expert" or "constructing expertise" as there are of situating practice, 
locating social identity, negotiating credibility, eliciting trust, engaging constituencies, 
or enacting reflexivity.32 This study, of public participation in the sociotechnical 
change of the built environment, indicates that perhaps one way for STS and PES to 
develop the sensitivities necessary to perceive and articulate these varieties is by paying
closer attention to a broader range of "technical" phenomena than the usual suspects 
of esoteric scientific research, emerging technological development, or other forms of 
technoscience as conventionally (and, at times, "unreflexively") conceived.
32. There is, of course, something of an ironic, paradoxical self-contradiction here. The claim 
that "expertise" cannot be theorized as a singular, abstract entity is itself a statement of 
such a theory!
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6.4: Return
You are sitting in the window seat of a Boeing 777 on a trans-Pacific flight 
from Narita to JFK Airport in New York. A small, Japanese woman reads a book 
while shivering under a blanket in the seat next to yours, while an American man, 
whose abdomen spills over the armrests of the aisle seat, is beginning to nod oﬀ in his 
t-shirt and shorts. You watch the white peaks of the northern "Japanese Alps" slide by 
far to the west, as the aircraft tracks up the east coast of Honshu, almost directly above 
the coastal towns of Tōhoku: Fukushima, Sendai, Onagawa, Minami-Sanriku, 
Kesennuma, Otsuchi, Kamaishi, and so many other communities struggling to 
recover. What will become of them? You wonder.
Your plane peels oﬀ toward the east, oﬀ the coast of Hokkaidō. The western 
coast of that northernmost of Japan's islands had suﬀered a tsunami in 1993, two years 
before Kobe's earthquake. The tsunami, generated by a M7.8 earthquake under the 
nearby seabed, had devastated a small island just oﬀ the coast called Okushiri. With 
run-up heights of 12 to 30 meters along its western shore, the tsunami completely 
destroyed two villages at either end of the island, killing nearly 200 people and wiping 
out close to 500 houses.33 Japan's long economic malaise had just begun at the time — 
it had not yet sunk in that this was more than just a temporary recession. The 
government responded to the disaster with over USD $1 billion in construction 
projects, elevating the villages and erecting seawalls of not less than 11 meters, which 
"give the fishing ports behind them the feel of miniature medieval castle towns, with 
fishermen able to reach the sea only through heavy steel gates."34 Since then, both the 
33. Hayashi (1994). The total figures including damage along Hokkaidō's west coast were 239 
killed and 558 houses totally destroyed. Okushiri, close to the epicenter, bore the brunt.
34. Fackler (2012).
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population and economy have declined faster than other rural areas of Japan, and 
Okushiri's fishing industry has virtually collapsed. The mayor and other local residents 
now say they regret the wasteful expenditures on massive construction and wish that 
the government had invested more in new industries and facilities for attracting young 
people. Martin Fackler, a New York Times reporter, quotes the mayor: "We have no 
reserves left, just debt.... Tōhoku should learn from our experiences."35
Okushiri's experience has not escaped the notice of Tōhoku's residents. Kudō:
Because it has been decided that the project must break ground by 2015 in order to 
receive funding, they are trying to go ahead [with construction of the seawalls] without
due consideration. That's why the authorities feel like the voicing of various opinions 
[by residents] is an encumbrance. But the fact is that if we do not consider it 
thoroughly [now], we will absolutely regret it later. We know this because we have 
observed Okushiri. They tell us that our situation is diﬀerent from that of Okushiri. 
But even if it is diﬀerent, people over there regret [the path of their recovery], so it's 
easy for us to imagine that we may also come to regret ours. Even just within 20 years,
they have been able to perceive this, so I think we can say, let's not make those same 
mistakes.36
Part of what is at issue in recovery planning in Tōhoku is not only the 
credibility of diﬀerent kinds of experts, but also the credibility of diﬀerent modes of 
response to disaster risk. Just as Shapin notes that the credibility of certain aspects of 
missile ballistics rested on assumptions that were "enfolded in Cold War military and 
political realities,"37 the credibility of seawalls and breakwaters rest on assumptions that
are “enfolded" in the institutional and political realities of the Japanese "construction 
35. ibid.
36. Kudō interview (March 2013).
37. Shapin (1995b), p. 263.
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state."38 Again to borrow from Shapin: "The political and economic interests mobilized
around the credibility of such [constructions] are massive."39 To continue using 
Shapin's language, large-scale public works construction, as a solution for seemingly 
any significant problem, still enjoys "a congenial credibility-environment"40 in Japan. 
This becomes clearer when alternative responses to (or preparations against) risk, such 
as those proposed by Kudō in Chapter 5, are systematically marginalized or dismissed.
Thus, quite aside from continued fears over the ongoing nuclear crisis in 
Fukushima, there are reasons — historical, political, economic, institutional, cultural,  
perhaps psychological — for skepticism about the ultimate fate of Tōhoku and its long,
arduous recovery to come. Will the region rebound economically, or continue to 
decline? Will its young people return, or continue to emigrate to urban centers? Will 
residents get to live in the kinds of towns and villages they have chosen? Will they 
enjoy their relationship with "nature," or will they be cut oﬀ from their environment 
by gargantuan concrete embankments? Will hundreds of newly (re-)built residential 
areas become vibrant communities, or will they sit empty within 20 years? Will 
residents proudly enjoy the results of hundreds of billions of dollars spent on the 
recovery, or will they regret the results as do the villagers of Okushiri?  
The answers to such questions will depend, in part, upon the eﬀectiveness of 
local, participatory recovery planning processes. If residents can manage the tensions 
within their own ranks, can come together with the aid of engagement agents and PRP
experts such as Kudō or Nozaki, and can forge functional working relationships with 
oﬃcials and contractors, they may be able to overcome the sociotechnical 
38. McCormack (1995, 2002).
39. ibid., p. 263.
40. ibid., p. 264.
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momentum41 of the "construction state" and configure their communities in ways that 
are sustainable, just, resilient, and consonant with their culture, history, lifestyles, and 
wishes. Throughout Tōhoku — indeed, throughout Japan — there are extraordinary 
individuals and groups exerting equally extraordinary eﬀorts to make this happen. 
Thus, there are reasons for hope, perhaps even optimism. It is still early, and the path 
of Tōhoku's recovery remains an open question. 
Given the early and unfinished state of the recovery, it might be argued that 
my decision to drop the "upstream" framing of this case was, in some respects, 
premature. While I maintain that the metaphor of the stream itself is problematic — it 
implies that technological development is linear, predictable, distinct from an 
"external" "society"; and it fails to acknowledge the perspectives of many relevant 
social groups — its great strength is its recognition of the need for anticipatory public 
engagement prior to the closing of black boxes and technological frames or the 
ossification of technological momentum. Certainly, the actors described in this 
dissertation frequently anticipate various short- and long-term futures, whether in 
preparation for possible future disasters, or for reconfiguring their imagined, 
reconstructed community to come. At the same time, the past as history, and as 
memory — of the tsunami itself as well as the long era that violently ended with it — 
weighs heavily on all participants in the recovery: local residents, government oﬃcials, 
PRP experts, contracted engineers, and others involved in planning and 
reconstruction. The past is mentioned as frequently as the future, and the process of 
recovery is a kind of dialectic working-out of the meanings of one and the worth of the 
other.
If Kobe's experience is any guide, the products of Tōhoku's recovery are likely 
41. Cf. the "technological momentum" of Hughes (1969, 1994).
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to be mixed. Some machi-zukuri were more successful than others at imposing their will 
upon the city's recovery plans for their areas. The results depended upon a variety of 
factors, including the strength of the community's social capital, its socioeconomic 
clout, and the eﬀectiveness of its assigned PRP experts. By and large, the shape of the 
city's final recovery strongly resembled the Master Plan it had completed prior to the 
earthquake,  with local, participatory planning having shaped finer details within the 
broad strokes of the city's planners, at least superficially raising doubts about the 
influence and value of public participation in local recovery planning. On the other 
hand, public acceptance of the final plans appeared to be much greater than the initial 
recovery plans unveiled with minimal public input.42 Furthermore, "incremental 
improvements are not less relevant because they are small. It is important not to 
identify technical progress solely with big changes and radical innovations."43 Thus, 
even if Japan's entire northeastern coast becomes encrusted with a thick(er) layer of 
concrete, it may not be completely an occasion for mourning the opportunity for local 
input, if that concrete is  a new type attractive to sea life, if it is covered in greenery, if 
it is complemented by other solutions such as floral tree-lined evacuation routes.
Except for the warm, dim glow of the no-smoking signs and the cold flickering 
of a few video screens, it is dark in the passenger cabin of your 777. Now over the 
northern reaches of the Japan Trench, that subduction zone periodically convulsed by 
violent seizures — a bottom-dweller like the titanic, earthquake-causing, subterranean 
catfish of old Japanese myth — your cruising altitude is roughly equal to the depth of 
the water beneath the atmosphere below. Sleepless in seat 33A, these are your 
42. Olshansky et al (2005), Edgington (2010). The results of UNOP in New Orleans a decade 
later mirrored this outcome. Q.v., Johnson & Olshansky (2010).
43. Bijker & Bijsterveld (2000), p. 501.
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thoughts, as your flight sweeps a great circle toward the east, into the rising sun.
Fig. 6-1: Everyone stops to observe a moment of silence at 2:46 pm on March 11, 2013, at the 
Fukkō Marché temporary shopping center in Shishiori District, Kesennuma. Photo by author 
(March 2013).
297
REFERENCES
Aibar, Eduardo, and Wiebe E. Bijker. 1997. "Constructing a City: The Cerdà Plan for
the Extension of Barcelona." Science, Technology & Human Values 22:3-30.
Akasaka, Norio, Akemi Yamauchi, and Eiji Oguma. 2011. Tōhoku Saisei (Tōhoku 
Rebirth). Tokyo: East Press. 
Akita, Noriko. 2006. "A Study on the Development Process of Machizukuri 
Ordinances." Reports of the City Planning Institute of Japan 7-2: 37–40.
———. 2010. "Case Study on the District Machizukuri Organizations by Kobe-city 
Machizukuri Ordinance." Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan 45: 2.
Akita, Noriko, Koizumi Hideki, and Okata Jun'ichiro. 2004. "A Study on the 
Development Control Through the Rural Community Plans-Case Study on 
the Machizukuri Ordinance of Kobe City, for the Urbanization Control Area."
Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan (39-2/39-3): 39.3,463–468.
Akrich, Madeleine. 1992. "The De-Scription of Technical Objects," in Bijker, Wiebe, 
and John Law (eds). Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical 
Change. The MIT Press.
Allen, Barbara L. 1998. "Women Scientists and Feminist Methodologies in Louisiana's
Chemical Corridor." http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.ark5583.0013.008.
———. 2003. Uneasy Alchemy: Citizens and Experts in Louisiana's Chemical Corridor Disputes. 
The MIT Press.
Allen, Barbara L. and Isabelle T. Maret.  2011. "Rebuilding the Historic Tremé 
Neighborhood: Lessons in the Repatriation of New Orleans," in Dowty, 
Rachel A., and Barbara L. Allen, eds., Dynamics of Disaster: Lessons on Risk, 
Response and Recovery. EarthScan.
Aldrich, Daniel P. 2012. Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery. 
University of Chicago Press.
Anderson, Benedict. 2006 (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, New Edition, Revised. Verso.
Anderson, Ashley A., Jason Delborne, and Daniel Lee Kleinman. 2013. "Information 
beyond the Forum: Motivations, Strategies, and Impacts of Citizen Participants
Seeking Information during a Consensus Conference." Public Understanding of 
Science 22 (8) (November 1): 955–970. 
Andreadakis, E., Kostaki, I., Kapourani, E., Lekkas, E. (2011). "Tohoku 11-3-11: A 
Mega-NaTech Disaster" Environmental Geosciences and Engineering Survey for Territory
Protection and Population Safety (EngeoPro) International conference, Moscow, 46-53.
298
Arnstein, Sherry R. 1969. "A Ladder Of Citizen Participation." Journal of the American 
Institute of Planners 35 (4): 216–224. 
Ashmore, Malcolm. 1989. The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. 
University of Chicago Press.
Balducci, Alessandro, and Raine Mäntysalo. 2013. Urban Planning as a Trading Zone. 
Springer.
Barrios, Roberto. 2010. "Budgets, Plans and Politics: Questioning the Role of Expert 
Knowledge in Disaster Reconstruction." Anthropology News 51 (7) (October 1): 7–
8. 
———.  2011.  "Post-Katrina Neighbourhood Recovery Planning," in Dowty, Rachel 
A., and Barbara L. Allen, eds., Dynamics of Disaster: Lessons on Risk, Response and 
Recovery. EarthScan.
Bauman, Catherine. 1998. Challenge of Land Use Planning After Urban Earthquakes: 
Observations from the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995. Oakland, CA: Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications.
Besley, John C. 2010. "Imagining public engagement." Public Understanding of Science. 
doi: 10.1177/0963662510379792
Bijker, Wiebe E. 1997. Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical 
Change. The MIT Press.
———. 2007a. "American and Dutch Coastal Engineering: Diﬀerences in Risk 
Conception and Diﬀerences in Technological Culture." Social Studies of Science 
37 (1) (February 1): 143–151. 
———. 2007b. "Dikes and Dams, Thick with Politics." Isis 98 (1) (March 1): 109–123. 
Bijker, Wiebe E., Roland Bal, and Ruud Hendriks. 2009. The Paradox of Scientific 
Authority: The Role of Scientific Advice in Democracies. The MIT Press.
Bijker, Wiebe E., and Karin Bijsterveld. 2000. "Women Walking through Plans: 
Technology, Democracy, and Gender Identity." Technology and Culture 41 (3) 
(July 1): 485–515.
Bijker, Wiebe, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch. 1987. The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. The 
MIT Press.
Bijker, Wiebe, and John Law. 1992. Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in 
Sociotechnical Change. The MIT Press.
Blumer, H. 1954. "What is wrong with social theory?" American Sociological Review, 18: 
3-10.
299
Bodmer, Walter, et al.  1985.  The Public Understanding of Science.  The Royal Society: 
London.
Boholm, Åsa. 2008. "The Public Meeting as a Theatre of Dissent: Risk and Hazard in 
Land Use and Environmental Planning." Journal of Risk Research 11(1):119-140. 
Bonney, Rick, H. Ballard, R. Jordan, et al. 2009. Public Participation in Scientific Research: 
Defining the Field and Assessing Its Potential for Informal Science Education. A CAISE 
Inquiry Group Report. Washington, D.C.: Center for Advancement of 
Informal Science Education (CAISE).
Bowen, Glen. 2006. "Grounded Theory and Sensitizing Concepts." International Journal 
of Qualitative Methods 5 (3): 12–23.
Bowker, Geoﬀrey C., and Susan Leigh Star. 1999. Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its
Consequences. Inside Technology. The MIT Press.
Brain, David. 2005. "From Good Neighborhoods to Sustainable Cities: Social Science 
and the Social Agenda of the New Urbanism." International Regional Science 
Review 28 (2) (April 1): 217–238.
———. 2006. "Democracy and Urban Design: The Transect as Civic Renewal [The 
Transect]." Places 18 (1) (August 1).
Broadbent, Jeﬀrey. 1999. Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest. 1st 
ed. Cambridge University Press.
Brown, Phil. 1987. "Popular Epidemiology: Community Response to Toxic Waste-
Induced Disease in Woburn, Massachusetts." Science, Technology, & Human 
Values 12, no. 3/4: 78-85.
———. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic Waste, Leukemia, and Community Action. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
———. 1992. "Popular Epidemiology and Toxic Waste Contamination: Lay and 
Professional Ways of Knowing." Journal of Health and Social Behavior 33:267-281.
Brunsma, David L., David Overfelt, and J. Steven Picou. 2010 (2007). The sociology of 
Katrina: perspectives on a modern catastrophe, 2nd ed. Rowman & Littlefield.
Bucchi, M. 2008. "Of deficits, deviations, and dialogues: Theories of public 
communication of science," in M. Bucchi & B. Trench (Eds.), Handbook of Public
Communication of Science and Technology (57-76). London: Routledge. 
Burby, Raymond J. 2003. "Making Plans That Matter: Citizen Involvement and 
Government Action." Journal of the American Planning Association 69 (1): 33–49. 
Burby, Raymond J., et al. 1999. "Unleashing the Power of Planning to Create 
Disaster-Resistant Communities." Journal of the American Planning Association 65 
(3): 247–258. 
300
Button, Gregory. 2010. Disaster Culture: Knowledge and Uncertainty in the Wake of Human and
Environmental Catastrophe. Left Coast Press.
Callon, Michel. 1986.  "Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of 
the scallops and the fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay," in J. Law (Ed.), Power, action 
and beliefe: a new sociology of knowledge? (196-223). London: Routledge.
Calvaresi, Claudio, and Linda Cossa. 2013. "A Neighbourhood Laboratory for the 
Regeneration of a Marginalised Suburb in Milan: Towards the Creation of a 
Trading Zone," in Balducci, Alessandro, and Raine Mäntysalo (eds). Urban 
Planning as a Trading Zone. Springer.
Campanella, Richard. 2006. Geographies of New Orleans: Urban Fabrics Before the Storm. 
Center For Louisiana Studies.
———. 2007. "An Ethnic Geography of New Orleans." Journal of American History 94 
(3) (December): 704–715.
———. 2008. Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans. University of 
Louisiana.
Campanella, Thomas J. 2006. "Urban Resilience and the Recovery of New Orleans." 
Journal of the American Planning Association 72 (2): 141–146. 
———. 2012. "Reconsidering Jane Jacobs: The Death and Life of American 
Planning." Places: Design Observer. Accessed September 13, 2013. http:/
/places.designobserver.com/feature/jane-jacobs-and-the-death-and-life-of-
american-planning/25188/.
Clancey, Gregory. 2006a. "The Meiji Earthquake: Nature, Nation, and the 
Ambiguities of Catastrophe." Modern Asian Studies 40:909-951.
———. 2006b. Earthquake Nation: The Cultural Politics of Japanese Seismicity, 1868-1930. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Clarke, Adele E. 1991. "Social Worlds/Arenas Theory as Organizational Theory." 
Social Organization and Social Process: Essays in Honor of Anselm Strauss: 119.
———. 1997. "A Social Worlds Research Adventure." Grounded Theory in Practice: 63–
94.
Clarke, Adele, and Susan Leigh Star. 2008. "The Social Worlds Framework: A 
Theory/methods Package." The Handbook of Science & Technology Studies.
Collins, H. M. 1981. "The Place of the Core-set in Modern Science: Social 
Contingency with Methodological Propriety in Science." History of Science 19 
(March 1): 6–19.
———. 1985. Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (Sage).
Collins, H. M., and Trevor Pinch. 1998. The Golem: What You Should Know about Science. 
2nd ed. Cambridge University Press.
301
Collins, H. M., and Robert Evans. 2002. "The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies
of Expertise and Experience." Social Studies of Science 32:235-296.
———. 2003. "King Canute Meets the Beach Boys: Responses to 'The Third Wave.'" 
Social Studies of Science 33 (3) (June): 435–452.
———. 2007. Rethinking Expertise. Chicago [u.a.: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Collins, H. M., Robert Evans, and Michael Gorman. 2007. "Trading zones and 
interactional expertise." Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A 
38:657-666.
Conley, Shannon N. 2011. "Engagement Agents in the Making: On the Front Lines of
Socio-Technical Integration." Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (4) (December 1): 
715–721. 
Douglass, Mike, and John Friedmann. 1998. Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of 
Civil Society in a Global Age. 1st ed. Academy Press.
Downer, John Richard. 2006. The Burden of Proof: Regulating Reliability in Civil Aviation. 
PhD Dissertation, Cornell University.
———. 2010. "Anatomy of a Disaster: Why Some Accidents are Unavoidable." LSE 
CARR Discussion Paper 61; March 2010; [ISBN 978-0-85328-403-1] Available 
online: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper61.pdf. 
Accessed June 15, 2013.
———. 2011. "'737-Cabriolet': The Limits of Knowledge and the Sociology of 
Inevitable Failure 1." American Journal of Sociology 117 (3) (November): 725–762. 
Dowty, Rachel A., and Barbara L. Allen. 2011. Dynamics of Disaster: Lessons on Risk, 
Response and Recovery. EarthScan.
Durant, Darrin. 2008. "Accounting for expertise: Wynne and the autonomy of the lay 
public actor." Public Understanding of Science, 17(1), 5-20.
Durant, John. 1999. "Participatory Technology Assessment and the Democratic 
Model of the Public Understanding of Science." Science and Public Policy 26 (5): 
313–319.
Durodié, Bill. 2003. "Limitations of Public Dialogue in Science and the Rise of New 
experts." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 6 (4): 82–92. 
Ebrahim, Alnoor, and Edward Weisband. 2007. Global Accountabilities: Participation, 
Pluralism, and Public Ethics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Edgington, David W. 2010. Reconstructing Kobe: The Geography of Crisis and Opportunity. 
Univ. of British Columbia Press.
Endo, Yasuhiro and Miyanishi, Yuji. 1981. "Naihatsu-teki machi-zukuri ni yoru chiku saisei 
katei: Kobe-shi Mano-chiku no kesu-sutadi" (The process of local regeneration by 
internal-type machi-zukuri: a case study of Mano, Kobe), in Yoshioka Kenji and 
302
Sakiyama Kosaku (Eds.) Dai-toshi no suitai to saisei (The decline and regeneration
of cities), Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 137–95.
Epstein, Steven. 1995. "The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism and the 
Forging of Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials," Science, Technology, & 
Human Values 20, no. 4: 408-437.
———. 1996. Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Erikson, Kai. 1978. Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the Buﬀalo Creek Flood. 
reprint. Simon & Schuster.
———. 1995. A New Species of Trouble: The Human Experience of Modern Disasters. W. W. 
Norton & Company.
Evans, Neil. 2002. "Machi-zukuri as a New Paradigm in Japanese Urban Planning: 
Reality or Myth?" Japan Forum 14 (3): 443. 
Fackler, Martin. 2011. "On Stones in Japan, Tsunami Warnings." The New York Times, 
April 20.
———. 2012. "In Japan, Okushiri, Rebuilt After Quake, Is Cautionary Tale." The 
New York Times, January 9.
Felt, Ulrike, Maximilian Fochler, Astrid Mager, and Peter Winkler. 2008. "Visions and
Versions of Governing Biomedicine: Narratives on Power Structures, Decision-
Making and Public Participation in the Field of Biomedical Technology in the 
Austrian Context." Social Studies of Science 38 (2) (April 1): 233–257. 
Felt, Ulrike, and Maximilian Fochler. 2010. "Machineries for Making Publics: 
Inscribing and De-scribing Publics in Public Engagement." Minerva 48:219-238.
Finlay, Mark. 2010. "Far Beyond Tractors: Envirotech and the Intersections of 
Technology, Agriculture, and the Environment." Technology and Culture 
51:480-485.
Fischer, Frank. 2000. Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge. 
Duke University Press.
Fisher, Erik. 2007. "Ethnographic Invention: Probing the Capacity of Laboratory 
Decisions." NanoEthics 1 (2): 155–165.
Fisher, Eric, and Roop L. Mahajan. 2006. "Midstream Modulation of 
Nanotechnology Research in an Academic Laboratory." Proceedings of ASME 
International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition (IMECE), 1–7. 
———. 2010. "Embedding the Humanities in Engineering: Art, Dialogue, and a 
Laboratory." In Trading Zones and Interactional Expertise, edited by Michael E. 
Gorman, 209–230. The MIT Press. 
303
Fisher, Erik, Roop L. Mahajan, and Carl Mitcham. 2006. "Midstream Modulation of 
Technology: Governance From Within." Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 
26 (6) (December 1): 485–496. 
Forester, John, Ken Reardon, Andrew Rumbach, Efrem Bycer, and Praj Kasbekar. 
2008. "Introduction: Making a Diﬀerence in Response to Hurricane Katrina." 
Planning Theory & Practice 9(4):517-564. 
Fortun, Kim. 2001. Advocacy after Bhopal: Environmentalism, Disaster, New Global Orders. 1st 
ed. University Of Chicago Press.
Fortun, Kim, and Scott Frickel. 2012. "Making a Case for Disaster Science and 
Technology Studies." An STS Forum on Fukushima. http:/
/fukushimaforum.wordpress.com/online-forum/making-a-case-for-disaster-
science-and-technology-studies/.
Freudenburg, William R., Robert B. Gramling, Shirley Laska, and Kai Erikson. 2009. 
Catastrophe in the Making: The Engineering of Katrina and the Disasters of Tomorrow. 
Shearwater.
Frickel, Scott, and M. Bess Vincent. 2007. "Hurricane Katrina, Contamination, and 
the Unintended Organization of Ignorance." Technology in Society 29 (2) (April): 
181–188. 
Friedmann, John. 1992. Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development. Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell.
Fujimura, Joan H. 1992. "Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary 
Objects, and 'translation.'" Science as Practice and Culture: 168–211.
Funck, Carolin.  2007.  "Machi-zukuri, civil society, and the transformation of Japanese 
city planning," in Sorensen, André and Carolin Funck, eds, Living Cities in 
Japan: Citizens' Movements, Machizukuri and Local Environments. London: Routledge:
137-156.
Funtowicz, Silvio O, and Jerome R Ravetz. 1990. Uncertainty and Quality in Science for 
Policy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Galison, Peter Louis. 1997. Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics. University 
Of Chicago Press.
———. 1999. "Trading zones: coordinating action and belief," in M. Biagioli (ed) The 
Science Studies Reader. Routledge, New York/London: 137–160.
———. 2010. "Trading with the enemy," in M. Gorman (ed) Trading Zones and 
Interactional Expertise: Creating New Kinds of Collaboration. Inside Technology. The 
MIT Press.
———. 2013. "Trading plans," in A. Balducci and R. Mäntysalo (eds) Urban Planning 
as a Trading Zone. Springer.
304
Ganapati, N.  Emel, and Sukumar Ganapati. 2009. "Enabling Participatory Planning 
After Disasters: A Case Study of the World Bank's Housing Reconstruction in 
Turkey." Journal of the American Planning Association 75 (1): 41–59. 
Gardels, Nathan. 2011. "The Silver Lining of Japan's Earthquake." Christian Science 
Monitor, March 14. 
Garfinkel, H. 1963. "A Conception of, and Experiments with, 'Trust' as a Condition 
for Stable Concerted Actions," in O.J. Harvey (ed.) Motivation and Social 
Interaction. New York: Ronald Press: 187–238.
George, Timothy S. 2001. Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy in Postwar 
Japan. Harvard East Asian Monographs 194. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard 
University Asia Center.
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford University Press.
———. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge,
U.K.: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell.
Gieryn, Thomas F. 1983. "Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from 
Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists." 
American Sociological Review 48(6):781-795. 
———. 2002. "What Buildings Do." Theory and Society 31 (1) (February 1): 35–74.
Glenday, Craig. 2012. Guinness World Records 2012. New York: Bantam Books.
Goﬀman, Erving. 1955. "On Face-work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social 
Interaction." Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes 18: 213–231.
———. 1967. Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behavior. Aldine Transaction.
Goldstein, Bruce Evan. 2012. Collaborative Resilience Moving through Crisis to Opportunity. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Gorman, Michael E. 2008. "Trading Zones, Moral Imagination and Socially Sensitive
Computing." Foundations of Science 13 (1).
———. 2010. Trading Zones and Interactional Expertise: Creating New Kinds of Collaboration. 
Inside Technology. The MIT Press.
———. 2011. "Doing Science, Technology and Society in the National Science 
Foundation." Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (4) (December 1): 839–849. 
Gorman, Michael E., Patricia H. Werhane, and Nathan Swami. 2009. "Moral 
Imagination, Trading Zones, and the Role of the Ethicist in Nanotechnology." 
NanoEthics 3 (3) (September): 185–195. 
Grant-Smith, Deanna, and Peter B. Edwards. 2011. "It Takes More than Good 
Intentions: Institutional and Attitudinal Impediments to Engaging Young 
People in Participatory Planning." Journal of Public Deliberation 7 (1): 11.
305
Haas, J. Eugene, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden. 1977. Reconstruction 
Following Disaster. The MIT Press.
Haraway, D. 1988. "Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the 
privilege of partial perspective." Feminist studies 14(3):575–599.
Hård, Mikael, and Thomas J. Misa. 2008. Urban Machinery: Inside Modern European Cities.
MIT Press.
Harding, Sandra. 1986. The Science Question in Feminism, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
———. 1991. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
———. 1991 (2001). "Feminist Standpoint Epistemology", in Muriel Lederman and 
Ingrid Bartsch (eds.), The Gender and Science Reader, pp.145-68.
———. 1993. "Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objectivity?" 
Feminist Epistemologies, Linda Alcoﬀ and Elizabeth Potter (eds.), New York: 
Routledge, 49–82.
Harvey, David. 2008. "The Right to the City." New Left Review (53) (October): 23–40.
Hayashi, Yoshitaka. 1994. "Tsunami Disaster Caused by 1993 Earthquake in 
Northern Part of Japan Sea." Journal of Coastal Research 10 (3) (July 1): 775–781.
Hein, Carola. 2001. "Toshikeikaku and Machizukuri in Japanese Urban Planning - the 
Reconstruction of Inner City Neighborhoods in Kobe." Jahrbuch Des DIJ 
(Deutsches Institut Für Japanstudien) (13): 221–252.
Henke, Christopher R. 2007. "Situation Normal? Repairing a Risky Ecology." Social 
Studies of Science 37:135-142. 
Hilgartner, Stephen. 1990. "The Dominant View of Popularization: Conceptual 
Problems, Political Uses." Social Studies of Science 20 (3) (August 1): 519–539.
———. 2000. Science on Stage: Expert Advice as Public Drama. Stanford University Press.
———. 2007. "Overflow and Containment in the Aftermath of Disaster." Social Studies
of Science 37:153-158.
Hirayama, Yosuke. 2000. "Collapse and Reconstruction: Housing Recovery Policy in 
Kobe After the Hanshin Great Earthquake." Housing Studies 15 (1): 111–128. 
Hirohara, Moriaki. 1989. "Senshin-teki machi-zukuri undo to chōnai-kai: Kobe-shi Maruyama, 
Mano, Fujisawa-shi Tsujidō-nanbu no hikaku kōsatsu" (Progressive machi-zukuri 
movements and neighborhood associations: a comparative study of Maruyama 
and Mano, Kobe, and Tsujido-nanbu, Fujisawa), in Iwasaki Nobuhiko (Ed.) 
Chōnaikai no Kenkyū (Neighborhood Associations Research), Tokyo: 
Ochanomizu Shobo, 324–61.
306
Ho, David Yau-fai. 1976. "On the Concept of Face." American Journal of Sociology 81 (4) 
(January 1): 867–884.
Hommels, Anique. 2005a. "Studying Obduracy in the City: Toward a Productive 
Fusion between Technology Studies and Urban Studies." Science, Technology & 
Human Values 30:323 -351.
———. 2005b. Unbuilding Cities: Obduracy in Urban Sociotechnical Change. The MIT Press.
Honjo, Yuichi. 2011. "Implementation of Kobe City Recovery Plan." Japan Social 
Innovation Journal 1 (1): 1–11.
Honjo, Yuichi, Yasuo Tanaka, and Chusaku Yasuda. 2010. "Comprehensive Strategy 
for Recovery from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake". Kobe, Japan: Kobe 
City. http://www.city.kobe.lg.jp/safety/hanshinawaji/revival/promote/img/
English.pdf.
Honma, Yoshihito. 1994. Machi-zukuri no Shiso: Doboku Shakai kara Shimin Shakai e (The 
ideology of machi-zukuri: from a public works society to a civil society), Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku.
Horst, Maja, and Alan Irwin. 2010. "Nations at Ease with Radical Knowledge On 
Consensus, Consensusing and False Consensusness." Social Studies of Science 40 
(1) (February 1): 105–126. 
Hughes, Thomas Parke. 1969 "Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation 
in Germany 1898-1933", Past and Present, No. 44: 106–132.
———. 1983. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
———. 1989.  "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems," in Bijker, Wiebe, 
Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch. The Social Construction of Technological 
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. The MIT Press.
———. 1994. "Technological momentum," in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx 
(eds), Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, MIT 
Press: 101–113.
———. 2004. Human-Built World: How to Think about Technology and Culture. University of
Chicago Press.
Hyōgo Prefecture. 2013. "Hanshin-Awaji Dai-Shinsai kara no fukkō no jōkyō" ("Status of 
recovery from Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake").
Innes, Judith Eleanor, and David E. Booher. 2004. Reframing Public Participation: 
Strategies for the 21st Century. Institute of Urban and Regional Development, 
University of California, Berkeley.
Irwin, Alan. 1994. "Review: Science and Its Publics: Continuity and Change in the 
Risk Society." Social Studies of Science 24 (1) (February): 168–184.
307
———. 1995. Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development. 
London: Routledge.
———. 2001. "Constructing the scientific citizen: Science and democracy in the 
biosciences." Public Understanding of Science 10(1):1-18.
———. 2006. "The Politics of Talk: Coming to Terms with the 'New' Scientific 
Governance." Social Studies of Science 36 (2) (April): 299–320.
Irwin, Alan, Torben Elgaard Jensen, and Kevin E. Jones. 2013. "The Good, the Bad 
and the Perfect: Criticizing Engagement Practice." Social Studies of Science 43 (1) 
(February 1): 118–135. 
Irwin, Alan, and Brian Wynne. 1996. Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of
Science and Technology. Cambridge University Press.
Ishikawa, Eiko. 2012. "The Process of Drawing Up Reconstruction Plans in Extensive 
Disaster-Hit Areas: Including Community Relocation and Challenges in the 
Implementation of Plans." Working Paper, Disaster Reduction and Human 
Renovation Institution.
Ito Atsuko. 1996. " 'Shinsai fukko machi-zukuri' ni okeru jūmin no ishi kettei katei: Rokkōmichi eki
minami-chiku no jirei" (The decision-making process of residents within 'disaster 
reconstruction machi-zukuri:' the case of the Rokkōmichi Station South Area), 
Shakaigaku Zasshi Vol. 14, Kobe: Kobe Daigaku Shakaigaku Kenkyukai, 258–
71.
———. 2000. " 'Fukko machi-zukuri' no tenkai to 'machi-zukuri kyōgikai' no kanōsei: Kobe-shi 
Nada-ku Rokkōmichi eki shuhen o jirei toshite" (The development of 'reconstruction 
machi-zukuri' and the possibilities for 'machi-zukuri councils': the Rokkōmichi 
Station area, Nada Ward, Kobe, as an example), in Shakaigaku Zasshi Vol. 17, 
Kobe: Kobe Daigaku Shakaigaku Kenkyukai, 117–36.
———.  2007. "Earthquake reconstruction machi-zukuri and citizen participation," in 
Sorensen, André and Carolin Funck, eds, Living Cities in Japan: Citizens' 
Movements, Machizukuri and Local Environments. London: Routledge: 157-171.
Ishikawa, Eiko, Hirotaka Ikeda, Masahiro Sawada, and Itsuki Nakabayashi. 2008. 
"Case of Reconstructed Villages from the Mid Niigata Earthquake." Journal of 
the City Planning Institute of Japan 43: 122.
Jackson, Roland, Fiona Barbagallo, and Helen Haste. 2005. "Strengths of Public 
Dialogue on Science‐related Issues." Critical Review of International Social and 
Political Philosophy 8 (3): 349–358. 
Jacobs, Jane. 1992 (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Vintage.
Jameson, Sam. 1995. "JAPAN : Kobe Faltering Despite Hopes : A Construction Boom 
Has Failed to Develop after Killer Quake Shook Economy." Los Angeles Times. 
September 29.
308
Japanese Red Cross Society.  2007.  "Higai no jōkyō" (Damage conditions).  Nippon 
Sekijujisha (Japanese Red Cross Society).  
Jasanoﬀ, Sheila. 1994. Learning from Disaster: Risk Management After Bhopal. University of 
Pennsylvania Press.
———. 2003a. "Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing 
Science.." Minerva: A Review of Science, Learning & Policy 41:223.
———. 2003b. "Breaking the Waves in Science Studies: Comment on H.M. Collins 
and Robert Evans, 'The Third Wave of Science Studies.'" Social Studies of Science 
33 (3) (June): 389–400.
———. 2004. States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and the Social Order. 
Routledge.
———. 2006.  "Technology as a Site and an Object of Politics."  Pp. 745-763 in 
Goodin, Robert E. and Charles Tilly, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 
Political Analysis.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2011. "Constitutional Moments in Governing Science and Technology." 
Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (4) (December 1): 621–638. 
Jasanoﬀ, Sheila, Gerald Markle, James Peterson, and Trevor Pinch. 1995. Handbook of 
Science and Technology Studies. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.
Jasanoﬀ, Sheila, and Sang-Hyun Kim. 2009. "Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical 
Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea." 
Minerva 47:119-146.
Johnson, Chalmers A. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy :
1925-1975. Stanford University Press.
Johnson, Laurie A., and Robert B. Olshansky. 2010. Clear as Mud: Planning for the 
Rebuilding of New Orleans. American Planning Association (Planners Press).
Joly, Pierre-Benoit, and Alain Kaufmann. 2008. "Lost in Translation? The Need for 
'upstream Engagement'with Nanotechnology on Trial." Science as Culture 17 (3): 
225–247.
Jones, Bernie. 1990. Neighborhood Planning: A Guide for Citizens and Planners. American 
Planning Association (Planners Press).
Juraku, Kohta, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Osamu Sakura. 2007. "Social Decision-Making 
Processes in Local Contexts: An STS Case Study on Nuclear Power Plant 
Siting in Japan." East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal 1 
(1) (December 1): 53–75. 
Kalland, Arne. 1995. Fishing Villages in Tokugawa, Japan. University of Hawaii Press.
———. 1996. "Geomancy and Town Planning in a Japanese Community." Ethnology 
35 (1) (January 1): 17–32.
309
Karakuwa Chōshi Hensan Iinkai (Miyagi Prefecture), and Hisashi Sasa. 1968. 
Karakuwa-Chō Shi. (A History of Karakuwa Township.) Karakuwa Township (Miyagi
Prefecture).
Kesennuma City. 2011. Kesennuma-shi Saigai Fukkō Keikaku: Umi to Ikiru (Kesennuma 
City Disaster Recovery Plan: To Live with the Sea). 
Kimura, Shuhei. 2012. "Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake: The Public 
Use of Anthropological Knowledge." Asian Anthropology 11 (1): 65–74. 
Kinmokusei International Project. 1999. Key Terminology in Restoration from Hanshin 
Earthquake Disaster (English Version). http://www.gakugei-pub.jp/kobe/key_e/. 
Accessed December 3, 2013.
Kinmokusei. 1999. Fukkō Machi-Zukuri Kī-waado Shū (Nihongo Ban) (Recovery Machi-
Zukuri Keyword Compilation, Japanese Version). http://www.gakugei-
pub.jp/kobe/key/index.htm. Accessed August 10, 2013.
Kleinman, Daniel Lee. 2000. Science, Technology, and Democracy. State University of New 
York Press.
Kline, Ronald, and Trevor Pinch. 1996. "Users as Agents of Technological Change: 
The Social Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States." 
Technology and Culture 37:763-795.
Klinenberg, Eric. 2003. Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago. University Of 
Chicago Press.
Kobayashi, Ikuo, ed. 1998. Jishin Fukkō ga Oshieru Machi-Zukuri no Shōrai: Hanshin-Awaji 
Dai-Shinsai (Earthquake recovery teaches the future of machi-zukuri: Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake). Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppansha.
———. 2007. "Machizukuri (Community Development) for Recovery Whose Leading 
Role Citizens Play." Journal of Disaster Research 2 (5): 359–371.
Kobe City.  2011.  "Hanshin-Awaji daishinsai hisai jokyo oyobi fukko e no torikumi jokyo" (The 
circumstances of victims as well as of the struggle toward recovery).  http:/
/www.city.kobe.lg.jp/safety/hanshinawaji/revival/promote/.
Konno, Hiroaki. 1991. "Dai-toshi suitai chiku ni okeru 'machi-zukuri' to jūmin no taio: 
Kobe-shi Mano-chiku no jirei" ('Machi-zukuri' and the response of residents 
within inner-city areas: the case of Mano, Kobe), Akita Daigaku Kyoiku-gakubu 
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